J'ai un entretien la semaine prochaine pour un programme en Chine et afin de me préparer j'ai commencé à me mettre dans la littérature un peu. Vu que la plupart des livres à la bibliothèque de l'Assemblée nationale sont en français, j'ai lu une traduction d'un bouquin écrit en anglais par Mark Leonard qui est le directeur exécutif du European Council on Foreign Relations, ce que je trouve assez bête, mais oui.
Le livre m'est fasciné. Leonard essaie de montrer la discussion économique et politique comment elle prend place en Chine. Fascinant, parce que:
Nous ne cessions de nous passionner pour les idées des différentes factions de la vie intellectuelle américaine [...] mais lequel d'entre nous peut nommer plus d'une poignée d'écrivains ou de penseurs chinois contemporain ?
La première clivage discuté est sur le champ économique où la nouvelle droite chinoise est favorable à une continuation de la politique de dérégulation commencée par Deng Xiaoping dans les années 80. Ce groupe se voit opposé par la nouvelle gauche chinoise qui veut accentuer plutôt la inégalité qui a été le prix de la croissance chinoise ces derniers 30 ans. Même si cela semble assez similaire de la discussion européenne voire américaine, elle est évidemment très différente déjà à cause des systèmes politiques incomparable.
Leonard discute les expérimentes démocratique dont la Chine s'engage dans certaines provinces sur des échelles locales (en sort une dictature délibérative). Il montre aussi la discussion au sein des experts des relations internationales. La militarisation asymétrique de la Chine, vu comme la seule tactique valable contre les Etats-Unis. L'accentuation du pouvoir attractif (soft power) sur lequel la Chine pourrait baser sa émergence. Il réclame finalement un monde hérissé de murailles comme la conception de la Chine opposée directement de l'idée américaine d'un monde plat.
De nouveau, très fascinant ce livre. Facile à lire et on a l'impression de gagner un bref aperçu sur la discussion chinoise. Qu'est-ce qu'il y a à critiquer? Leonard reste (nécessairement probablement) très superficiel. Le livre sert comme une introduction mais rien plus que ça. La langage simple est facilement accessible du bouquin aide à la compréhension, mais au même temps j'ai l'impression qu'il oblige à une sur-simplification parfois. Cela est peut-être fait par volonté car il me semble comme si le livre n'est pas nécessairement écrit pour une audience scientifique seulement. En tout cas, il vaut la peine.
Monday, April 20, 2009
Thursday, April 16, 2009
Twilight
I read William Gay's short story collection i hate to see that evening sun go down (the title being a reference to the WC Handy song most famously covered by Bessie Smith with Louis Armstrong playing the cornet) a few years ago and I believe I actually wrote an essay on one of those stories for a literature class of mine back in Austria. More importantly though I had sat in on an interview my dad did with him in Hohenwald, Tennessee (check out this photo if you care to see the friends we made there while having breakfast). Southern, gothic literature at its finest. The old Faulkner comparisons are most definitely overdone, but still valid in this case.
I couldn't resist buying the book while I was in a store getting a present for a friend and considered as a treat in between my regular consumption of French and scientific literature (nothing against either of those, but I have to admit that my heart still lies with good, ol'-fashioned Southern writing). I even read the book the way you would consume a piece of candy that pleases your taste buds and that you are afraid to let go, even while sucking hard on it and getting pleasure out of it will let it fade away far too quick. Sometimes I wish I'd spend my life reading books like this.
Now, in order to actually say something, anything about the novel. It is great. A page-turner without being dumb, exciting without being cheap. Gay's stories are violent. He writes about common folk in the rural South of first half of the 20th century. Yet, his heroes are beset by evil and by the inertia of institutions and public figures. I realize I am not making much sense, but there is a reason I have not become a literary critic of professor. Read him (it), he (it) is worth it.
I couldn't resist buying the book while I was in a store getting a present for a friend and considered as a treat in between my regular consumption of French and scientific literature (nothing against either of those, but I have to admit that my heart still lies with good, ol'-fashioned Southern writing). I even read the book the way you would consume a piece of candy that pleases your taste buds and that you are afraid to let go, even while sucking hard on it and getting pleasure out of it will let it fade away far too quick. Sometimes I wish I'd spend my life reading books like this.
Now, in order to actually say something, anything about the novel. It is great. A page-turner without being dumb, exciting without being cheap. Gay's stories are violent. He writes about common folk in the rural South of first half of the 20th century. Yet, his heroes are beset by evil and by the inertia of institutions and public figures. I realize I am not making much sense, but there is a reason I have not become a literary critic of professor. Read him (it), he (it) is worth it.
Thursday, April 02, 2009
Voyages dans le Reich
J'ai trouvé cette collection par hasard à la bibliothèque de l'Assemblée et je l'aurais jamais lu en français normalement vu que beaucoup des textes ont été traduits de l'allemand ou de l'anglais. Mais, même sous cette considération, l'œuvre, compilée par Oliver Lubrich, est recommandable. Effectivement et comme le titre implique Lubrich a amassé des textes des étrangers voyageant en Allemagne de 1933 à 1945, dont les auteurs connus (C. Isherwood, M. Frisch, V. Woolf, A. Camus) et moins connus (un étudiant chinois, la fille de l'ambassadeur américain, des journalistes).
Les textes soi-même varient beaucoup en longueur et style, ils sont tous plus ou moins littéraire mais certains sont beaucoup plus biographique que des autres. Et, comme toujours dans une collection, certains textes sont simplement meilleur que des autres. Mais en général je peux dire que ces écrivains offrent une perspective fascinante sur l'Allemagne et les allemands de l'époque. Certains entre eux se montre intrigué par le fascisme, mais même leurs descriptions (avec l'intention de flatter) réussissent à faire peur du climat à l'époque.
Depuis toujours, l'être allemand, tant l'individu que le peuple dans son entier, hésite entre la peur de l'infériorité et une confiance en soi exagérée. Je n'adhère pas aux préjugés trop simple comme celle je viens de citer, mais elle m'a fait rire quand même. Et finalement, si vous l'avez pas encore remarqué en lisant ce blog ou en me parlant:
D'habitude, le Berlinoi aime commenter.
Les textes soi-même varient beaucoup en longueur et style, ils sont tous plus ou moins littéraire mais certains sont beaucoup plus biographique que des autres. Et, comme toujours dans une collection, certains textes sont simplement meilleur que des autres. Mais en général je peux dire que ces écrivains offrent une perspective fascinante sur l'Allemagne et les allemands de l'époque. Certains entre eux se montre intrigué par le fascisme, mais même leurs descriptions (avec l'intention de flatter) réussissent à faire peur du climat à l'époque.
Depuis toujours, l'être allemand, tant l'individu que le peuple dans son entier, hésite entre la peur de l'infériorité et une confiance en soi exagérée. Je n'adhère pas aux préjugés trop simple comme celle je viens de citer, mais elle m'a fait rire quand même. Et finalement, si vous l'avez pas encore remarqué en lisant ce blog ou en me parlant:
D'habitude, le Berlinoi aime commenter.
Europe continued
I am actually decently busy at work, so let's keep this short, even if it would be fun to engage in something a bit more fundamental. (IPE)
Europe as a whole does not have a military of course (the battle groups are ready by now, but let's pass on that). It is not true that Europe always has been divided on these issues (even if I of course adhere to the more general point that this is too frequently, if not to say usually, the case), Afghanistan seems to be the most striking counter example. The point I was trying to make here is that Europe's militaries would suffice to act against virtually everyone (with a few notable exceptions that apply to the US as well). Basically, Europe's armies are powerless only when compared to the US and why should Europe even try to compete with its closest ally?
