Der Erfolgreiche Abstieg Europas

Eberhard Sandschneider ist Professor an der FU Berlin in Internationale Beziehungen, er leitet desweiteren die Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. Eine gestandene Persönlichkeit in der - ja angeblich kleinen - deutschen internationalen Beziehungsgemeinde. Sein Buch Der Erfolgreiche Abstieg Europas war nichtsdestotrotz eine Enttäuschung. Ich vermute - oder befürchte, - daß Sandschneider Publikumserfolge wie Fareed Zakarias Post-American World kopieren will und dementsprechend schreibt er auch. Sein Buch ist voll von Allgemeinplätzen, Plattitüden, Wiederholungen und einer elendigen Aneinanderreihung von Sprichworten. Wie er es selber so schön ausdrückt:

"Der Wettbewerb um Begriffe dreht sich sicher auch um Einfluss, Eitelkeit und Geld. Wer es schafft, provozierend zu formulieren, kann sicher sein, von der Presse zitiert und auf Konferenzen und in Talkshows eingeladen zu werden. Zugegeben: Nichts anderes tue auch ich in diesem Buch. Ich versuche pointiert, manchmal vielleicht sogar überspitzt zu formulieren, um Dinge, die mir wichtig sind, deutlich zu machen."

Problem erkannt und voll in die Falle reinmarschiert. Er hat wahrscheinlich Recht in dem was er sagt - "die Welt des 21. Jahrhundert besteht eben nicht aus Nullsummenspielen" - oder zumindest teile ich seine Meinung, aber gelernt habe ich von diesem Buch wenig. Die deutsche Führungsrolle, die er gegen Ende einfordert ist inzwischen auch ein Gemeinplatz und bleibt dennoch eine fast schon erstaunlich unrealistische Option für ein Land in welchem weder Syrien noch Europa im gerade vergangenen Wahlkampf eine große Rolle gespielt haben - geschweige denn das Debakel der vorherigen Regierung in Bezug auf Libyen.

The German Europe

Prompted by the reset in thinking brought about by the euro crisis, there has been a flurry of publications dealing with a possible future of Europe recently. To begin with Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Guy Verhofstadt – both of the rarest of species: Well known Members of the European Parliament (EP) – published their federalist manifesto Debout l'Europe! Martin Schulz, President of the EP weighed in with his entry tellingly entitled The Tied Up Giant – Europe's Last Chance. Jürgen Habermas has also made his voice heard with an essay Zur Verfassung Europas. Even that weathercock of the subject du jour, Bernard-Henri Levy, has co-signed a manifesto on Europe ou le chaos? together with a number of other European writers.

Ulrich Beck with his short essay on The German Europe fits right into this – important – fad. In his book, he provides a criticism of the current state of Europe, while at the same time putting forward a new Rousseauian social contract for a better future Europe. His is an integrationist vision that he proclaims a necessity for Europe if it is to be “capable of finding answers for [today's] fundamental transformation and great challenges without falling into the trap of xenophobia and violence.”

For Beck, Europe has become German in a process that is determined by economic might on the one hand and “Merkiavelli's” (in)action on the other hand. Said inaction is what in particular reinforces German power. It is not the fear to be dominated by German money – or tanks – that prompts the submission to German policy preferences, it is the all-dominating fear – inherently part of modernity's risk society – of a forced exit from the Euro prompted by the absence of German money that results in the political might of the country.

This German inaction has been described and criticized (Beck: “Germany has become too powerful to allow itself not to take a decision”) elsewhere of course, Beck's analysis is nothing new in this regard then. It also comes up surprisingly short when he claims that Merkel had seized her chance and changed the balance of power in Europe. Even while admits himself, that the current situation is untenable with the crisis still very much – and once again – raging.

Germany's hesitant action at every recurring point of deep crisis might be sufficient to contain the problem of the day; an end to the crisis per se cannot come without deep structural and institutional solutions. Current German might in that regard is merely a temporary phenomenon based on a specific politico-economic problem-set that allows the country to position itself as a normative model whose policy solutions others are expected to apply.

