The second part of the Snopes Trilogy (read my review of the first part) allowed me to delve deeper into Faulkner's universe, into Yoknapatawpha County. Cross references in other books make more sense now, especially Chick Mallison and his uncle Gavin Stevens who both appear again in one of my favorite Faulkner novels Intruder in the Dust become more well-rounded characters. I enjoyed the book thus as a Faulkner enthusiast, I was happy to welcome back Ratliff and the indomitable Flem Snopes, yet I would refrain from recommending this work to anyone looking for an introduction to Faulkner.
Granted, his prose is once again of course magnificient, his sentences are wonderfully convoluted and the occasional re-reading is a necessity. The story also runs along smoothly, and offers enough suspense (not in outcome, Faulkner rarely provides that, but in how things arrive to be that way) to keep to reader attached to the book (except of course if he has as much work as me). Yet, for some reason that I cannot pinpoint quite well, The Town will not be one of my favorite Faulkner novels, easily being beat by The Sound and the Fury, the aforementioned Intruder in the Dust, Go Down Moses, and Absalom, Absalom.
Tuesday, May 06, 2008
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
Exorbitant Privilege
I wrote an economics paper on the side this semester, dealing with the United States' (or the dollar's) benefit accrueing through its position in the international monetary system. Very interesting subject I found out, check it out.
Tuesday, April 01, 2008
Money and Security
Hubert Zimmermann, a German author, wrote Money and Security. Troops, Monetary Policy, and West Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971 in English, even while focusing on a part of German history I had been embarassingly unaware of. I will not focus too much on it, as I plan on using it in my master thesis and an economics paper that I have to write.
Let it suffice to say that Zimmermann, shows in a very conscise and convincing manner how Germany came under pressure from the United States (and to a lesser extent Britain) because of the foreign exchange surplus that foreign troops in Germany created for the mark. Because these troops had to be paid in German money, Germany ran a balance-of-payments surplus for years on end (not only because of that though, but this was responsible for a large part of it).
The United States continously during the 1960s tried the German government to offset this deficit (for the US), succeeding increasingly less over the course of that decade. Highly interesting stuff, the foreign troops in Germany thus directly contributed to the end of the Bretton Woods system. Economy and security as two sides of one and the same coin. Read it. (I am too tired for better posts tonight, sorry)
Let it suffice to say that Zimmermann, shows in a very conscise and convincing manner how Germany came under pressure from the United States (and to a lesser extent Britain) because of the foreign exchange surplus that foreign troops in Germany created for the mark. Because these troops had to be paid in German money, Germany ran a balance-of-payments surplus for years on end (not only because of that though, but this was responsible for a large part of it).
The United States continously during the 1960s tried the German government to offset this deficit (for the US), succeeding increasingly less over the course of that decade. Highly interesting stuff, the foreign troops in Germany thus directly contributed to the end of the Bretton Woods system. Economy and security as two sides of one and the same coin. Read it. (I am too tired for better posts tonight, sorry)
Jesse James. Last Rebel of the Civil War.
I had - intelligently enough I know - forgotten this book on the subway once (just btw, I don't think that had ever happened to me before, that I lost a book that is), but someone (thank you someone, you are always on my mind) got it for me again. It took me a while, but I picked it up the other day (more like week, considering the amount of academic stuff I read nowadays) and started from the beginning again.
Well, the book is wonderful, T. J. Stiles does a great job of not only describing the outlaw Jesse James' life, but also places him in a broader historical context, that most people are hardly aware of. - A completely unrelated sidenote at this point, Lucky Luke comics are historically super accurate, it is quite stunning. The more I find out about American history, the more I realize how many minute and truthful details Goscinny and Morris included in their comics. The portrayal of Jesse James in their version is the most accurate one I have ever seen anywhere in a fictionalized format - Basically, Jesse James was not just a Bandit of the Wild West, like Billy the Kid (and even he was part of a politicized struggle) or Butch Cassidy, but instead he was really a rebel who could not stop fighting once the Civil War was over.
Stiles places James in the context of a militarized Missouri, where neighbors and families drift to differing political camps (mainly based on their ownership of and economic dependence on slaves). While the Civil War in Missouri was not as bloody as Sherman's march through Georgia or Gettysburg, while it did not involve massive armies fighting the first modern war, it pitted guerilla units from Kansas (the Jayhawkers), against those from Missouri (the Bushwackers) as well as Unionist militias (who in fact won the bloody war against the Bushwackers). Both sides massacred and robbed families and farms sympathizing with the other side indiscriminately, while - of course - claiming to fight for the worthier cause.
After the war, the Radicals (basically the most extreme wing of the Republican Party and ironically dominated by German immigrants) took over the Missouri government and enacted wide-sweeping reforms, emancipating slaves and disempowering Confederate veterans - sound policy from today's point of view really. This did lead to Southern sympathizers' embitterment of course, something which the James (Frank and Jesse) and Younger brothers gave impression too. They simply kept on robbing trains and banks, limiting their escapades (not solely, but mostly) to governmental or Northern company owned assets, and considered this the continuation of war with other means (not my idea of a joke, this is from Stiles).
In the end, they simply outlived themselves, after 1876, reconstruction was over, the Democrats had a majority in Missouri and were instrumental in Washington again, the Lost Cause was not as lost at it had seemed (see black emancipation and legal rights). The bandits who had missed their opportunity to become regular citizens lost support in the population as they were not considered allies in a fight against the oppressor anymore.
Jesse James finally, can be understood only in the context of the Civil War, in the fight of Southerners against Northern aggression (or - and more accurate aside from historical glorifications and my personal affinity for the American South - in the fight of Southerners for the preservation of slavery). He was not just a criminal, he shaped political debate, through his letter-writing, through his newspaper consumption, through the choice of his targets and it can be argued that he was on the winning side, except that his erstwhile allies didn't want any part of him anymore after their victory at the polls was secured.
He died, shot in the back by members of his own band. Times had moved on, the money on his head had become more important than his cause to Robert Ford (the coward according to popular myth).
Well, the book is wonderful, T. J. Stiles does a great job of not only describing the outlaw Jesse James' life, but also places him in a broader historical context, that most people are hardly aware of. - A completely unrelated sidenote at this point, Lucky Luke comics are historically super accurate, it is quite stunning. The more I find out about American history, the more I realize how many minute and truthful details Goscinny and Morris included in their comics. The portrayal of Jesse James in their version is the most accurate one I have ever seen anywhere in a fictionalized format - Basically, Jesse James was not just a Bandit of the Wild West, like Billy the Kid (and even he was part of a politicized struggle) or Butch Cassidy, but instead he was really a rebel who could not stop fighting once the Civil War was over.