It is clear that the provision of security for Europe by the US has greatly widened the range of possibilities for European social policy decision-making. Europe paid back through a lack of foreign policy independence though (Suez being only the most prominent example).
I did realize that the post was mainly geared towards economics, I guess I just enjoy looking at security and foreign policy more. Anyways. I think it is important to note that most people in Europe don't believe in the necessity of more fiscal stimulus (rightly or wrongly - I tend to believe they are wrong, but that's besides the point really). They are not asking the US to provide further stimulus to their economy even if they will take the continuing exports of course (and the German obliviousness to their problematic status as Exportweltmeister shall not even be further explored). The crisis is seen as having originated in the US alone (again, rightly or wrongly, I tend to believe there is a point to this, but again, that doesn't really matter) and people ask themselves why they should help bail out an unregulated overly-capitalistic giant (it would be a pretty hard political sell as well btw). I am not quite sure then whether it can be called free-riding if you do something I don't think I necessarily need, even when it benefits me to some extent.
The IMF:
diplomats say that the strongest opposition to thorough IMF reforms currently comes from the US – reluctant to give up its de facto ability to veto IMF decisions – rather than Europe. (CER)
I don't remember where I read this, but the US also refuses to discuss supranational structures in order to oversee the international financial system (which is not surprising considering the differing attitudes (modern/post-modern) in the US and Europe). I thus simply have a hard time seeing how the American position is more cooperative than the European one. You can of course argue that the European positions are wrong and that Europe should come around to the American ones, but that's not cooperation anymore then. In fact that'd smell suspiciously like the same old (admittedly benign) coercion.
Europe as a whole does not have a military of course (the battle groups are ready by now, but let's pass on that). It is not true that Europe always has been divided on these issues (even if I of course adhere to the more general point that this is too frequently, if not to say usually, the case), Afghanistan seems to be the most striking counter example. The point I was trying to make here is that Europe's militaries would suffice to act against virtually everyone (with a few notable exceptions that apply to the US as well). Basically, Europe's armies are powerless only when compared to the US and why should Europe even try to compete with its closest ally?
It is clear that the provision of security for Europe by the US has greatly widened the range of possibilities for European social policy decision-making. Europe paid back through a lack of foreign policy independence though (Suez being only the most prominent example).
I did realize that the post was mainly geared towards economics, I guess I just enjoy looking at security and foreign policy more. Anyways. I think it is important to note that most people in Europe don't believe in the necessity of more fiscal stimulus (rightly or wrongly - I tend to believe they are wrong, but that's besides the point really). They are not asking the US to provide further stimulus to their economy even if they will take the continuing exports of course (and the German obliviousness to their problematic status as Exportweltmeister shall not even be further explored). The crisis is seen as having originated in the US alone (again, rightly or wrongly, I tend to believe there is a point to this, but again, that doesn't really matter) and people ask themselves why they should help bail out an unregulated overly-capitalistic giant (it would be a pretty hard political sell as well btw). I am not quite sure then whether it can be called free-riding if you do something I don't think I necessarily need, even when it benefits me to some extent.
The IMF:
diplomats say that the strongest opposition to thorough IMF reforms currently comes from the US – reluctant to give up its de facto ability to veto IMF decisions – rather than Europe. (CER)
I don't remember where I read this, but the US also refuses to discuss supranational structures in order to oversee the international financial system (which is not surprising considering the differing attitudes (modern/post-modern) in the US and Europe). I thus simply have a hard time seeing how the American position is more cooperative than the European one. You can of course argue that the European positions are wrong and that Europe should come around to the American ones, but that's not cooperation anymore then. In fact that'd smell suspiciously like the same old (admittedly benign) coercion.
Wednesday, April 01, 2009
Bashing Europe
Well, well, well.
Now I am the last one not to criticize European leaders for their lack of action and coordination, but I do feel that some criticism leveled at Europe from the US (conveniently?) forgets to put into account some aspects of European contributions.
1 - Europe (as a whole) has by far the second most impressive military in the world. Would Americans really want the EU to start competing with them too?
2 - American security provision exists only when American (hegemonic if you want) interests are concerned (see the lack of activity in Albania and Macedonia). Plus, if that provision includes starting (or continuing) unnecessary wars all over the place (Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Iraq to name just a few) I have to wonder why European accounts should even be charged for it.
3 - For the war that Europe supported (Afghanistan) Europeans have provided nearly as many troops as the US did.
4 - If you put development aid into account, European spending on world affairs is not really all that much smaller than that of the US.
5 - Without European support (intelligence, infrastructure) wars such as in Iraq would be virtually impossible for the US or in the least far more expensive (in political and financial terms).
What else? Criticism from the US that Europe is only willing to coordinate on their terms is quite amusing of course (Kyoto anyone? the ICC?), I am not even going to really comment on that.
I could try to respond to some of the more specific accusations against the European (non-)activities on economic/financial questions. Let it suffice to say that some American beliefs simply are not shared by a large majority of European politicians (fiscal stimulus!) so why should they adapt their policies in order to please a partner with whom they disagree? And that the difference between $99,7 million and $100 million is not something that I would describe with the word chunk.
One last, and more important, note though. I understand some of the criticism leveled at Europe (if not its tone), but all those people clamoring for more European contributions hopefully realize one thing: It'll come at a cost. Europe having its own security/defense forces will not let itself be pushed around by the US on foreign policy issues. The same is true for virtually every policy field. Be sure you know what you wish for is all I can say. Me, I think Iraq, this crisis, the G20 all mark very much the twilight of the American unipolar moment.
Now I am the last one not to criticize European leaders for their lack of action and coordination, but I do feel that some criticism leveled at Europe from the US (conveniently?) forgets to put into account some aspects of European contributions.
1 - Europe (as a whole) has by far the second most impressive military in the world. Would Americans really want the EU to start competing with them too?
2 - American security provision exists only when American (hegemonic if you want) interests are concerned (see the lack of activity in Albania and Macedonia). Plus, if that provision includes starting (or continuing) unnecessary wars all over the place (Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Iraq to name just a few) I have to wonder why European accounts should even be charged for it.
3 - For the war that Europe supported (Afghanistan) Europeans have provided nearly as many troops as the US did.
4 - If you put development aid into account, European spending on world affairs is not really all that much smaller than that of the US.
5 - Without European support (intelligence, infrastructure) wars such as in Iraq would be virtually impossible for the US or in the least far more expensive (in political and financial terms).
What else? Criticism from the US that Europe is only willing to coordinate on their terms is quite amusing of course (Kyoto anyone? the ICC?), I am not even going to really comment on that.
I could try to respond to some of the more specific accusations against the European (non-)activities on economic/financial questions. Let it suffice to say that some American beliefs simply are not shared by a large majority of European politicians (fiscal stimulus!) so why should they adapt their policies in order to please a partner with whom they disagree? And that the difference between $99,7 million and $100 million is not something that I would describe with the word chunk.
One last, and more important, note though. I understand some of the criticism leveled at Europe (if not its tone), but all those people clamoring for more European contributions hopefully realize one thing: It'll come at a cost. Europe having its own security/defense forces will not let itself be pushed around by the US on foreign policy issues. The same is true for virtually every policy field. Be sure you know what you wish for is all I can say. Me, I think Iraq, this crisis, the G20 all mark very much the twilight of the American unipolar moment.