This temporary and sectoral – because economic – hegemony might of course be translated into a more enduring institutional and structural format once a sort of new European Union (2.0) has emerged. Yet, Germany has so far produced little but a cacophony of voices advocating changes with little tangible proposals emanating from the supposed leader of the pack. It is is difficult to argue then that Merkel has – at least so far – managed to implement a lasting shift of powers within the EU's complex governance system.

Beck finally lays out his vision for a social contract for Europe. He regards this kind of contract as the overcoming of an out-dated national state of existence – Nationalzustand. Europe of course is not a society though, which means that a “post-national society of national societies” has to be constructed instead. The fact that there is no European people hardly matters in this regard since our societies are increasingly individualized in the first place.

The Erasmus generation were to live this kind of individualized European life horizontally already, even while the vertical, institution-oriented process of integration, prompts their criticism of Brussels. For Beck, this new social contract needs to be accompanied by more social security at the European level especially to address youth unemployment in Southern Europe. Increased integration furthermore were to go along with an increased bottom-up democratization process, leading to aforementioned individuals emerging as the sovereign of European democracy.

The German sociologist lays out an interesting vision of a German Europe, dominated by Merkiavelli's government. Yet, his analysis is a disappointingly temporal nature, not taking into account demographic, economic, nor even institutional changes, that will seriously impact the intra-EU balance of power as he presents it. His proposed social contract, finally, is an interesting idea that Beck seems to have no idea how it could be implemented though.

Postwar

Tony Judt is one of the most renowned, relatively (2010) recently deceased public intellectuals, historians around. His book Postwar - A History of Europe since 1945 is a massive - in physical size and scope - undertaking to tell the history of the divided - and then re-united - continent following the two wars that shaped its destiny. He devotes 900 pages to this endeavor, which yet is obviously impossible, he is obliged to concentrate on a number of major states while putting forward major trends and faultlines.

For me it was a fascinating introduction into regional and temporal parts of history I had been little familiar with previously. Necessarily slightly superficial where I already had a good understanding, essentially Germany and to some extent France, but ever there Judt contributed new elements or analysis to my understanding. Most valuable though, was the book for me where I knew hardly anything about such as Eastern Europe but also, say, Italian or UK history of the 1960s-1970s. The end with it heavy concentration on the very recent past seemed a bit redundant for anybody well versed with the news of the day (say, the last ten-fifteen years), yet a great overview for anybody interested in European history.

Making the European Monetary Union

Harold James' history of the Euro, Making the European Monetary Union - The Role of the Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Origins of the European Central Bank was directly commissioned by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) both of whom made their archives containing protocols and minutes available for the author. I have no idea to what extent the Euro crisis played a role in this commission, but it is what makes a rather tedious piece of bureaucratic history a fascinating read.

What is maybe the most important lesson of this history, is how little the issues discussed in years leading up to EMU have fundamentally changed. The following clearly applies to the situation today as much as it refers to the 1950s and the following decades:

"One way of thinking about these imbalances is as a reflection of changes in relative competitiveness. Thus a German surplus was a reflection of favourable development of productivity gains and of wage costs contained by a collaborative and collective approach to wage setting."

What still escapes me to some extent is that "there was a clear economic as well as as political logic behind the creation of a single European economy." James describes this economic logic as the forefathers of the ECB (the aforementioned Committee of Central Bank Governors (the CoG)) looking to overcome "genuine problems of currency instability and misalignment at the international level [meaning the dollar]." Yet, this logic of course contrasts starkly with the misalignments at the European level clearly visible today and also directly runs counter the Bundesbank's preference, expressed here by the President of the New York Fed as late as 1992, for "what they think is the single most important principle of the mechanism [the ESM], i.e., that it be flexible."