Stiles places James in the context of a militarized Missouri, where neighbors and families drift to differing political camps (mainly based on their ownership of and economic dependence on slaves). While the Civil War in Missouri was not as bloody as Sherman's march through Georgia or Gettysburg, while it did not involve massive armies fighting the first modern war, it pitted guerilla units from Kansas (the Jayhawkers), against those from Missouri (the Bushwackers) as well as Unionist militias (who in fact won the bloody war against the Bushwackers). Both sides massacred and robbed families and farms sympathizing with the other side indiscriminately, while - of course - claiming to fight for the worthier cause.
After the war, the Radicals (basically the most extreme wing of the Republican Party and ironically dominated by German immigrants) took over the Missouri government and enacted wide-sweeping reforms, emancipating slaves and disempowering Confederate veterans - sound policy from today's point of view really. This did lead to Southern sympathizers' embitterment of course, something which the James (Frank and Jesse) and Younger brothers gave impression too. They simply kept on robbing trains and banks, limiting their escapades (not solely, but mostly) to governmental or Northern company owned assets, and considered this the continuation of war with other means (not my idea of a joke, this is from Stiles).
In the end, they simply outlived themselves, after 1876, reconstruction was over, the Democrats had a majority in Missouri and were instrumental in Washington again, the Lost Cause was not as lost at it had seemed (see black emancipation and legal rights). The bandits who had missed their opportunity to become regular citizens lost support in the population as they were not considered allies in a fight against the oppressor anymore.
Jesse James finally, can be understood only in the context of the Civil War, in the fight of Southerners against Northern aggression (or - and more accurate aside from historical glorifications and my personal affinity for the American South - in the fight of Southerners for the preservation of slavery). He was not just a criminal, he shaped political debate, through his letter-writing, through his newspaper consumption, through the choice of his targets and it can be argued that he was on the winning side, except that his erstwhile allies didn't want any part of him anymore after their victory at the polls was secured.
He died, shot in the back by members of his own band. Times had moved on, the money on his head had become more important than his cause to Robert Ford (the coward according to popular myth).
Sunday, March 23, 2008
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
Another realist explanation of international politics, John J. Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics provided a slightly different take than Waltz or James had. He argues for a more aggresive version which he terms offensive realism. The main difference most likely being that in his system, states seek hegemonic power and not just a balance of powers in order to ensure their continued survival.
I did not admittedly, if shamefully, read the whole book, as I have started to realize that I should probably start working on my master thesis in a little more goal-orientated form. Yet, I found Mearsheimer's comments and analysis interesting even if at times more like a blueprint against which I can argue. As an introduction to realist thought I would definitely recommend this over either Waltz or James simply because it is a lot easier to read and understand. Don't stop with him though, Waltz is a lot more encompassing and in the end makes a more persuavive argument in my opinion.
I did not admittedly, if shamefully, read the whole book, as I have started to realize that I should probably start working on my master thesis in a little more goal-orientated form. Yet, I found Mearsheimer's comments and analysis interesting even if at times more like a blueprint against which I can argue. As an introduction to realist thought I would definitely recommend this over either Waltz or James simply because it is a lot easier to read and understand. Don't stop with him though, Waltz is a lot more encompassing and in the end makes a more persuavive argument in my opinion.
Thursday, March 06, 2008
Theory of International Politics
After the Patrick James' book proved so inconclusive (and complicated) I decided to check out his (and my current favored explanatory theory's) ideological forefather, Kenneth N. Waltz. His book, Theory of International Politics, seems to be to realism what Das Kapital is to Marxism, it provides the founding idea. I found it to be easier and to a large extent more applicable than International Relations & Scientific Progress and can generally only recommend it to students of international relations.
Waltz's argument is the more or less well-known and plain realist one. He believes in an international system that is state-centered. These states foremost care about their own survival and all their actions are fundamentally shaped by this belief. He furthermore puts forward the argument that a bipolar system is fundamentally more stable (as in peaceful, meaning less wars) than a multipolar world. Especially a tripolar world according to him is inherently instable, as two great powers could band up on the third one and divide the spoils (which does not bode well for the future I guess, since my arguments probably will be that we are moving towards a world just like that).
One last note, some of his observations while surely sound at the time seem anachronistic today, as he for example claims that interdependence in his day (1979) was lower than before the First World War. Today, with China financing American debt and the EU having become an ever more important trading partner this seems like a dubious assumption to say the least.
I will not expound further on this book, too many ideas, too much food for thought, and I am too tired, but read it (or read my master thesis once I am done, I will pick up on a lot of this), seriously, it is worth it.
Waltz's argument is the more or less well-known and plain realist one. He believes in an international system that is state-centered. These states foremost care about their own survival and all their actions are fundamentally shaped by this belief. He furthermore puts forward the argument that a bipolar system is fundamentally more stable (as in peaceful, meaning less wars) than a multipolar world. Especially a tripolar world according to him is inherently instable, as two great powers could band up on the third one and divide the spoils (which does not bode well for the future I guess, since my arguments probably will be that we are moving towards a world just like that).
One last note, some of his observations while surely sound at the time seem anachronistic today, as he for example claims that interdependence in his day (1979) was lower than before the First World War. Today, with China financing American debt and the EU having become an ever more important trading partner this seems like a dubious assumption to say the least.
I will not expound further on this book, too many ideas, too much food for thought, and I am too tired, but read it (or read my master thesis once I am done, I will pick up on a lot of this), seriously, it is worth it.
Thursday, February 28, 2008
La puissance ou la mort
Surtout parce que ayant une bibliographie en trois langues est cool mais également parce que j'avais pensé que une perspective française serait intéressante sinon nécessaire au point des vues des relations trans-atlantique et du développement d'une politique étrangère et militaire commune. Il faut admettre quand même que j'ai triché avec ce bouquin-là. Je ne l'ai pas fini.
Christian Saint-Étienne dans La puissance ou la mort. L'Europe face à l'empire américain offre une analyse de la situation mondiale politique et à la fin donne son avis comment les Européens dévraient réagir face au déclin relatif des États-Unis et l'émergence de la Chine. C'est cette partie que je n'ai pas lue, l'analyse de Saint-Étienne enfin n'était pas assez convaincante pour que j'aie eu envie de passer deux heures en plus lisant ses propositions.