Friday, March 20, 2009
AIG-Bonuses
The House has passed a bill taxing the bonuses AIG gave out after it had passed into the government's hands 90% (NY Times). This kind of retroactive action seems problematic to me (apart from the fact that it is nothing but populist policy and additionally unimportant in the big scheme of things (Drezner) from a credibility point of view. The Economist criticizes it from a political point of view, IPE at UNC for more economical reasons (it were to encourage excessive risk-taking; drive the best and brightest employees from firms under government control and set a [dangerous?] precedent of retroactive punitive tax policy).
While I agree with the assessment that this macroeconomically irrelevant, I believe that symbolic politics matter and I also have a hard time believing in the danger of driving the best and the brightest away, if only because it reminds of Kennedy's administration which delivered so far less than it had promised it's not even funny anymore. On a more general level I simply don't believe there is a big difference in quality at the top of any game or profession. You might have a few dominating people (Jordan, King James), but the difference between some random power forward playing in Spain and the guy on the bench behind David Lee is just not that big I believe. If you apply this to the business world, it follows that the guys driven away from AIG (or any other government owned/funded financial company) will only marginally (if at all) be better than those taking over. This especially considering that the best and the brightest, did not really produce.
To make a final and larger point, I believe that this whole discussion points out an apparently system-inherent problematic of the capitalist system as it exists in the United States. Abstracting from the macroeconomic irrelevance of this issue and the potentially negative impact of this retroactive decision, I think it is obvious that the AIG-employees did not deserve these bonuses, after all their company failed and had to be bailed out by the government. How is it possible that they receive bonuses for their work if they fail at it? Do go back to an illustrative example, does a construction worker receive a bonus after the building he worked on crumbles? Does the UNC team of last year receive an extra car per player from some booster because they lost against Kansas? This evidently is a problematic situation and this is the case, because there is no sufficient oversight in these financial (and other business) institutions. Evidently, if I determine my own salary and that of my colleagues and friends I will pay myself more than I am worth, after all that is a normal human reflex. I am not familiar enough with the administrative construction of these companies to suggest anything here or even to criticize them in a more precise manner, but it seems obvious that something is afoul (and not just morally) in a systematic manner if something like these bonuses are given out. Especially, because this is not the first time something like this takes place.
While I agree with the assessment that this macroeconomically irrelevant, I believe that symbolic politics matter and I also have a hard time believing in the danger of driving the best and the brightest away, if only because it reminds of Kennedy's administration which delivered so far less than it had promised it's not even funny anymore. On a more general level I simply don't believe there is a big difference in quality at the top of any game or profession. You might have a few dominating people (Jordan, King James), but the difference between some random power forward playing in Spain and the guy on the bench behind David Lee is just not that big I believe. If you apply this to the business world, it follows that the guys driven away from AIG (or any other government owned/funded financial company) will only marginally (if at all) be better than those taking over. This especially considering that the best and the brightest, did not really produce.
To make a final and larger point, I believe that this whole discussion points out an apparently system-inherent problematic of the capitalist system as it exists in the United States. Abstracting from the macroeconomic irrelevance of this issue and the potentially negative impact of this retroactive decision, I think it is obvious that the AIG-employees did not deserve these bonuses, after all their company failed and had to be bailed out by the government. How is it possible that they receive bonuses for their work if they fail at it? Do go back to an illustrative example, does a construction worker receive a bonus after the building he worked on crumbles? Does the UNC team of last year receive an extra car per player from some booster because they lost against Kansas? This evidently is a problematic situation and this is the case, because there is no sufficient oversight in these financial (and other business) institutions. Evidently, if I determine my own salary and that of my colleagues and friends I will pay myself more than I am worth, after all that is a normal human reflex. I am not familiar enough with the administrative construction of these companies to suggest anything here or even to criticize them in a more precise manner, but it seems obvious that something is afoul (and not just morally) in a systematic manner if something like these bonuses are given out. Especially, because this is not the first time something like this takes place.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Lettres à un ami allemand
Je suis tombé sur ce livre l'autre jour par hasard et vu qu'il n'a que ~80 pages, je l'ai lu ces derniers jours. Il est très sympa. Albert Camus écrit des lettres à un ami allemand, quelqu'un avec qui il avait une relation amicale avant la guerre, avec qui il avait discuté sur la politique, sur la nation, sur le monde. Il montre comment et dans quelle mesure lui (et son peuple en général) aurait été tenté par quelques aspects de la philosophie de cet ami allemand (sans doute un militant des Nazis), mais il montre surtout pourquoi cette perception du monde a tort. Comment elle va inévitablement perdre et pourquoi la France (ou l'occident démocrate) va finir par vaincre son ennemi. Les essais (il y a quatre lettres en total) sont d'une beauté remarquable, je les ai trouvé très agréable à lire et très persuadant sur nu niveau philosophique.
Mon seul problème avec cet oeuvre est lié à mon point de vue cynique habituel. Cela veut dire que même si je suis bien d'accord sur la suprématie de la pensée de Camus envers la pensée des Nazis je ne suis pas convaincu que la victoire de la France (ni les alliés en général) a été inévitable. Je ne crois pas à une victoire nécessaire du bien sur le mal. Je voudrais bien y croire évidemment, mais je ne peux pas.
Mon seul problème avec cet oeuvre est lié à mon point de vue cynique habituel. Cela veut dire que même si je suis bien d'accord sur la suprématie de la pensée de Camus envers la pensée des Nazis je ne suis pas convaincu que la victoire de la France (ni les alliés en général) a été inévitable. Je ne crois pas à une victoire nécessaire du bien sur le mal. Je voudrais bien y croire évidemment, mais je ne peux pas.
Thursday, March 05, 2009
Currency Appreciation and the Iraqi Insurgency
I had already linked to this paper (props to IPE at UNC for making me aware of its existence) a few days ago and only got around to truly reading it this morning. Amazing paper. Seriously. Read it! It might very well have no validity, or its underlying thesis might be accurate yet have had no true impact or not a big one, in any case its impact is not measurable. But fascinating concept
The authors argue that the decline in insurgency activity in Iraq (measured by for example the number of American and Iraqi (solider and civilian) deaths) has been accompanied by a strong appreciation of the Iraqi and that the two are in fact linked. Why? The underlying assumption is that the civilian population will be willing to aid (if passively as in not aiding the counter-insurgency forces) an insurgency if they accrue a net benefit through its activities. The insurgents need to provide social welfare to civilians in effect (see Hamas or Hezbollah as examples of organizations that have perfectioned this mixture of guerrilla warfare and social welfare provider). In order for them do this efficiently (and provide a net benefit to the population) the insurgent group needs to receive financial assistance from abroad. If it were to finance itself domestically some kind of a tax needs to be raised and considering the costs of running an organization and the efficiency losses accompanied through the raising of taxes (and even more so of taxes not enforceable through a true government) no net benefit would accrue to the population.
If this is taken for granted, and the argument seems intellectually sound, then the increase in real value of the Iraqi Dinar versus the Dollar (and the Saudi currency which is pegged to the Dollar) had a direct (and negative) impact on the insurgency's capacity to buy hearts and minds in Iraq. This especially in a country where a large number of insurgents simply became such in order to provide for a living for themselves and their families. For the authors this was not a result that the US (or the Iraqi government) expected and had tried to achieve, but simply an accidental by-product of the currency appreciation due to the lift of sanctions and the massive inflow of cash through the American occupying forces.