People clearly understood the problems associated with a common currency, see the Bundesbank's President Karl Otto Pöhl:

"In a monetary union with irreversibly fixed exchange rates the weak would become ever weaker and the strong ever stronger. We would thus experience great tensions in the real economy of Europe. [...] In order to create a European currency, the governments and parliaments of Europe would have to be prepared to transfer sovereign rights to a supranational institution."

Or the the Italian Finance Minister Giuliano Amato:

"Indeed, there is a "fundamental problem" in the EMS; which can be attributed to the fact that there is no "engine of growth." Not only is the pivot currency of the system fundamentally undervalued, but the growth of domestic demand in Germany is lower than the average; the result is that the country has structural surpluses also vis-à-vis the rest of the EEC. These surpluses, both commercial and current, on the one hand induce tension within the exchange system, pushing up the D-mark, particularly when the dollar drops, and, on the other hand, they remove growth potential from the other nations. In the long run, the cohesion of the system could suffer."

"Pöhl [...] thought that the best option was for the European governments to call on the CoG to investigate a currency union as the endpoint of a process of economic integration,"a point that is still off into the future then. Yet, the Delors Committee, which paved the way for EMU really and of which the European central banks' presidents were members, believed that the "maximum possible extent adjustment should occur by way of market mechanisms" with a Community budget of around 3% providing an additional escape valve. The problem of course today is that the EU's budget still hovers near the 1% mark.

The ECB to large extent has to be seen as the successful upload of the Bundesbank's preferences to the European level ("astonishingly all the committee members agreed with the German position") including central bank independence, the absence of an "explicit role for the ECB in supervising banks," and strict inflation targeting.

Harold James describes the Bundesbank's support for EMU very interestingly - and convincingly - as a way for German central bankers to preserve their independence, which was constantly being threatened by the international agreements German politicians entered into and which undercut the Bundesbank's control over the DM's money supply figures. 

"The Bundesbank was really not strong enough to stand up to such an orchestration of demands, so it needed to cast around for allies. [...] the Bundesbank needed to look more to a European mechanism for building support for its bargaining position in a German context."

History is an inaccurate social science. It is far from clear what lessons James' detailed account offers us then. Most interestingly maybe is the repetitiveness of the arguments we believe to be du jour and the conclusions which were drawn from them then (banking union, reinforced intra-EU financial support mechanisms, deeper economic integration/convergence) as much as today without truly having been put into place neither then nor now.

Young Europe

I've started writing on a blog for a Polish think tank, Instytut Obywatelski, called Young Europe. Here is the introductory piece, and here my first content piece on the lessons of the US Supreme Court for European integration.

La construction de l'Europe

La construction de l'Europe de Pierre Gerbet est une histoire de l'intégration européenne commençant avec les idées intégrationnistes du début du 20ème voire avant et se terminant à la fin de ce dernier siècle. Je l'ai lu il y a carrément trop longtemps pour en faire une critique adéquate surtout parce que Gerbet présente une vue globale des développements sur plusieurs décennies. Pourtant l'auteur réussit à permettre au lecteur de développer une meilleure connaissance l'histoire de l'intégration. Peu importe si cela inclut les tentatives d'intégration avortées des années 20, les essais forcés ou échoués de la deuxième guerre mondiale, voire les crises des années intermédiaires entre l'échec de la Politique européenne de défense et l'Acte unique.

Une petite collection des meilleurs citations afin de conclure:

• Napoléon à Sainte-Hélène : Je ne pense pas qu'il y ait en Europe d'autre grand équilibre possible que l'agglomération et la conféderation des grands peuples.
• Les apôtres du mouvement des nationalités espéraient que les peuplés libérés, pacifiques par nature, seraient frères.
• Bismarck : L'Europe n'est qu'un mot employé par les puissances, qui exigent des autres ce qu'elles n'osent pas réclamer en leur nom.
• Ernest Renan : Les nations ne sont pas quelque chose d'éternel. Elles ont commencé, elles finiront. La confédération européenne, probablement, les remplacera [1887!].
• Edvard Beneš comme militant du Pan-Europe de Coudenhove-Kalergi
• 16 juin 1940, proposition d'une Union franco-britannique au gouvernement de Reynaud, même soirée que celui démissionne et Pétain est nommé Président du conseil