Son livre, à mon avis, est surtout écrit pour le monde non-academic et pour cette raison on y trouvre trop de populisme, des citations simplistique et une analyse très superficielle. En plus, je ne suis simplement pas d'accord avec certain de ses conclusions. Par exemple, il croit que le monde sera dominé par une autre pair de supers puissances (les États-Unis et la Chine) commençant environ en 2020. Moi au contraire je crois qu'on revient dans une situation similaire de l'Europe après la défaite de Napoleon. Alors, une balance de puissance avec plusieurs joueurs (les deux déjà nommés, l'Europe, l'Inde, même le Brésil peut-être), un monde multipolaire enfin , pas bipolaire.
Alors, il faut pas que vous le lisez.
Christian Saint-Étienne dans La puissance ou la mort. L'Europe face à l'empire américain offre une analyse de la situation mondiale politique et à la fin donne son avis comment les Européens dévraient réagir face au déclin relatif des États-Unis et l'émergence de la Chine. C'est cette partie que je n'ai pas lue, l'analyse de Saint-Étienne enfin n'était pas assez convaincante pour que j'aie eu envie de passer deux heures en plus lisant ses propositions.
Son livre, à mon avis, est surtout écrit pour le monde non-academic et pour cette raison on y trouvre trop de populisme, des citations simplistique et une analyse très superficielle. En plus, je ne suis simplement pas d'accord avec certain de ses conclusions. Par exemple, il croit que le monde sera dominé par une autre pair de supers puissances (les États-Unis et la Chine) commençant environ en 2020. Moi au contraire je crois qu'on revient dans une situation similaire de l'Europe après la défaite de Napoleon. Alors, une balance de puissance avec plusieurs joueurs (les deux déjà nommés, l'Europe, l'Inde, même le Brésil peut-être), un monde multipolaire enfin , pas bipolaire.
Alors, il faut pas que vous le lisez.
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Exposé 2
A second version of my exposé for my Magisterarbeit (master thesis). I am not very happy or confident about the theoretical part yet, but I need to actually start producing something. What can I say apart from that? 17 pages of notes, 10 books, lik 20 articles and I could keep on reading forever. If this wasn't so much fun, it would be depressing.
Monday, February 25, 2008
War Against the Panthers
I finally finished Huey P. Newton's War Against the Panthers: A Study Of Repression in America (his doctoral dissertation) this evening. Only a couple of words about it here, because (a) it is relatively short, (b) very descriptive only, and (c) not all that exciting to read. Newton's opening is very strong where he explains how he does not consider the US a democracy, because of '[1] social and racial cleavages which have historically been the source of division and bitter antagonism between sectors, and [2] the inherent and long-standing distrust held by America's ruling class of any institutionalized democracy involving the mass population.'
Quite obviously, Newton, (and understandably considering his experiences) exaggerates the relevance of oppression as a means of governing the United States, but he makes a very coherent and convincing argument. While this argument is not completely swaying, it does result in sympathetic interest and a desire to further one's knowledge in this 'other' side of American history. The Haymarket incident, Emma Goldmann, AIM, the FBI's activities against civil rights leaders and the Black Panther Party all do show a shocking lack of democratic institutions in the United States until well into the 1970s.
Newton after this historical summary just enumerates the ways in which the BPP was attacked by government agents (CIA, FBI, IRS, local police). I cannot verify most of his claims, but from what I can gather (or know as of right now) his general point of the BPP having been unjustly repressed is very valid.
In the end a truly interesting story, even if I would prefer reading something more comprehensive and less tedious and factually dominated about this. Mainly, because I feel like the dark sides of American history are gladly (and too easily) glossed over in today's society (where girls with teary eyes sing the national anthem before a basketball game rejoicing in their patriotic souls without really reflecting on what it is they are endorsing and praising).
Quite obviously, Newton, (and understandably considering his experiences) exaggerates the relevance of oppression as a means of governing the United States, but he makes a very coherent and convincing argument. While this argument is not completely swaying, it does result in sympathetic interest and a desire to further one's knowledge in this 'other' side of American history. The Haymarket incident, Emma Goldmann, AIM, the FBI's activities against civil rights leaders and the Black Panther Party all do show a shocking lack of democratic institutions in the United States until well into the 1970s.
Newton after this historical summary just enumerates the ways in which the BPP was attacked by government agents (CIA, FBI, IRS, local police). I cannot verify most of his claims, but from what I can gather (or know as of right now) his general point of the BPP having been unjustly repressed is very valid.
In the end a truly interesting story, even if I would prefer reading something more comprehensive and less tedious and factually dominated about this. Mainly, because I feel like the dark sides of American history are gladly (and too easily) glossed over in today's society (where girls with teary eyes sing the national anthem before a basketball game rejoicing in their patriotic souls without really reflecting on what it is they are endorsing and praising).
International Relations & Scientific Progress
This book was a wonderfully smooth read, that I enjoyed throughout the few days that I had the honor of perusing it. Read it, your life will be worth more for it once you are done.
Actually, touch this book only if you really feel the need to be put in your place, if you really want to dwell on your stupidity and incomprehension of political science. Patrick James' International Relations & Scientific Progress - Structural Realism Reconsidered is possibly - rivaled by Joyce's Ulysseus maybe, but I never actually finished that - the most complicated book I ever read. Another author (Barry R. Posen) had referenced to structural realism as an interesting theory in order to explain the European build-up in military capability. So I had stumbled upon this oeuvre.
Again, I had a really hard time getting through this, a really hard time. James focuses less on structural realism as a theory, but seemingly spends more time on the theoretical determination of theories, of scientific valid and sound propositions. He recounts numerous criticisms of realism in its differing varieties. Not knowing all (or even most of) these varieties nor their criticism I read the first 100 pages of this book understanding maybe a third (talking about a frustrating experience by the way). This lack of understanding is not really due so much to the vocabulary that he utilizes (even though that is quite thought-provoking (to put it positively) as well), but due his multiple references and most of all to the ridiculously abstract discussion James leads.
In later parts, when he actually explains what he considers to be the best (and most recent) version structural realism, the book becomes a lot clearer and might actually have helped me some, but I will need to look at this theory again from another angle, sorry Patrick.
Just really quickly, one of his main points is that unit (countries/states) analysis is not sufficient as these micro-micro relations (as he calls them) do not reflect the aggregate of actions in international relations. He proposes a sytemism analysis that also includes macro-micro and macro-macro relations and thus including structure (bipolarity, multipolarity...) and interdependent developments.