Evidently it seems preposterous to argue that this was the only reason for the diminution in insurgent activities. The surge, changes in strategic thinking (the Awakening Councils) and tactical measures on the ground (the US forces realizing that peace-making is different from war-making) played important roles. But the thesis of the paper seems valid, important and relevant for a variety of other conflicts as well. Definitely some food for thought.
The authors argue that the decline in insurgency activity in Iraq (measured by for example the number of American and Iraqi (solider and civilian) deaths) has been accompanied by a strong appreciation of the Iraqi and that the two are in fact linked. Why? The underlying assumption is that the civilian population will be willing to aid (if passively as in not aiding the counter-insurgency forces) an insurgency if they accrue a net benefit through its activities. The insurgents need to provide social welfare to civilians in effect (see Hamas or Hezbollah as examples of organizations that have perfectioned this mixture of guerrilla warfare and social welfare provider). In order for them do this efficiently (and provide a net benefit to the population) the insurgent group needs to receive financial assistance from abroad. If it were to finance itself domestically some kind of a tax needs to be raised and considering the costs of running an organization and the efficiency losses accompanied through the raising of taxes (and even more so of taxes not enforceable through a true government) no net benefit would accrue to the population.
If this is taken for granted, and the argument seems intellectually sound, then the increase in real value of the Iraqi Dinar versus the Dollar (and the Saudi currency which is pegged to the Dollar) had a direct (and negative) impact on the insurgency's capacity to buy hearts and minds in Iraq. This especially in a country where a large number of insurgents simply became such in order to provide for a living for themselves and their families. For the authors this was not a result that the US (or the Iraqi government) expected and had tried to achieve, but simply an accidental by-product of the currency appreciation due to the lift of sanctions and the massive inflow of cash through the American occupying forces.
Evidently it seems preposterous to argue that this was the only reason for the diminution in insurgent activities. The surge, changes in strategic thinking (the Awakening Councils) and tactical measures on the ground (the US forces realizing that peace-making is different from war-making) played important roles. But the thesis of the paper seems valid, important and relevant for a variety of other conflicts as well. Definitely some food for thought.
Tuesday, March 03, 2009
Au bonheur des dames
J'ai voulu écrire une critique du livre Au bonheur des dames d'Émile Zola depuis longtemps. Maintenant, il fait un peu trop de temps que je l'ai lu, seulement quelques remarques courts alors.
Zola dans ce bouquin détaille l'émergence d'une grande magasin à Paris (comme le Bon Marché) et ses effets sur les petits vendeurs au quartier. Peu surprenant, sa description est loin d'être flatteuse. Il montre le patron du magasin, sa clientèle accro, et ses vendeurs traités uniquement comme des sources de revenues. D'une certaine façon le livre peut être lu comme une critique anti-moderne seulement, mais au même temps un caractère fort sympa qui ne réussit pas à s'adapter au magasin disparaît inglorieusement au contraste avec le patron qui trouve son bonheur (même si ce bonheur n'est plus basé sur les aspects financières). Je peux carrément recommandé le livre, je l'ai bien aimé, même si j'avais du mal à comprendre certains partis descriptives sur le tissus vendus par exemple. Les seuls choses critiquables de mon points de vue ont été les constants références aux caractéristiques 'juives' (l'avarice, la capacité de devenir riche), mais au même temps il semble impossible d'accuser Zola de l'antisemitisme. Deuxièmement, il serait très instructive de lire une critique féministe de cette œuvre - vu que l'idée structurelle est que les grands magasins réussirent parce que les femmes sont très faibles de résister les prix à bon marché.
Zola dans ce bouquin détaille l'émergence d'une grande magasin à Paris (comme le Bon Marché) et ses effets sur les petits vendeurs au quartier. Peu surprenant, sa description est loin d'être flatteuse. Il montre le patron du magasin, sa clientèle accro, et ses vendeurs traités uniquement comme des sources de revenues. D'une certaine façon le livre peut être lu comme une critique anti-moderne seulement, mais au même temps un caractère fort sympa qui ne réussit pas à s'adapter au magasin disparaît inglorieusement au contraste avec le patron qui trouve son bonheur (même si ce bonheur n'est plus basé sur les aspects financières). Je peux carrément recommandé le livre, je l'ai bien aimé, même si j'avais du mal à comprendre certains partis descriptives sur le tissus vendus par exemple. Les seuls choses critiquables de mon points de vue ont été les constants références aux caractéristiques 'juives' (l'avarice, la capacité de devenir riche), mais au même temps il semble impossible d'accuser Zola de l'antisemitisme. Deuxièmement, il serait très instructive de lire une critique féministe de cette œuvre - vu que l'idée structurelle est que les grands magasins réussirent parce que les femmes sont très faibles de résister les prix à bon marché.
Europe
One of my professors at UNC last year, Thomas Oatley, generally takes a rather critical view of monetary aspects of European integration. In his IPE textbook for one his outlook on the future of a common European currency without an accompanying economic government is rather pessimistic (or realistic, but in any case not rosy). Recent events seem to provide evidence that he is right (and the € doomed) and even mainstream European publications have picked up on the possibility of monetary union failing. On his blog there now is a post mocking (criticizing if you want) review of European leaders' responses to the monetary crisis.
I do not have much to say in defence of European governments, I wholeheartedly agree with Mr Oatley's implication that these national responses are not sufficient in fact. Especially Germany needs to step up to the plate and help its neighbors in need, simply because it is one of the few countries (if not the only European one) that can, because of its own interests (preserving the €) even coming at a short-term price, but also out of interest in the higher ideals of European integration and the amazing progress we have made on this continent ever since 1945.
What I think needs to be stressed are the underlying reasons for this lack of European coordination. The main (philosophical) problem as far as I am concerned is that there is no European identity. The news, the discussion, the political leaders in Europe (or in the two countries, France and Germany, where I follow the news in any case) are French or German and nothing else. There is not enough acceptance of an overriding European frame-work. Merkel is a German politician that has to deal with the impact of her policies on a German electorate (federal elections in September!) that is not willing to pay for the 'spend-thrift' countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. She has to furthermore deal with an inner-party rival in Seehofer (who recently emerged as the new leader of the Bavarian section of the Union (CDU/CSU) (imagine the Dixiecrats having formed their own party at some point and constantly winning by large percentages in the South while still working as part of the Democrats in Washington; it's not a good situation as anyone familiar with Strom Thurgood can attest)) who through populist attacks is trying to make up for the recent electoral losses of the CSU. National politics and posturing simply pays more than European solidarity (see Sarkozy's initiatives at the outbreak of the Gaza War for example, completely ignoring its effects on the perception of the Czech EU-presidency).
On a more structural level two aspects seem to be of relevance to me.
As part of a realist approach, Germany ever since its reunification (and the disappearance of the dinosaur Kohl) has shown more willingness to assert itself on the European political scene. A mixture of a bad conscience (and thus genuine conviction) and a perception of it being the only way leading to international acceptance after the Second World War, made the Federal Republic willing to foot a large part of the bill of European integration. This is not the case anymore. Constrained budgets in Germany (and an obsession with a debt-free budget) and the difficult economic period following the reunification, further increased this aversion to pay for developments perceived as emanating from other countries only.
On a cultural level, the problem quite simply is that there are not enough Europeans governing Europeans countries. The descriptive aspects enumerated above concerning Merkel could easily be transferred to Sarkozy or any other European national leader. The politicians of this generation have not had the same exposure to Europe as (some) members of my generation did. Merkel never spent a significant amount of time abroad, neither did Sarkozy. I had a course with Hubert Védrine (Secretary of State in France under the Jospin government; came up with the controversial term of hyperpuissance) here in France and his point of view is also extremely nationalist. I honestly feel like there is a disconnect between the EU as it has evolved over the years, between the reality of European life and interdependence and the people that actually govern it (above the EU-bureaucrat level that is). If I look at the members of my generation that care about European (and international) politics, then I see a group of people that speaks three languages at least (English and the respective mother tongue being a given) that has friends and significant others' of different nationalities and different origins. These circumstances of life shape decisions and perspectives. European leaders today lack this perspective.