The Post-American World

In one of the more hyped books of the political science literature, Fareed Zakaria, explains The Post-American World, which were to follow the United States unipolar moment during the late 20th/early 21st century. For Zakaria this is not so much due to "the decline of America but rather about the rise of the everyone else." The economic success and increasing geopolitical importance of "the rest," the non-Western world, has been "most visible in Asia but it is no longer confined to it" with the rest of the BRICs but also large parts of Africa having made tremendous progress.

Zakaria goes then on to detail to some extent the rise of China and India contrasting their respective economic and political (dis)advantages - democratic governance vs efficient decision-making to sum it up really concisely. His final chapter then deals with the US again and effectively proposes policy but also cultural or societal changes that would help the country, which for the coming decades undoubtedly will remain the major player in a multipolarizing world, adapt to its relative decline in a constructive manner as the UK did in the early 20th century.

While I am very much in agreement with most of what Zakaria puts forward in his book, which I am wary to truly consider part of the political science canon, his argument feels slightly redundant or rather commonplace in today's world. He wrote it in 2007/2008, so maybe he was more of an outlier at the time, yet arguably his stance and book has only become such a modern, classic of political commentary literature because of the American insularity that he decries himself. Essentially, knowledge of other languages, other cultures, other political system, other economic success stories in the US remains astonishingly limited - or is belittled in any case. Movements in the tectonic plates of global power politics are noticed slower than in the US as they are in culturally more internationally aware and open societies. The Post-American World provides little added-value to the politically- and economically-informed reader of news and - non-scientific - analysis.

Vie et Mort du bloc soviétique

La Vie et Mort du bloc soviétique de Georges Mink est un court ouvrage moyennant récent qui se concentre surtout sur l'histoire de l'Europe central - Pologne, Tchécoslovaquie, Hongrie, Bulgarie et Roumanie mais aussi à un moindre degré l’Albanie et Yougoslavie.

L'auteur discerne deux grandes lignes dans l'histoire post-guerre de cette région la soviétisation - ce qui est la transplantation du modèle soviétique dans sa zone d'influence - de 1947 jusqu'aux milieu des années 1950 et la désoviétisation à partir de ce moment jusqu'à la fin de l'empire soviétique.

Après-guerre la plupart des pays libéré par l'Armée rouge - comme en France vraiment - ont été gouverné par une vaste coalition des partis politiques divers. Ce dualisme des politiques est remplacé par une soviétisation de la politique et par une prise de pouvoir des partis communistes (voire commune socialiste et communiste) par différents moyens - semi-révolution, semi-coup de d'Etat en Tchécoslovaquie, des élections faussées en Pologne.

Suivi la tactique du salami qui consistait dans l'élimination de l'opposition politique commençant par l’extrême droite - souvent les collaborateurs avec des Allemands - et passant par le centre jusqu'aux politiciens de gauche trop social-démocrates voire indépendants vu leur engagement individuel au sein par exemple de la guerre civile en Espagne. Ces purges aurait été nécessaire pour réaliser une soviétisation parfaite, condition sine qua non de l'homogénéité du bloc.

Les nouveaux régimes profitaient d'une certaine légitime politique voire soutien populaire basée sur ceux qui profitaient du nouveau système. Effectivement la situation d'économies sous-développées [...] encore sous-industrialisés, à dominante agricole, avec une population habitant majoritairement les zones rurales, employés dans une agriculture d'autosubsistance se prêtait aisément à un "capital-based" développement de l'industrie lourde, technologiquement peu avancé. Ce soutien s'est basé alors à la fois sur les nouvelles élites ayant remplacées celles victimes de la purge et les anciens paysans devenu travailleur.