He identifies six aspects as defining structural realism:
state centrism (as the most relevant actor in the international field)
rational choice (the actors, the states)
security seeking (again, the states)
anarchy (in the international system)
status undifferentiated by function (I am still working on that)
structure as capability distribution (virtually economic and military power distribution all over the world)
I am not going to discuss this further, mainly because I move on very thin ice here, but I will definitely come back to this, after having read more.
Actually, touch this book only if you really feel the need to be put in your place, if you really want to dwell on your stupidity and incomprehension of political science. Patrick James' International Relations & Scientific Progress - Structural Realism Reconsidered is possibly - rivaled by Joyce's Ulysseus maybe, but I never actually finished that - the most complicated book I ever read. Another author (Barry R. Posen) had referenced to structural realism as an interesting theory in order to explain the European build-up in military capability. So I had stumbled upon this oeuvre.
Again, I had a really hard time getting through this, a really hard time. James focuses less on structural realism as a theory, but seemingly spends more time on the theoretical determination of theories, of scientific valid and sound propositions. He recounts numerous criticisms of realism in its differing varieties. Not knowing all (or even most of) these varieties nor their criticism I read the first 100 pages of this book understanding maybe a third (talking about a frustrating experience by the way). This lack of understanding is not really due so much to the vocabulary that he utilizes (even though that is quite thought-provoking (to put it positively) as well), but due his multiple references and most of all to the ridiculously abstract discussion James leads.
In later parts, when he actually explains what he considers to be the best (and most recent) version structural realism, the book becomes a lot clearer and might actually have helped me some, but I will need to look at this theory again from another angle, sorry Patrick.
Just really quickly, one of his main points is that unit (countries/states) analysis is not sufficient as these micro-micro relations (as he calls them) do not reflect the aggregate of actions in international relations. He proposes a sytemism analysis that also includes macro-micro and macro-macro relations and thus including structure (bipolarity, multipolarity...) and interdependent developments.
He identifies six aspects as defining structural realism:
state centrism (as the most relevant actor in the international field)
rational choice (the actors, the states)
security seeking (again, the states)
anarchy (in the international system)
status undifferentiated by function (I am still working on that)
structure as capability distribution (virtually economic and military power distribution all over the world)
I am not going to discuss this further, mainly because I move on very thin ice here, but I will definitely come back to this, after having read more.
Friday, February 22, 2008
End The War
So, basically every (pseudo or truly) left-wing person on this campus is of the opinion that the US needs to 'end the war in (or on I guess) Iraq.' SDS organized a demonstration to that extent in the Pit yesterday, most people I know here probably wholeheartedly agree. Now, I am definitely left-leaning (well, maybe not just leaning, but you get my point, long live Rosa, Karl, Rudi and Daniel!) as well, but this is just plain bullshit.
First, the US cannot 'end' the war in the first place. Iraq has been enduring a simmering civil war, pulling out American troops will not stop extremists from trying to topple a (more or less) secular regime. The slogan per se is just ridiculous thus. You could compare this to some extent with the Vietnam War where the 'end' of the war by the Americans led to two more years of fighting followed by North Vietnamese troops conquering Hanoi, or Afghanistan where the 'end' of the war by the Soviet Union led to an everlasting civil war, which only the Taliban kind of ended, for better or worse, but that is besides the point really. An occupying (and to some extent) stabilizing power such as the US in Iraq is simply not capable of ending a war which it - inadvertently - caused but cannot control.
Second, let us assume for a second the US is going to crouch back home like a dog with its tail stuck between its hind legs. Let us also abstract for a second from the impact on the perception of American power and how serious countries like Sudan (Darfur!) will take American threats. What will most likely happen in Iraq? As of right now there is Shiite-dominated government (with a Kurdish president). The Northern part of the country has to some extent emancipated itself from the rest of the country and most Sunnis are clamoring for more political power having realized that Al-Qaeda was not a good ally for them to have in the reordering of Iraq after Saddam. These Awakening Councils (of Sunni ex-resistance fighters) have contributed significantly to the (relative and very limited) increase in safety in Iraq over the last few weeks/months. With forced coherence by the Americans falling away now what would happen to this instable power triangle?
The Kurds almost assuredly would try to either become independent or at least segregate themselves even further from the rest of the country. They have decently organized armies (yes, more than one, if they became independent and had no common enemy anymore, the stability of Kurdistan itself would be questionable) and would want (or need) the oil sources around Mossul for economical survival. Also, they would probably try to make most Arabs leave their territory (especially Mossul again were Saddam had been trying to create an Arabic majority). The Shiites, unchecked by American power, would dominate the central government, most likely not feeling any need to include the Sunni-minority in a power-sharing deal. The Awakening Councils and their members, the Sunni militias that patrol for peace and against terrorists as of right now, would they be happy to agree to a situation in which decisions on their political and economical future would be made by a solely Shiite government? Most likely not, their natural response in fact would be to take up arms against this (perceived or truly) repressive government.
Additionally, Iran would try to increase their influence in Iraq through supporting their Shiite 'brethren', Saudi-Arabia would feel the need to support their fellow Sunnis in order to maintain some kind of a balance of power. The Kurds in Turkey (and Syria?) and the PKK still active in Northern Iraq would be beleaguered by a desire to create a Great-Kurdistan, which of course Turkey would not accept. Turkey would also without an American presence feel a lot less inhibited in its incursions into Iraq to fight the PKK.
Did I forget something? I hope not. I think not. I realize this is not the most coherent argument ever, I did not want to spend too much time on this. But this is a challenge to all those of you who say the US needs to 'end the war' now. Tell me why. Tell me why it would be better for the Iraqi people if the US disappeared. Because I just don't see it.
One last note, I was against this invasion (read my older entries), I think the Bush administration grandiosely screwed up with it in more than one sense, but we have to deal with the world as it is, not as we would want it to be. So, again, I hope some of you will find counterarguments for why the American devil needs to get out of Mesopotamia.
First, the US cannot 'end' the war in the first place. Iraq has been enduring a simmering civil war, pulling out American troops will not stop extremists from trying to topple a (more or less) secular regime. The slogan per se is just ridiculous thus. You could compare this to some extent with the Vietnam War where the 'end' of the war by the Americans led to two more years of fighting followed by North Vietnamese troops conquering Hanoi, or Afghanistan where the 'end' of the war by the Soviet Union led to an everlasting civil war, which only the Taliban kind of ended, for better or worse, but that is besides the point really. An occupying (and to some extent) stabilizing power such as the US in Iraq is simply not capable of ending a war which it - inadvertently - caused but cannot control.