Yet, to be slightly more optimistic (weird position for me to be in admittedly) and even though I really like Alexandre Dumas, it is not unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno of course, but rather the ever deeper union. Even the United States needed 21 years from independence to the ratification of its constitution and that took place in a union far smaller and diverse than today's EU. We need some more time for any kind of true European solidarity to emerge.
I personally hope that the current crisis will lead to an extension and deepening of European integration. But then maybe I am a hopelessly naive federalist.
I do not have much to say in defence of European governments, I wholeheartedly agree with Mr Oatley's implication that these national responses are not sufficient in fact. Especially Germany needs to step up to the plate and help its neighbors in need, simply because it is one of the few countries (if not the only European one) that can, because of its own interests (preserving the €) even coming at a short-term price, but also out of interest in the higher ideals of European integration and the amazing progress we have made on this continent ever since 1945.
What I think needs to be stressed are the underlying reasons for this lack of European coordination. The main (philosophical) problem as far as I am concerned is that there is no European identity. The news, the discussion, the political leaders in Europe (or in the two countries, France and Germany, where I follow the news in any case) are French or German and nothing else. There is not enough acceptance of an overriding European frame-work. Merkel is a German politician that has to deal with the impact of her policies on a German electorate (federal elections in September!) that is not willing to pay for the 'spend-thrift' countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. She has to furthermore deal with an inner-party rival in Seehofer (who recently emerged as the new leader of the Bavarian section of the Union (CDU/CSU) (imagine the Dixiecrats having formed their own party at some point and constantly winning by large percentages in the South while still working as part of the Democrats in Washington; it's not a good situation as anyone familiar with Strom Thurgood can attest)) who through populist attacks is trying to make up for the recent electoral losses of the CSU. National politics and posturing simply pays more than European solidarity (see Sarkozy's initiatives at the outbreak of the Gaza War for example, completely ignoring its effects on the perception of the Czech EU-presidency).
On a more structural level two aspects seem to be of relevance to me.
As part of a realist approach, Germany ever since its reunification (and the disappearance of the dinosaur Kohl) has shown more willingness to assert itself on the European political scene. A mixture of a bad conscience (and thus genuine conviction) and a perception of it being the only way leading to international acceptance after the Second World War, made the Federal Republic willing to foot a large part of the bill of European integration. This is not the case anymore. Constrained budgets in Germany (and an obsession with a debt-free budget) and the difficult economic period following the reunification, further increased this aversion to pay for developments perceived as emanating from other countries only.
On a cultural level, the problem quite simply is that there are not enough Europeans governing Europeans countries. The descriptive aspects enumerated above concerning Merkel could easily be transferred to Sarkozy or any other European national leader. The politicians of this generation have not had the same exposure to Europe as (some) members of my generation did. Merkel never spent a significant amount of time abroad, neither did Sarkozy. I had a course with Hubert Védrine (Secretary of State in France under the Jospin government; came up with the controversial term of hyperpuissance) here in France and his point of view is also extremely nationalist. I honestly feel like there is a disconnect between the EU as it has evolved over the years, between the reality of European life and interdependence and the people that actually govern it (above the EU-bureaucrat level that is). If I look at the members of my generation that care about European (and international) politics, then I see a group of people that speaks three languages at least (English and the respective mother tongue being a given) that has friends and significant others' of different nationalities and different origins. These circumstances of life shape decisions and perspectives. European leaders today lack this perspective.
Yet, to be slightly more optimistic (weird position for me to be in admittedly) and even though I really like Alexandre Dumas, it is not unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno of course, but rather the ever deeper union. Even the United States needed 21 years from independence to the ratification of its constitution and that took place in a union far smaller and diverse than today's EU. We need some more time for any kind of true European solidarity to emerge.
I personally hope that the current crisis will lead to an extension and deepening of European integration. But then maybe I am a hopelessly naive federalist.
Thursday, February 26, 2009
News update
Haven't done this in a while and am really too busy to be doing it, but there were quite a few interesting ones today.
- Paul Krugman's insistence on the duration of the economic crisis, leading to a lost decade (similar to Japan's experience in the 1990s) is one of the more depressing subplots not sufficiently discussed today. I hope that he (and Adam Posen one of the experts on Japan's deflationary period) is wrong, but I feel like that might not be true and it is people like Bernanke proclaiming the economy will pick up again this year that delude themselves. I, II
- Can Obama's policies even succeed theoretically? Increased spending and a balanced budget? Drezner
- I didn't really read anything on Mr Jindal's speech, but Mr Krugman definitely didn't like it. Also it seems quite funny how the Republicans are trying to prove that they are not the least bit racist these days. A black secretary general (or whatever their part leader officially is called) and the main against-Obama speaker of Indian origin. Are these guys supposed to be representative?
- The impact of economics on the success of the surge in Iraq. Crazy, crazy theory. Read it.
- Manche Leute sind einfach zu blöd. Nicht wahr Herr Mahler? taz
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Change we can believe in
I guess I should be a classy winner and cynic and just let it go. But I still have some hope left to convert some of my younger and more naive American friends to a more realistic view of their new President. NY Times
Friday, January 30, 2009
Gold and the Dollar Crisis
I have to admit that I get some kind of a bizarre (sadomasochistic?) joy out of these intellectually challenging economics books. But then I like to read for Faulkner for fun and devote a significant chunk of time to the upkeep of a blog whose number of hits (aka readers) is, well, not overly impressive, maybe I simply am bizarre when it comes down to it. In any case, Robert Triffin's Gold and the Dollar Crisis - The Future of Convertibility was fun, even if I only read the first half (the second half deals with his proposed changes to the Bretton Woods system finally truly in place in 1958 - analyzing never enacted reforms to a system not in place anymore felt a little bit too hardcore).
Triffin of course is the source of the famous (maybe my perception has become a little bit skewed here) Triffin dilemma, which states that a continued American capital deficit is necessary in order to provide the liquidity needed in an economically expanding world, while it will at the same time undermine the dollar's credibility as the global reserve currency because of the increasing gap between American gold reserves and greenbacks circulating (metaphorically speaking).
In his own words:
'The gold exchange standard may but does not necessarily, help in relieving a shortage of world monetary reserves. It does so only to the extent that the key currency countries are willing to let their net reserve position decline through increases in their short-term monetary liabilities unmatched by corresponding increases in their own gross reserves. If they allow this to happen, however, and to continue indefinitely they tend to bring about a collapse of the system itself through the gradual weakening of foreigners’ confidence in the key currencies.'
Very similar to Eichengreen's analysis at times, he argues that up to 1914 the gold standard worked and provided stability (to major Western countries in any case) because of cushioning, private financial flows (because of the expectancy that problems would be solved and currencies not depreciated) as well as 'higher endurance of macroeconomic suffering' (unemployment namely) feasible due to very restrictive voting rights (and in turn a lack of democratic accountability). He differs from Eichengreen in the sense that these explanations do not suffice in his opinion. He thus adds the 'widespread acceptance of long-term deficits' and the fact that major imbalances were prevented ex ante before its impacts on employment or growth could be felt. Finally, 'financing of expenditures over production did not exist in any dangerous manner.'