Mais, la soviétisation [...] provoque la naissance de [...] la désoviétisation à cause de sa nature trop rigide et doctrinaire. La désoviétisation décrit un ensemble de mécanismes [...] qui permettent au régime communiste de perdurer.
 

Surtout au niveau économique se présentait des problèmes à cause d'une croissance économique extensive - c'est à dire basée sur une augmentation d'"input" (travailleurs et capital) - qui fallait être remplacée par une croissance intensive - c'est à dire basée sur une augmentation de la productivité. Un besoin économique voire financière qui n'était augmenté par le mal du bloc soviétique de maintenir leurs dépenses militaires élèves.

Suite vient la tentative de sauvetage du bloc par sa modernisation et sa relégitimation [qui finalement] échouera. Cet effet Gorbachev consiste en partie de l'idée de faire de la Pologne (et de la Hongrie) un modèle réformateur mais pas de faire du table rond - pour juste citer un exemple - un modèle de la sortie du communisme pour le pays de l'Europe central en grande partie à cause du fait que la certitude que les moyens de coercition internes étaient hors d'image devait être confortée par la preuve que le centre de l'empire ne réagissait pas non plus.

Ce qui nous laisse avec une réfolution (contraction des mots évolution et reforme) en Europe central qui menait à une passation du pouvoir - à l'exception de la Roumanie - négociée.

The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire - Volume I

Edward Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire is a bit of a monster seeing as it is split in five volumes of 500 pages each. I am considering myself a bit of a fool for even having started it, but then I am also a bit of a fool for trying to learn Arabic, so I guess that's just who I am. Anyway, the first volume I've finished now and it made for a surprisingly enjoyable and pleasurable read. I was expected a more out-dated language, a less modern historiography and in general a much slower, more tedious lecture.

Instead Gibbon's offers a fast-paced, battle-filled account of Roman history, which in fact moves too fast at times, with emperors, generals, and battles even cities being named left and right that I had never heard of before (raise your hand if you know Nicomedia, well really, you should know it, take my word for it). Apart from feeling a bit lost at times amid all these historical personalities that I had been unaware of previously, Gibbon's does provide his reader with a far better understanding of the Roman empire, its constant internal and external struggles, its borders, boundaries and centers. He showed how Rome moved from being the center of the universe, well empire, to the seat of an ignored Senate, discusses the Praetorian Guard, which for him was instrumental in bringing about the decline of Roman civic virtue, the emergence of a military state with the emperors, and finally the rise of Christianity within the empire.

Publius Abroad Update

Just a few updates on what I've written on my Publius Abroad blog:

On the Eurozone, don't expect this to be over before 2013 and reconsidering it. Additionally, Germany's Master Plan for Europe or rather lack of it.

And a statistical and graphical breakdown of final electoral results in Tunisia.

Publius Abroad

I am running a new endeavor by the way. Publius Abroad

Here my first three posts on Tunisian elections, the Bundestag's decision on the Eurozone crisis last week, and the following summit.

Europe blog

I have started writing on another blog over at the Foreign Policy Association. You can find said new blog here: http://europe.foreignpolicyblogs.com/

Europe continued

I am actually decently busy at work, so let's keep this short, even if it would be fun to engage in something a bit more fundamental. (IPE)

Europe as a whole does not have a military of course (the battle groups are ready by now, but let's pass on that). It is not true that Europe always has been divided on these issues (even if I of course adhere to the more general point that this is too frequently, if not to say usually, the case), Afghanistan seems to be the most striking counter example. The point I was trying to make here is that Europe's militaries would suffice to act against virtually everyone (with a few notable exceptions that apply to the US as well). Basically, Europe's armies are powerless only when compared to the US and why should Europe even try to compete with its closest ally?

It is clear that the provision of security for Europe by the US has greatly widened the range of possibilities for European social policy decision-making. Europe paid back through a lack of foreign policy independence though (Suez being only the most prominent example).