Second, let us assume for a second the US is going to crouch back home like a dog with its tail stuck between its hind legs. Let us also abstract for a second from the impact on the perception of American power and how serious countries like Sudan (Darfur!) will take American threats. What will most likely happen in Iraq? As of right now there is Shiite-dominated government (with a Kurdish president). The Northern part of the country has to some extent emancipated itself from the rest of the country and most Sunnis are clamoring for more political power having realized that Al-Qaeda was not a good ally for them to have in the reordering of Iraq after Saddam. These Awakening Councils (of Sunni ex-resistance fighters) have contributed significantly to the (relative and very limited) increase in safety in Iraq over the last few weeks/months. With forced coherence by the Americans falling away now what would happen to this instable power triangle?
The Kurds almost assuredly would try to either become independent or at least segregate themselves even further from the rest of the country. They have decently organized armies (yes, more than one, if they became independent and had no common enemy anymore, the stability of Kurdistan itself would be questionable) and would want (or need) the oil sources around Mossul for economical survival. Also, they would probably try to make most Arabs leave their territory (especially Mossul again were Saddam had been trying to create an Arabic majority). The Shiites, unchecked by American power, would dominate the central government, most likely not feeling any need to include the Sunni-minority in a power-sharing deal. The Awakening Councils and their members, the Sunni militias that patrol for peace and against terrorists as of right now, would they be happy to agree to a situation in which decisions on their political and economical future would be made by a solely Shiite government? Most likely not, their natural response in fact would be to take up arms against this (perceived or truly) repressive government.
Additionally, Iran would try to increase their influence in Iraq through supporting their Shiite 'brethren', Saudi-Arabia would feel the need to support their fellow Sunnis in order to maintain some kind of a balance of power. The Kurds in Turkey (and Syria?) and the PKK still active in Northern Iraq would be beleaguered by a desire to create a Great-Kurdistan, which of course Turkey would not accept. Turkey would also without an American presence feel a lot less inhibited in its incursions into Iraq to fight the PKK.
Did I forget something? I hope not. I think not. I realize this is not the most coherent argument ever, I did not want to spend too much time on this. But this is a challenge to all those of you who say the US needs to 'end the war' now. Tell me why. Tell me why it would be better for the Iraqi people if the US disappeared. Because I just don't see it.
One last note, I was against this invasion (read my older entries), I think the Bush administration grandiosely screwed up with it in more than one sense, but we have to deal with the world as it is, not as we would want it to be. So, again, I hope some of you will find counterarguments for why the American devil needs to get out of Mesopotamia.
Tuesday, February 19, 2008
The Sub-Prime Crisis
Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff in Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison make the argument that the current financial crisis is in fact very much related to earlier ones all over the world. They try to show this through a comparison with data from eighteen crises ranging from 1977 to 1994. Their graphs generally speaking show developments from a point in time (t-4) four years before the onset of the crisis (T) to three years after its climax (t+3). The US crisis of course is different in the sense that we currently are at T. Rogoff and Reinhart then try to make the readers aware of how these other crises in general played out, and, yeah, it is not a pretty picture. In regard to housing prices, real GDP growth per capita, public debt and the current account balance as a percentage of GDP, developments between these eighteen financial crises (especially the so-called five big ones) are eerily similar. A fall in housing prices analogue to earlier cases would mean a loss in value of another 25%. Public debt (and thus really inter-generational borrowing) would in this case also increase significantly (as a side note, as much as I would vote for Democrat just because I abhor religion, xenophobic tendencies, and nationalism, what does an Obama (or Clinton) presidency coupled with Democratic majorities in both Houses mean for the American budget balance and free trade negotiations (see Obama's remarks on NAFTA in today's NY Times).
Finally, the only truly diverging statistic the authors show are real equity prices. Here, prices should have started falling already, yet instead have risen even from t-1 to T. What does this mean then? Rogoff and Reinhart propose as a reason that "the US Federal Reserve [has] pumped in an extraordinary amount of stimulus in the early part of the most recent episode." Whether this is true or not, the relevant question for me would be whether this just means that a decrease in value will occur later than expected (and possibly higher because the value is unnaturally high?) or whether it can be avoided through this stimulus (doubtful somehow, as the Fed cannot simply feeding 'the beast', right?).
Questions, over questions, the social sciences are just wonderful, we really have no clue what's going on, but are very eloquent at making educated guesses. That is why I love it I guess. In any case, it does not look good for the American economy (and by extension the next American president (less important) and the rest of the world (more important)).
Finally, the only truly diverging statistic the authors show are real equity prices. Here, prices should have started falling already, yet instead have risen even from t-1 to T. What does this mean then? Rogoff and Reinhart propose as a reason that "the US Federal Reserve [has] pumped in an extraordinary amount of stimulus in the early part of the most recent episode." Whether this is true or not, the relevant question for me would be whether this just means that a decrease in value will occur later than expected (and possibly higher because the value is unnaturally high?) or whether it can be avoided through this stimulus (doubtful somehow, as the Fed cannot simply feeding 'the beast', right?).
Questions, over questions, the social sciences are just wonderful, we really have no clue what's going on, but are very eloquent at making educated guesses. That is why I love it I guess. In any case, it does not look good for the American economy (and by extension the next American president (less important) and the rest of the world (more important)).
Monday, February 18, 2008
World Economics and andere Zeitverschwendungen
The glory of collecting information, of acquiring knowledge that will most likely never be relevant to my future profession or life is one of my favorite pastimes. I will keep on the ball in this regard, no worries my dear reader masses. So yeah, From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist: The US External Adjustment and The Exorbitant Privilege by Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène Rey is part of my - futile I know, but trying in vain seems less lame than not trying and as Townes would put it: 'it seemed easier than waiting around to die' - attempt at understanding the system of world economics that we live in.
Most everyone will have heard about the gigantic American capital account surplus (and its complementary current account deficit), yet what shocked me (even if I had heard about it before) was the extent to which the US still benefits of an 'exorbitant privilege' (in DeGaulle's words) by virtue of functioning as a currency reserve for the rest of the world. This essay was very technical and mathematical, and I am sure I missed as much information as I actually gleamed from it, but basically the authors show that the nature of foreign American liabilities and assets are quite different. In simple terms, the US receives low-risk, low-interest money (government bonds for example) while investing in (relatively) high-interest, high-risk projects (through FDIs mainly). This results in the US paying less interest to the world than its own investments generate even though these assets abroad are smaller in absolute terms than the foreign-owned ones on US soil (figuratively speaking). Think about this for a second. Anybody want to lend me 10 bucks on 3.61% interest and in turn receive 9 bucks from me on 5.72% and keep this going over a couple of decades?