All of this changed after WWI. Especially private financial flows became accentuating rather than cushioning of the impact of current account imbalances simply because the belief that currencies would not depreciate had evaporated (here his and Eichengreen's analyses are congruent again). Basically the same situation developed around the Dollar (not the Pound Sterling of the interwar years) after WWII.
Triffin's dilemma of course perfectly summed up the situation and his definition quoted above describes perfectly what 'happened to the UK in 1931' and (unbeknownst to him in 1960 of course) to the USA in 1971 and 1973. Ironic in retrospective is that Triffin shows himself convinced that this situation would not arise again. 'Only an incredible complacency on our part could [...] force us to suspend or modify the legal gold cover requirements of the Federal Reserve System.' His main concern lies with the deflationary consequences of an adjustment to the American balance of payments deficit instead.
His suggestion to solve this problem lies with an international lender of last resort, more powerful and better financed than the current (or historic) IMF since 'the basic absurdity of the gold exchange standard is that it makes the international monetary system highly dependent on individual countries’ decisions about the continued use of one or a few national currencies as monetary reserves.'
Triffin of course is the source of the famous (maybe my perception has become a little bit skewed here) Triffin dilemma, which states that a continued American capital deficit is necessary in order to provide the liquidity needed in an economically expanding world, while it will at the same time undermine the dollar's credibility as the global reserve currency because of the increasing gap between American gold reserves and greenbacks circulating (metaphorically speaking).
In his own words:
'The gold exchange standard may but does not necessarily, help in relieving a shortage of world monetary reserves. It does so only to the extent that the key currency countries are willing to let their net reserve position decline through increases in their short-term monetary liabilities unmatched by corresponding increases in their own gross reserves. If they allow this to happen, however, and to continue indefinitely they tend to bring about a collapse of the system itself through the gradual weakening of foreigners’ confidence in the key currencies.'
Very similar to Eichengreen's analysis at times, he argues that up to 1914 the gold standard worked and provided stability (to major Western countries in any case) because of cushioning, private financial flows (because of the expectancy that problems would be solved and currencies not depreciated) as well as 'higher endurance of macroeconomic suffering' (unemployment namely) feasible due to very restrictive voting rights (and in turn a lack of democratic accountability). He differs from Eichengreen in the sense that these explanations do not suffice in his opinion. He thus adds the 'widespread acceptance of long-term deficits' and the fact that major imbalances were prevented ex ante before its impacts on employment or growth could be felt. Finally, 'financing of expenditures over production did not exist in any dangerous manner.'
All of this changed after WWI. Especially private financial flows became accentuating rather than cushioning of the impact of current account imbalances simply because the belief that currencies would not depreciate had evaporated (here his and Eichengreen's analyses are congruent again). Basically the same situation developed around the Dollar (not the Pound Sterling of the interwar years) after WWII.
Triffin's dilemma of course perfectly summed up the situation and his definition quoted above describes perfectly what 'happened to the UK in 1931' and (unbeknownst to him in 1960 of course) to the USA in 1971 and 1973. Ironic in retrospective is that Triffin shows himself convinced that this situation would not arise again. 'Only an incredible complacency on our part could [...] force us to suspend or modify the legal gold cover requirements of the Federal Reserve System.' His main concern lies with the deflationary consequences of an adjustment to the American balance of payments deficit instead.
His suggestion to solve this problem lies with an international lender of last resort, more powerful and better financed than the current (or historic) IMF since 'the basic absurdity of the gold exchange standard is that it makes the international monetary system highly dependent on individual countries’ decisions about the continued use of one or a few national currencies as monetary reserves.'
Manias, Panics, and Crashes
Continuing my preparation for my last university exam (assuming I am not going the PhD route that is) as well as my self-education concerning economics. I finished Manias, Panics, and Crashes - A History of Financial Crises by Charles P. Kindleberger a few days ago. While the edition I read dated from the mid-90s and did not include the financial crisis of our times a few weeks ago, Kindleberger's book did provide for an interesting analysis of the nature of crises in general. In fact, it was quite the spooky read at times simply because some of the quotes on, say, the Tulip crisis of the 17th century seemed like a perfect description of the recently exploded bubble.
In more general terms, Kindleberger presents a model and an analysis of crises over the last 400 years that leaves the reader stunned due to the lack of singularity of our financial crisis. Evidently, this one was bigger, as far as countries hit by it as well as sheer numbers, than most other crises but the basic underlying principles are the same. Kindleberger sees an exogenous event such as a new invention (.com bubble!) at the origin of every speculative bubble (I am not quite sure what this could have been in our case, 9/11 and the fact that (turning the non-existence of something negative into a positive element) nothing bad (economically speaking) resulted from it?). This is followed by a monetary expansion (global low interest rates, especially in the USA; massive capital imports into the US from especially China) including the emergence of new credit instruments (sub primes!) multiplying this expansion. Finally, 'overtrading', the creation of a speculative bubble takes place.
Describing a housing boom in Chicago in 1857(sic!):
'In the ruin of all collapsed booms is to be found the work of men who bought property at prices they knew perfectly well were fictitious, but who were willing to pay such prices simply because they knew that some still greater fool could be depended on to take the property off their hands and leave them with a profit.' Putting it more succinctly: 'The first taste is for high interest, but that taste soon becomes secondary. There is a second appetite for large gains to be made by selling the principal.'
When this bubble bursts, everyone tries to get out as fast as possible and prices fall only faster. Individual rational actors and decisions result in collectively irrational results. Or, 'the actions of each individual is rational – or would be, were it not for the fact that others are behaving in the same way.'
Talking about bad omens for today's situation (not that we need any considering we're already in a recession in any case): 'A 'financial crisis [can be][...] the culmination of a period of expansion and lead[...] to downturn.' The only piece of good news would be that Kindleberger believes that a 'lender of last resort shortens depressions.' Yet, here Keynes (and Krugman today) comes in arguing that in the special circumstances of deflation combined with a zero interest rate monetary policy becomes ineffective (1, 2 book reviews on this topic). I definitely do not want to open this Pandora's box right now though.
A fun quote on the irrationality of economics to end this post instead (even when I am not certain as to the validity or importance of this part of his argument):
'A competent driver of an automobile, for example, or an expert chess player [or an experienced basketball player I might add] has moved beyond the stage of calculating what needs to be done at a given time. That individual sees the situation and does what is required without pausing to reason out the optimal course of action [...] The notion that asset markets are made up of [...] intelligent, well-informed [...] speculators who calculate by rational steps is [...] not [necessarily true].'
In more general terms, Kindleberger presents a model and an analysis of crises over the last 400 years that leaves the reader stunned due to the lack of singularity of our financial crisis. Evidently, this one was bigger, as far as countries hit by it as well as sheer numbers, than most other crises but the basic underlying principles are the same. Kindleberger sees an exogenous event such as a new invention (.com bubble!) at the origin of every speculative bubble (I am not quite sure what this could have been in our case, 9/11 and the fact that (turning the non-existence of something negative into a positive element) nothing bad (economically speaking) resulted from it?). This is followed by a monetary expansion (global low interest rates, especially in the USA; massive capital imports into the US from especially China) including the emergence of new credit instruments (sub primes!) multiplying this expansion. Finally, 'overtrading', the creation of a speculative bubble takes place.