I did realize that the post was mainly geared towards economics, I guess I just enjoy looking at security and foreign policy more. Anyways. I think it is important to note that most people in Europe don't believe in the necessity of more fiscal stimulus (rightly or wrongly - I tend to believe they are wrong, but that's besides the point really). They are not asking the US to provide further stimulus to their economy even if they will take the continuing exports of course (and the German obliviousness to their problematic status as Exportweltmeister shall not even be further explored). The crisis is seen as having originated in the US alone (again, rightly or wrongly, I tend to believe there is a point to this, but again, that doesn't really matter) and people ask themselves why they should help bail out an unregulated overly-capitalistic giant (it would be a pretty hard political sell as well btw). I am not quite sure then whether it can be called free-riding if you do something I don't think I necessarily need, even when it benefits me to some extent.

The IMF:
diplomats say that the strongest opposition to thorough IMF reforms currently comes from the US – reluctant to give up its de facto ability to veto IMF decisions – rather than Europe. (CER)

I don't remember where I read this, but the US also refuses to discuss supranational structures in order to oversee the international financial system (which is not surprising considering the differing attitudes (modern/post-modern) in the US and Europe). I thus simply have a hard time seeing how the American position is more cooperative than the European one. You can of course argue that the European positions are wrong and that Europe should come around to the American ones, but that's not cooperation anymore then. In fact that'd smell suspiciously like the same old (admittedly benign) coercion.

Bashing Europe

Well, well, well.

Now I am the last one not to criticize European leaders for their lack of action and coordination, but I do feel that some criticism leveled at Europe from the US (conveniently?) forgets to put into account some aspects of European contributions.

1 - Europe (as a whole) has by far the second most impressive military in the world. Would Americans really want the EU to start competing with them too?

2 - American security provision exists only when American (hegemonic if you want) interests are concerned (see the lack of activity in Albania and Macedonia). Plus, if that provision includes starting (or continuing) unnecessary wars all over the place (Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Iraq to name just a few) I have to wonder why European accounts should even be charged for it.

3 - For the war that Europe supported (Afghanistan) Europeans have provided nearly as many troops as the US did.

4 - If you put development aid into account, European spending on world affairs is not really all that much smaller than that of the US.

5 - Without European support (intelligence, infrastructure) wars such as in Iraq would be virtually impossible for the US or in the least far more expensive (in political and financial terms).

What else? Criticism from the US that Europe is only willing to coordinate on their terms is quite amusing of course (Kyoto anyone? the ICC?), I am not even going to really comment on that.

I could try to respond to some of the more specific accusations against the European (non-)activities on economic/financial questions. Let it suffice to say that some American beliefs simply are not shared by a large majority of European politicians (fiscal stimulus!) so why should they adapt their policies in order to please a partner with whom they disagree? And that the difference between $99,7 million and $100 million is not something that I would describe with the word chunk.

One last, and more important, note though. I understand some of the criticism leveled at Europe (if not its tone), but all those people clamoring for more European contributions hopefully realize one thing: It'll come at a cost. Europe having its own security/defense forces will not let itself be pushed around by the US on foreign policy issues. The same is true for virtually every policy field. Be sure you know what you wish for is all I can say. Me, I think Iraq, this crisis, the G20 all mark very much the twilight of the American unipolar moment.

Europe

One of my professors at UNC last year, Thomas Oatley, generally takes a rather critical view of monetary aspects of European integration. In his IPE textbook for one his outlook on the future of a common European currency without an accompanying economic government is rather pessimistic (or realistic, but in any case not rosy). Recent events seem to provide evidence that he is right (and the € doomed) and even mainstream European publications have picked up on the possibility of monetary union failing. On his blog there now is a post mocking (criticizing if you want) review of European leaders' responses to the monetary crisis.