Two additional aspects of this. First, an exchange depreciation of the dollar actually increases American assets. This, because most foreign liabilities are denominated in dollars, while 70% of the foreign assets are denominated in other currencies. 'Hence a 10% depreciation of the dollar represents, ceteris paribus, a transfer of around 5.9% of GDP from the rest of the world to the US.' Second, if investors lose trust in the dollar (because of a self-fulfilling fear of depreciation), this will result in a super-sized problem for the US (and the rest of the world in extension, considering how dependent on the American economy we all are).
What I am furthermore wondering is whether the EU (well, the Euro area) would in this case (or already is in the process of doing so) be capable of taking over this role of the safe monetary haven for the rest of the world and thus also the beneficiary of this system of the provision of liquidity.
Most everyone will have heard about the gigantic American capital account surplus (and its complementary current account deficit), yet what shocked me (even if I had heard about it before) was the extent to which the US still benefits of an 'exorbitant privilege' (in DeGaulle's words) by virtue of functioning as a currency reserve for the rest of the world. This essay was very technical and mathematical, and I am sure I missed as much information as I actually gleamed from it, but basically the authors show that the nature of foreign American liabilities and assets are quite different. In simple terms, the US receives low-risk, low-interest money (government bonds for example) while investing in (relatively) high-interest, high-risk projects (through FDIs mainly). This results in the US paying less interest to the world than its own investments generate even though these assets abroad are smaller in absolute terms than the foreign-owned ones on US soil (figuratively speaking). Think about this for a second. Anybody want to lend me 10 bucks on 3.61% interest and in turn receive 9 bucks from me on 5.72% and keep this going over a couple of decades?
Two additional aspects of this. First, an exchange depreciation of the dollar actually increases American assets. This, because most foreign liabilities are denominated in dollars, while 70% of the foreign assets are denominated in other currencies. 'Hence a 10% depreciation of the dollar represents, ceteris paribus, a transfer of around 5.9% of GDP from the rest of the world to the US.' Second, if investors lose trust in the dollar (because of a self-fulfilling fear of depreciation), this will result in a super-sized problem for the US (and the rest of the world in extension, considering how dependent on the American economy we all are).
What I am furthermore wondering is whether the EU (well, the Euro area) would in this case (or already is in the process of doing so) be capable of taking over this role of the safe monetary haven for the rest of the world and thus also the beneficiary of this system of the provision of liquidity.
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
Paul Kennedy's monster work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers - Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 had been referenced by a lot of the guys I had read before. It is a crazy book because of the detailed look it takes at power politics over a period of 500 years. I have to admit that I don't want to get into describing this book too much because any short blog entry would barely scratch the surface anyway and not give the amount of information provided by Kennedy justice. Thus, in only a few sentences:
Kenedy's main argument is that economic change and military prowess go hand in hand and that in the long run economic might determines military might and thus shapes the politics of the Great Powers. Disappointing, even if Kennedy surely cannot be blamed for that, was the fact that the book was written before the fall of the USSR, thus some of the analyses are completely irrelevant for today. Nonetheless I felt that his book helped me to develop a better understanding of the politics of power and war of the last 500 years (and especially and most relevantly of the 20th century).
Don't read this book just out of boredom, but if you do pick it up, it will provide with a wealth of information, the only downside of which might be that it proves once again how little we really know.
Kenedy's main argument is that economic change and military prowess go hand in hand and that in the long run economic might determines military might and thus shapes the politics of the Great Powers. Disappointing, even if Kennedy surely cannot be blamed for that, was the fact that the book was written before the fall of the USSR, thus some of the analyses are completely irrelevant for today. Nonetheless I felt that his book helped me to develop a better understanding of the politics of power and war of the last 500 years (and especially and most relevantly of the 20th century).
Don't read this book just out of boredom, but if you do pick it up, it will provide with a wealth of information, the only downside of which might be that it proves once again how little we really know.
Wednesday, February 13, 2008
The End of the American Era
Nomen est omen, Charles A Kupchan's The End of the American Era - US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century deals with the demise of American hegemony. Kupchan tries to offer up a grand strategy for the US to adopt, similar to Roosevelt's vision for the post-war world and opposed to the failed position of isolationism the US took after the 1st World War. This normative side of his argument, I found a lot less interesting than the analytical parts. In parts he details exactly what the American government should do to allow for a smooth transformation to a new world system ("The US is faced with a challenge that few great nations have managed to pull off – accepting the rise of alternative power centers and willingly ceding influence to them.").
Most interesting for me was that he believes Europe to be the primary challenger arising for the declining hegemon. He bases this on a future development of European integration that might be overtly optimistic at times, but his general argument makes sense. With the US increasingly pulling out troops from Europe and restricting interventions in Europe (due to a lack of interest (=isolationism) in regional conflicts non-threatening to the US (Macedonia, 2001), military over-stretch (Iraq) and rising expectations in European contributions to security and defence measures), the EU needs to start developing capabilities to patrol its own backyard - which it failed to do in Bosnia and Kosovo.
The US response to this, the emergence of a balance of powers (very much in the development still admittedly) has been ambivalent to say the least. While expecting the EU to shoulder a bigger financial and manpower burden, it has expected to remain a firm leader of the West. This dilemma is what I want to explore further and I am looking forward to it :)
Most interesting for me was that he believes Europe to be the primary challenger arising for the declining hegemon. He bases this on a future development of European integration that might be overtly optimistic at times, but his general argument makes sense. With the US increasingly pulling out troops from Europe and restricting interventions in Europe (due to a lack of interest (=isolationism) in regional conflicts non-threatening to the US (Macedonia, 2001), military over-stretch (Iraq) and rising expectations in European contributions to security and defence measures), the EU needs to start developing capabilities to patrol its own backyard - which it failed to do in Bosnia and Kosovo.
The US response to this, the emergence of a balance of powers (very much in the development still admittedly) has been ambivalent to say the least. While expecting the EU to shoulder a bigger financial and manpower burden, it has expected to remain a firm leader of the West. This dilemma is what I want to explore further and I am looking forward to it :)
Wednesday, February 06, 2008
The OECD Jobs Study
The OECD Jobs Study - Facts, Analysis, Strategies (1994) was a lot less dray than it sounds. It is pretty short (around 60 pages), but very informative and in a very compressed way gives an outlook of unemployment how it has changed in OECD countries over the last decades and how it governments should respond to it. Most of the policy recommendations seem to be geared towards continental European states, even if the report does not directly say this, it feels that way considering the criticism leveled at these states in regard to their employment performance.