Describing a housing boom in Chicago in 1857(sic!):
'In the ruin of all collapsed booms is to be found the work of men who bought property at prices they knew perfectly well were fictitious, but who were willing to pay such prices simply because they knew that some still greater fool could be depended on to take the property off their hands and leave them with a profit.' Putting it more succinctly: 'The first taste is for high interest, but that taste soon becomes secondary. There is a second appetite for large gains to be made by selling the principal.'
When this bubble bursts, everyone tries to get out as fast as possible and prices fall only faster. Individual rational actors and decisions result in collectively irrational results. Or, 'the actions of each individual is rational – or would be, were it not for the fact that others are behaving in the same way.'
Talking about bad omens for today's situation (not that we need any considering we're already in a recession in any case): 'A 'financial crisis [can be][...] the culmination of a period of expansion and lead[...] to downturn.' The only piece of good news would be that Kindleberger believes that a 'lender of last resort shortens depressions.' Yet, here Keynes (and Krugman today) comes in arguing that in the special circumstances of deflation combined with a zero interest rate monetary policy becomes ineffective (1, 2 book reviews on this topic). I definitely do not want to open this Pandora's box right now though.
A fun quote on the irrationality of economics to end this post instead (even when I am not certain as to the validity or importance of this part of his argument):
'A competent driver of an automobile, for example, or an expert chess player [or an experienced basketball player I might add] has moved beyond the stage of calculating what needs to be done at a given time. That individual sees the situation and does what is required without pausing to reason out the optimal course of action [...] The notion that asset markets are made up of [...] intelligent, well-informed [...] speculators who calculate by rational steps is [...] not [necessarily true].'
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Capitalism
Macroeconomically speaking this is completely irrelevant of course. What are $18 billion when Congress will spend over $800 billion after all. Plus I guess this recession needs high incomes in order to kick-start consumption again. But, talking symbolic politics (which I admittedly criticized a mere two days ago), how am I supposed to develop any kind of respect toward these leaders of global capitalism (that's what these people are after all to some extent)? How am I supposed to respect this thing called capitalism in the first place, if the immediate response to the biggest financial crash since 1929 is a massive payout to the people responsable for just that crash?
I guess Churchill must have been right, capitalism is clearly the wort imaginable economic system, except for all the others.
I guess Churchill must have been right, capitalism is clearly the wort imaginable economic system, except for all the others.
Monday, January 26, 2009
Obama's challenges
Afghanistan seems to be ignored to some extent when compared to the financial crisis, the recession, Guantanamo or the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. But, now that Iraq seems to be more or less established as a semi-democracy (good-bye model for the greater Middle East, good-bye all you idealistic neo-cons), it represents the biggest challenge of Western (aka American) credibility and it's not looking good. This is one place where political symbolism (closing Guantanamo, Geithner commenting on China, increased governmental transparency) doesn't even do the slightest good. It's a question of putting your money (troops, actual money, but also ideas, nation-building not war-making) where your mouth is.
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
The War over Iraq
I guess this was my personal goodbye to the Bush administration book. Lawrence Kaplan & William Kristol: The War over Iraq - Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission. A very short booklet, written on the eve of the American invasion, it does for a very entertaining reading (for a cynic such as myself in any case). The two neocons argue for invasion of Iraq and criticize American foreign policy by Bush (the father) and Clinton along the way. Basically, Bush should have marched into Baghdad during the Gulf War when he had the chance but his realistic convictions (and Powell's reservations as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) prevented from endeavoring this course not directly linked to American's vital interests. Clinton on the other hand out of an exaggerated moralism (and liberalism), the perception that every display of American power is a bad thing as such, refused to become more active in Iraq than with a few missiles here and there, never truly threatening Saddam's hold on power. Bush (the son) on other hand represents a glorious mixture of a hard-handed approach (from the realists' school) and moralism (taken from the liberals), something that the authors call a distinctively American internationalism (aka neoconservatism).
An American invasion of Iraq will end Saddam's tyranny and torture chambers (some of the descriptions eerily resemble the ones about American soldiers in Abu Ghraib, even when in Saddam's case these are the low-intensity ones), will create a liberal democracy to Iraq which will act as an ally to Israel and the US in the region, as a counterweight to Iran and maybe most importantly be a kind of city upon a hill showing that democracy is possible in the Middle East. All this can be achieved with 75.000 soldiers, staying in Iraq at most one or two years and at the cost of $16 billion only. Definitely sounds like a good deal if you ask me.
Some of the more amusing arguments:
- American spending on military capabilities is far too low
- civil war in Iraq cannot erupt because there is no historic precedent for it
- Iraq is a safe haven for international terrorism as the PKK is operating from its territory
- quotes from the Bush administration during the gulf war explaining their decision not to march on Baghdad ('the Lebanonization of Iraq' for example) that are being mocked
An American invasion of Iraq will end Saddam's tyranny and torture chambers (some of the descriptions eerily resemble the ones about American soldiers in Abu Ghraib, even when in Saddam's case these are the low-intensity ones), will create a liberal democracy to Iraq which will act as an ally to Israel and the US in the region, as a counterweight to Iran and maybe most importantly be a kind of city upon a hill showing that democracy is possible in the Middle East. All this can be achieved with 75.000 soldiers, staying in Iraq at most one or two years and at the cost of $16 billion only. Definitely sounds like a good deal if you ask me.
Some of the more amusing arguments:
- American spending on military capabilities is far too low
- civil war in Iraq cannot erupt because there is no historic precedent for it
- Iraq is a safe haven for international terrorism as the PKK is operating from its territory
- quotes from the Bush administration during the gulf war explaining their decision not to march on Baghdad ('the Lebanonization of Iraq' for example) that are being mocked
The Paradox of American Power
Joseph Nye's The Paradox of American Power deals with the American dilemma in today's world. Too strong to be truly challenged, yet too weak to go at it alone (as a quick glance at Bush's policies and failures confirms). According to Nye this is the case for a variety of reasons, most importantly the fading unipolar world. Remnants still exist, militarily most of all, but Nye separates the world in three chess boards (a military one, an economic one and a transnational one) only one of which features a dominating USA on top (you can guess which). Further eroding American power are transnational developments such as information flow, which lead to states in general being less capable of solving problems on their own.
The only way to preserve American (benign of course) hegemony is a concept Nye introduced in the 1990s called soft power (as opposed to hard military power). Soft power describes one's capability to 'get[...] others to want what you want.' Considering the impressive array of cultural and political appeal that the United States still possesses (apart from the usually cited Hollywood movies, one need only glance at the fuss made of Obama's inauguration outside of the US), Nye sees a distinct possibility that American hegemony can be prolonged significantly in this manner. For me personally, a large part of this argument is wishful thinking, beginning with the benign American hegemony (examples of its far less benign aspects abound I believe) soft power is exactly not what the US owns in abundance currently. In fact the Bush administration has been highly successful in eroding this kind of power and the good-will extended to Obama as of right now will undoubtedly change with the first unpopular decision of his government (say American support of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites or extended excursions into Waziristan in order to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan).
While I find the concept of soft power and its impact on international relations quite appealing (Zivilmacht Europa) and relevant and agree with Nye's basis of analysis, his criticism of American emphasis on defense over diplomatic budgets (16:1) for example, I cannot share his optimistic view concerning American capabilities to preserve their hegemony. Even assuming that Obama will reclaim some (or all) of the soft power lost under his predecessor, that will not change the fact that a variety of actors have begun to act as regional hegemons (the EU, China, Brazil). The US cannot counter this movement and while it will remain the most important voice on the international scene for a long time to come it cannot allow itself to even try to go at it alone anymore.