I do not have much to say in defence of European governments, I wholeheartedly agree with Mr Oatley's implication that these national responses are not sufficient in fact. Especially Germany needs to step up to the plate and help its neighbors in need, simply because it is one of the few countries (if not the only European one) that can, because of its own interests (preserving the €) even coming at a short-term price, but also out of interest in the higher ideals of European integration and the amazing progress we have made on this continent ever since 1945.

What I think needs to be stressed are the underlying reasons for this lack of European coordination. The main (philosophical) problem as far as I am concerned is that there is no European identity. The news, the discussion, the political leaders in Europe (or in the two countries, France and Germany, where I follow the news in any case) are French or German and nothing else. There is not enough acceptance of an overriding European frame-work. Merkel is a German politician that has to deal with the impact of her policies on a German electorate (federal elections in September!) that is not willing to pay for the 'spend-thrift' countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. She has to furthermore deal with an inner-party rival in Seehofer (who recently emerged as the new leader of the Bavarian section of the Union (CDU/CSU) (imagine the Dixiecrats having formed their own party at some point and constantly winning by large percentages in the South while still working as part of the Democrats in Washington; it's not a good situation as anyone familiar with Strom Thurgood can attest)) who through populist attacks is trying to make up for the recent electoral losses of the CSU. National politics and posturing simply pays more than European solidarity (see Sarkozy's initiatives at the outbreak of the Gaza War for example, completely ignoring its effects on the perception of the Czech EU-presidency).

On a more structural level two aspects seem to be of relevance to me.
As part of a realist approach, Germany ever since its reunification (and the disappearance of the dinosaur Kohl) has shown more willingness to assert itself on the European political scene. A mixture of a bad conscience (and thus genuine conviction) and a perception of it being the only way leading to international acceptance after the Second World War, made the Federal Republic willing to foot a large part of the bill of European integration. This is not the case anymore. Constrained budgets in Germany (and an obsession with a debt-free budget) and the difficult economic period following the reunification, further increased this aversion to pay for developments perceived as emanating from other countries only.

On a cultural level, the problem quite simply is that there are not enough Europeans governing Europeans countries. The descriptive aspects enumerated above concerning Merkel could easily be transferred to Sarkozy or any other European national leader. The politicians of this generation have not had the same exposure to Europe as (some) members of my generation did. Merkel never spent a significant amount of time abroad, neither did Sarkozy. I had a course with Hubert Védrine (Secretary of State in France under the Jospin government; came up with the controversial term of hyperpuissance) here in France and his point of view is also extremely nationalist. I honestly feel like there is a disconnect between the EU as it has evolved over the years, between the reality of European life and interdependence and the people that actually govern it (above the EU-bureaucrat level that is). If I look at the members of my generation that care about European (and international) politics, then I see a group of people that speaks three languages at least (English and the respective mother tongue being a given) that has friends and significant others' of different nationalities and different origins. These circumstances of life shape decisions and perspectives. European leaders today lack this perspective.

Yet, to be slightly more optimistic (weird position for me to be in admittedly) and even though I really like Alexandre Dumas, it is not unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno of course, but rather the ever deeper union. Even the United States needed 21 years from independence to the ratification of its constitution and that took place in a union far smaller and diverse than today's EU. We need some more time for any kind of true European solidarity to emerge.

I personally hope that the current crisis will lead to an extension and deepening of European integration. But then maybe I am a hopelessly naive federalist.

La puissance ou la mort

Surtout parce que ayant une bibliographie en trois langues est cool mais également parce que j'avais pensé que une perspective française serait intéressante sinon nécessaire au point des vues des relations trans-atlantique et du développement d'une politique étrangère et militaire commune. Il faut admettre quand même que j'ai triché avec ce bouquin-là. Je ne l'ai pas fini.

Christian Saint-Étienne dans La puissance ou la mort. L'Europe face à l'empire américain offre une analyse de la situation mondiale politique et à la fin donne son avis comment les Européens dévraient réagir face au déclin relatif des États-Unis et l'émergence de la Chine. C'est cette partie que je n'ai pas lue, l'analyse de Saint-Étienne enfin n'était pas assez convaincante pour que j'aie eu envie de passer deux heures en plus lisant ses propositions.