Important is a distinction made in the beginning between structural and cyclical unemployment - the latter of which Keynesian policies can smoothen out, the former of which needs to be tackled through microeconomic changes. As the names suggest cyclical unemployment rises and falls with economic recessions and booms, while structural unemployment remains steady no matter the economic performance of the specific country as it is due to institutional arrangements more than anything else.
Over the last few decades diverging trends have been discernible, while the United States has managed to decrease unemployment rates since the 1960s/1970s, the European states' rates have increased over the same time-frame. In general it can also be said that young people are more often unemployed than older ones, countries with strong apprenticeship systems are the exceptions for this rule. I wonder how Germany's position in this regard has changed though, considering the gloomy manner in which 'das Ausbildungssystem' has been discussed over there in the last few years. The second major problem of European states lies in the predominance of long-term unemployment in their systems. Thus, in the EU area (before even the accession of even the EFTA states) more than 40% of general unemployment is long-term (meaning lasting at least 12 months), while for the US it is only 11%. The reason for this wide disparity lies in the low rate of inflow into employment in Europe (coupled with low inflows into unemployment), while the US shows signs of a high rate of flow into employment (and unemployment). The EU area has a problem involving the hiring of employees.
The above-mentioned diverging trends in unemployment rates in the US and EU are explained by an increase in productivity in the EU coupled with non-functioning labor markets (see the hiring problem detailed above). In this context I have to admit that I was wondering about the validity of this study for today, mainly because Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands are three prominent negative outliers for these problematic labor markets, all of whom have significantly reformed since.
Not only have unemployment rates risen though, employment participation rates in most of Europe and Japan have not kept pace with developments in North American and Oceania. This is due mostly to Southern outliers (Italy, Greece, Spain) with traditional low female participation rates and continued encouragement for women to stay at home. Another factor are the early retirement schemes still popular in Germany today, that were used a means to avoid the cliffs of firing-legislation in the 80s and 90s mainly.
Finally, corporatist wage negotiations or Unions in general have prohibited European countries from responding to increased competition (globalization as lame as that argument has become) and pressure on low-skilled through wage adjustments. English-speaking countries have responded through a widening of wage differentials. Adjustment to this move away from demand for low-skilled workers in Central Europe has thus taken place through higher unemployment. While this argument made sense to me, what baffled me was the assumption that wage differentials have not increased in Europe as I know they have at least over the last 20-30 years. Possibly this trend was not as discernible as it is today in 1994. The downside for American workers has been that their real wages have in fact decreased, pointing to the possibility of a trade-off between unemployment and a 'living wage' (and the avoidance of the 'working poor').
The authors of the OECD Study then go on to suggest some remedies for this development in unemployment rates. Firstly, they argue for a stable macroeconomic environment (limiting public debt in order to avoid the crowding out of private investment through high interest rates & low levels of inflation), even while admitting that good macroeconomic policy is necessary but not sufficient for an improvement on the employment front. Thus, structural adjustments are necessary as well. Their suggestions here are:
All in all, most of the analysis and suggestions seem very solid and sensible. Some of the questions I feel should not be left only for economists to discussed, as the level of solidarity of a society, the wage-level of its lowest paid workers and such, should not be considered under economic merit alone.
Important is a distinction made in the beginning between structural and cyclical unemployment - the latter of which Keynesian policies can smoothen out, the former of which needs to be tackled through microeconomic changes. As the names suggest cyclical unemployment rises and falls with economic recessions and booms, while structural unemployment remains steady no matter the economic performance of the specific country as it is due to institutional arrangements more than anything else.
Over the last few decades diverging trends have been discernible, while the United States has managed to decrease unemployment rates since the 1960s/1970s, the European states' rates have increased over the same time-frame. In general it can also be said that young people are more often unemployed than older ones, countries with strong apprenticeship systems are the exceptions for this rule. I wonder how Germany's position in this regard has changed though, considering the gloomy manner in which 'das Ausbildungssystem' has been discussed over there in the last few years. The second major problem of European states lies in the predominance of long-term unemployment in their systems. Thus, in the EU area (before even the accession of even the EFTA states) more than 40% of general unemployment is long-term (meaning lasting at least 12 months), while for the US it is only 11%. The reason for this wide disparity lies in the low rate of inflow into employment in Europe (coupled with low inflows into unemployment), while the US shows signs of a high rate of flow into employment (and unemployment). The EU area has a problem involving the hiring of employees.
The above-mentioned diverging trends in unemployment rates in the US and EU are explained by an increase in productivity in the EU coupled with non-functioning labor markets (see the hiring problem detailed above). In this context I have to admit that I was wondering about the validity of this study for today, mainly because Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands are three prominent negative outliers for these problematic labor markets, all of whom have significantly reformed since.
Not only have unemployment rates risen though, employment participation rates in most of Europe and Japan have not kept pace with developments in North American and Oceania. This is due mostly to Southern outliers (Italy, Greece, Spain) with traditional low female participation rates and continued encouragement for women to stay at home. Another factor are the early retirement schemes still popular in Germany today, that were used a means to avoid the cliffs of firing-legislation in the 80s and 90s mainly.
Finally, corporatist wage negotiations or Unions in general have prohibited European countries from responding to increased competition (globalization as lame as that argument has become) and pressure on low-skilled through wage adjustments. English-speaking countries have responded through a widening of wage differentials. Adjustment to this move away from demand for low-skilled workers in Central Europe has thus taken place through higher unemployment. While this argument made sense to me, what baffled me was the assumption that wage differentials have not increased in Europe as I know they have at least over the last 20-30 years. Possibly this trend was not as discernible as it is today in 1994. The downside for American workers has been that their real wages have in fact decreased, pointing to the possibility of a trade-off between unemployment and a 'living wage' (and the avoidance of the 'working poor').
The authors of the OECD Study then go on to suggest some remedies for this development in unemployment rates. Firstly, they argue for a stable macroeconomic environment (limiting public debt in order to avoid the crowding out of private investment through high interest rates & low levels of inflation), even while admitting that good macroeconomic policy is necessary but not sufficient for an improvement on the employment front. Thus, structural adjustments are necessary as well. Their suggestions here are:
- A move away from social security contribution to indirect taxes (TVA), which would increase employment through limiting taxes' impact on the labor market's demand function.
- An increase in wage differentials would allow adjustments through wages instead of unemployment rates (apparently there is some cross-country evidence for this). As already mentioned above this prompts the question of how to treat the so-called 'working poor', basically this, to me, seems to be a moral question that every society needs to answer for itself and not just an economic one.