The only way to preserve American (benign of course) hegemony is a concept Nye introduced in the 1990s called soft power (as opposed to hard military power). Soft power describes one's capability to 'get[...] others to want what you want.' Considering the impressive array of cultural and political appeal that the United States still possesses (apart from the usually cited Hollywood movies, one need only glance at the fuss made of Obama's inauguration outside of the US), Nye sees a distinct possibility that American hegemony can be prolonged significantly in this manner. For me personally, a large part of this argument is wishful thinking, beginning with the benign American hegemony (examples of its far less benign aspects abound I believe) soft power is exactly not what the US owns in abundance currently. In fact the Bush administration has been highly successful in eroding this kind of power and the good-will extended to Obama as of right now will undoubtedly change with the first unpopular decision of his government (say American support of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites or extended excursions into Waziristan in order to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan).
While I find the concept of soft power and its impact on international relations quite appealing (Zivilmacht Europa) and relevant and agree with Nye's basis of analysis, his criticism of American emphasis on defense over diplomatic budgets (16:1) for example, I cannot share his optimistic view concerning American capabilities to preserve their hegemony. Even assuming that Obama will reclaim some (or all) of the soft power lost under his predecessor, that will not change the fact that a variety of actors have begun to act as regional hegemons (the EU, China, Brazil). The US cannot counter this movement and while it will remain the most important voice on the international scene for a long time to come it cannot allow itself to even try to go at it alone anymore.
Les États-Unis ont-ils besoin d'alliés?
Recommandé par un de mes professeurs à Sciences Po Yves Haine développe une théorie des relations entre les États-Unis et l'europe très intéressant dans Les États-Unis ont-ils besoin d'alliés? - Les États-Unis et leurs alliés européens, de la guerre froide à l'Irak. Le titre du livre est un peu trompeur parce que Haine n'est commence pas en 1989 (ou 1991) mais en 1949 (le fondement de l'Otan) et revient même plus tôt à Washington, Madison et Wilson et leur impact sur la politique étrangère des États-Unis.
Haine se prouve très lettré en montrant comme le libéralisme et le réalisme ne réussit pas à expliquer l'existence et (surtout) la continuation de l'Alliance après la disparition du danger soviétique. Il est persuadé qu'il y a un aspect de personnalité, de caractéristique personnelle ainsi que nationale qui a contribué à la création et la persévérance de l'Otan. Haine n'essaie pas d'expliquer trop mais se contente à montrer les défauts du raisonnement libéral et réaliste suivi par une descriptions de quelques situation fondamentale dans l'histoire de l'Otan (Cuba, la réunification allemande, le Kosovo).
Il est persuadé que la guerre en Kosovo marque un 'tournant dans l'évaluation de l'outil atlantique par Washington' et qu'en conséquence les américains ont préféré de mener l'attaque en Afghanistan hors de la structure de l'Alliance même vu la volonté de ses alliés à contribuer à cause des mauvaises expériences de 'la guerre en comité.' Pour moi, et en considération de l'inauguration d'Obama hier, je ne suis pas convaincu si cet éloignement n'a pas été une phase temporaire à cause d'une situation et un Président exceptionel(le). Haine lui-même admet que les alliés aujourd'hui contribuent en Afghanistan dans le cadre de l'Otan, qu'il y avait un processus d'apprentissage de l'administration Bush déjà. Il craint surtout un 'partenariat [qui] [...] se réduisait à une division du travail entre une Amérique se chargeant de la haute intensité technologique et une Europe réduite au rôle de gardien de la paix'. Je partage cette analyse d'un avenir probable, mais ne réussis pas à voir le problème dans cela. Vu le capability gap existant aujourd'hui dans le cadre de la révolution militaire entre les États-Unis et le reste du monde (dont Europe), la rattrapage des européens coûterait beaucoup trop chère. Pourquoi pas profité de l'avantage comparative des européens, le peace-making ou nation-building, alors? Même l'administration Bush vient de réaliser que la dominance des américains dans la seule dimension unipolaire au monde aujourd'hui (la dimension militaire) suffit pour gagner n'importe quelle guerre, mais ne pas assez pour assurer la paix après. Sous Obama une alliance plus équilibré pourrait bien redevenir un contributeur important dans la sécurité occidentale.
Haine se prouve très lettré en montrant comme le libéralisme et le réalisme ne réussit pas à expliquer l'existence et (surtout) la continuation de l'Alliance après la disparition du danger soviétique. Il est persuadé qu'il y a un aspect de personnalité, de caractéristique personnelle ainsi que nationale qui a contribué à la création et la persévérance de l'Otan. Haine n'essaie pas d'expliquer trop mais se contente à montrer les défauts du raisonnement libéral et réaliste suivi par une descriptions de quelques situation fondamentale dans l'histoire de l'Otan (Cuba, la réunification allemande, le Kosovo).
Il est persuadé que la guerre en Kosovo marque un 'tournant dans l'évaluation de l'outil atlantique par Washington' et qu'en conséquence les américains ont préféré de mener l'attaque en Afghanistan hors de la structure de l'Alliance même vu la volonté de ses alliés à contribuer à cause des mauvaises expériences de 'la guerre en comité.' Pour moi, et en considération de l'inauguration d'Obama hier, je ne suis pas convaincu si cet éloignement n'a pas été une phase temporaire à cause d'une situation et un Président exceptionel(le). Haine lui-même admet que les alliés aujourd'hui contribuent en Afghanistan dans le cadre de l'Otan, qu'il y avait un processus d'apprentissage de l'administration Bush déjà. Il craint surtout un 'partenariat [qui] [...] se réduisait à une division du travail entre une Amérique se chargeant de la haute intensité technologique et une Europe réduite au rôle de gardien de la paix'. Je partage cette analyse d'un avenir probable, mais ne réussis pas à voir le problème dans cela. Vu le capability gap existant aujourd'hui dans le cadre de la révolution militaire entre les États-Unis et le reste du monde (dont Europe), la rattrapage des européens coûterait beaucoup trop chère. Pourquoi pas profité de l'avantage comparative des européens, le peace-making ou nation-building, alors? Même l'administration Bush vient de réaliser que la dominance des américains dans la seule dimension unipolaire au monde aujourd'hui (la dimension militaire) suffit pour gagner n'importe quelle guerre, mais ne pas assez pour assurer la paix après. Sous Obama une alliance plus équilibré pourrait bien redevenir un contributeur important dans la sécurité occidentale.
Friday, January 16, 2009
NY Times article
Haven't posted a simple link to a news article in quite some time, but I found this one really interesting. I have of course written a decent amount of posts on the question of race in the United States here, one very positive, others more negative (1, 2, 3, 4) plus a variety of book reviews (1, 2, 3, 4). The article deals with Obama's impact on social interracial relations in the US:
Two studies on strategic colorblindness [...] concluded that whites, including children as young as 10, may attempt to avoid talking about race with blacks, or even acknowledging racial differences, so as not to appear prejudiced.
The studies also found that blacks viewed that tactic as evidence of prejudice.
I don't luckily have that kind of sensitivity, timidity or whatever you might call it. Maybe always being the foreigner helps, in any case I never encountered a negative response to my curious question or remarks.
Two studies on strategic colorblindness [...] concluded that whites, including children as young as 10, may attempt to avoid talking about race with blacks, or even acknowledging racial differences, so as not to appear prejudiced.
The studies also found that blacks viewed that tactic as evidence of prejudice.
I don't luckily have that kind of sensitivity, timidity or whatever you might call it. Maybe always being the foreigner helps, in any case I never encountered a negative response to my curious question or remarks.
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