Son livre, à mon avis, est surtout écrit pour le monde non-academic et pour cette raison on y trouvre trop de populisme, des citations simplistique et une analyse très superficielle. En plus, je ne suis simplement pas d'accord avec certain de ses conclusions. Par exemple, il croit que le monde sera dominé par une autre pair de supers puissances (les États-Unis et la Chine) commençant environ en 2020. Moi au contraire je crois qu'on revient dans une situation similaire de l'Europe après la défaite de Napoleon. Alors, une balance de puissance avec plusieurs joueurs (les deux déjà nommés, l'Europe, l'Inde, même le Brésil peut-être), un monde multipolaire enfin , pas bipolaire.

Alors, il faut pas que vous le lisez.

Eurosceptism

The Times argues in a column that a revised Constitutional Treaty (which would be purged of certain national elements (anthem....) and not be called constitutional anymore (which was incorrect and a PR debacle in the first place)) is not wanted nor needed in Europe. They also demand, not to be cheated out of a referendum on this treaty. They obviously have a point in regard to the referenda (I will get back to that in a second), but their overall argument is quite faulty.

The implication is that the treaty gives 'still more power to the European bureaucracy.' This completely ignores the fact that the treaty in its current form actually strengtens national parliaments as well as the EP. Also, through qualified majority voting (meaning that not as many issues would require unanimous deciscion-making anymore) the clout of democratically elected politicians would be strengthened (even if at the expense of the nation state, yet definitely not favoring the European bureaucracy).

Fear of the 'Franco-German alliance' dominating the EU are invoked, which suggests that the author has not kept up to date on his politics for a while. Ever since the accessions of 2004 France and Germany simply cannot dominate as much anymore, two countries, no matter their size or historical/traditional EU-powers, cannot impose their will on 25 others. If Britain was willing to take a more active role in EU-politics, its influence would rise accordingly and no would be able to (nor really want to) prevent this from happening. A case in point for this would be developement of the European Defense and Security Policy in which Britain played a decisive role (plainly speaking, it would have never gotten off the ground if not for British involvement).

Finally, William Rees-Mogg claims that 'a number of countries' would prefer no new treaty. I don't see that. Poland, yes. The UK, maybe (not so sure whether Blair or even Brown would agree). But that's kind of it, I believe 18 countries have ratified the Constitutional Treaty, showing open support to it, two have rejected it. I wonder a little where those numbers that he talks about are coming from.

Lastly, in regard to possible referenda, I agree that it would be elitist to ratifiy a new treaty based on the old Constitutional one, especially in France, the Netherlands (where the people rejected the earlier one) and the UK (where a referendum had been promised to the people). Yet, I would argue that a referendum should take place on a European level, on one day, involving some kind of mixture of states and absolute votes won to pass the treaty. Thus, the people would have their say, but at the same time would not pass judgement on Blair, Chirac or Balkenende and turn Europe into a scapegoat. This obviously will not happen, national politicians are not really interested in creating a European political arena, but it would be a strong signal of taking the people and European democracy serious while at the same time strengthening an emerging European society (yes, it is still a long way to go, but what do you want? I am a progressive utopian sometimes, not just a cycnic all the time).

European Solidarity

Ulrich Speck and Timothy Ash call for European solidarity in the face of Iranian aggression - the capture of 15 British soldiers. I wholeheartedly agree. I am sick and tired of the Europeans' lacking unity in regard to foreign policy. Whether it be the Iraq War or the American Missile Systems in Eastern Europe. If we really want to talk about the EU as a proper political institution then now is the time to defend our European soldiers by a unified reaction (such as a common boycott of relations and the threat of immediate economical repercussions) pronounced by the current EU leader (Frau Merkel). This situation really is calling for European solidarity. Otherwise one really has to wonder what the point of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) is. Or what the point of a European army would be.