- Unemployment protection should be limited as it also provides a disincentive for companies to hire employees.
- Labor market policies need to become active (and not passive as in providing income for the unemployed), to provide education, training and improve job skills in general. This especially in light of the fact that the life-long job has become a thing of the past in most OECD countries (Japan still being an exception to some extent).
- In general education measures need to be improved, especially for children from disadvantaged parts of the societies, to counter the increased loss of low-skilled jobs. This applies to pre-primary, primary, secondary and tertiary education.
- Finally, unemployment benefits should be lowered to provide greater incentives to take on a new job.
All in all, most of the analysis and suggestions seem very solid and sensible. Some of the questions I feel should not be left only for economists to discussed, as the level of solidarity of a society, the wage-level of its lowest paid workers and such, should not be considered under economic merit alone.
Monday, February 04, 2008
The post-modern state and the world order
Robert Cooper is a career diplomat who is nowadays working for the European Council and directly responsible to Javier Solana (talking about a job I would want to do). His book (more like an essay really) The post-modern state and the world order was super interesting. It does not contain any ground-breaking (or maybe it did back then (1997), but it describes the post 1989 very, very accurately, including a prediction of the emergence of failed states and terrorist organizations harbored in these as a threat to the world.
Cooper separates the world in three parts. The post-modern world (basically the EU, to some extent the US) where the rule of law (based on self-restricting treaties) in inter-state interactions is dominant, military power is not a viable solution to problem-solving and borders are increasingly irrelevant. The modern world which describes the world as Machiavelli and Clausewitz knew it, with war a method of politics, borders subject to change, and traditional nation-states competing with each other (unlike the post-modern world where competition takes place more on an economic and individual level). Finally, the pre-modern world, which describes failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan. These states, where no one holds a monopoly on violence, should in (cruel if you want) realpolitischen terms be left alone, since they cannot bother anyone. Yet, in today's society this is not possible due to two reasons. Firstly, the impact of newspaper reporting and popular pressure to act in case of suffering, murder or (worst of all) genocide. These interventions are usually very limited in nature, simply because it is difficult to estimate their true value for the intervening state (especially considering the flighty nature of public opinion which, after the death of a few soldiers, can rapidly swing against any intervention). Secondly, the aforementioned non-state actors who in an asymmetrical war can hurt virtually anyone (remember this was written before 2001).
A very descriptive, very good and accurate essay. Check it out if you care to find out more about the world as it is today.
Cooper separates the world in three parts. The post-modern world (basically the EU, to some extent the US) where the rule of law (based on self-restricting treaties) in inter-state interactions is dominant, military power is not a viable solution to problem-solving and borders are increasingly irrelevant. The modern world which describes the world as Machiavelli and Clausewitz knew it, with war a method of politics, borders subject to change, and traditional nation-states competing with each other (unlike the post-modern world where competition takes place more on an economic and individual level). Finally, the pre-modern world, which describes failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan. These states, where no one holds a monopoly on violence, should in (cruel if you want) realpolitischen terms be left alone, since they cannot bother anyone. Yet, in today's society this is not possible due to two reasons. Firstly, the impact of newspaper reporting and popular pressure to act in case of suffering, murder or (worst of all) genocide. These interventions are usually very limited in nature, simply because it is difficult to estimate their true value for the intervening state (especially considering the flighty nature of public opinion which, after the death of a few soldiers, can rapidly swing against any intervention). Secondly, the aforementioned non-state actors who in an asymmetrical war can hurt virtually anyone (remember this was written before 2001).
A very descriptive, very good and accurate essay. Check it out if you care to find out more about the world as it is today.
Die grossen Maechte
Leopold von Rankes Werk Die grossen Maechte war eines der Buecher, welches ich als Fussnoten in anderen Werken fand und als potenziell relevant und interessant einstufte. Vor allem hatte ich nichts dagegen mal wieder ein Buch auf Deutsch zu lesen (geht halt immer noch ein bisschen schneller), gebracht hat mir es aber leider nichts oder wenig.
Von Ranke beschreibt die Welt wie er sie im Jahr 1833 wahrnimmt, das Schwinden der Dominanz Frankreichs auf dem Kontinent, welches Napoleon kuenstlich durch eine komplette Mobilisierung noch einmal nach hinten verschieben konnte. Das Aufkommen Englands und (wichtiger fuer ihn) das langsame Anwachsen eines mehr oder weniger geeinten Deutschlands. Ich fand es als kleine Geschichtsstunde ganz interessant, es war eine nette kurze (60 Seiten) Ablenkung, mehr (leider) nicht.
Von Ranke beschreibt die Welt wie er sie im Jahr 1833 wahrnimmt, das Schwinden der Dominanz Frankreichs auf dem Kontinent, welches Napoleon kuenstlich durch eine komplette Mobilisierung noch einmal nach hinten verschieben konnte. Das Aufkommen Englands und (wichtiger fuer ihn) das langsame Anwachsen eines mehr oder weniger geeinten Deutschlands. Ich fand es als kleine Geschichtsstunde ganz interessant, es war eine nette kurze (60 Seiten) Ablenkung, mehr (leider) nicht.
World Systems Analysis
I finally laid hands Immanuel Wallerstein's World System Analysis - An Introduction (thanks Steve) as I didn't want to read his trilogy as a way of introduction. I had a surprising grasp or pre-understanding of his theory through his essay collection The Decline of American Power and Arrighi's take on this concept. To recount again - in a simplified manner - the argument is that there is a dominant capitalist system in place ever since the 15th/16th century, which has as a goal the endless accumulation of capital. It moves in systemic cycles, moving from one hegemony to the next (with phase A seeing a rise in power, phase B a decline and a shift to a new hegemonic power). We obviously are in phase B of the American hegemony. Unlike most other social scientific attempts at explaining the world the state is not the unit of analysis, also the approach is unidisciplinary (no artificial separation of anthropology, economics, political science, sociology...) and finally the world system in this theory is of longue duree but not inevitable and endless.
Wallerstein's main point thus accordingly is that the 'endless' accumulation of capital is slowly coming to a natural end (because of an steady increase in taxes, external costs (environmental destruction for example) and the price of resources). I still am not too sure about this point, but am honestly for the time being more occupied with trying to tie this into my master thesis and how European emancipation of American dominance is tied into all this. Obviously, the general point is clear, American hegemony is dwindling (the twilight of the unipolar world to put it more poetic), Wallerstein's theory in the end is based too much on economic theory to be very useful in what I want to focus on in military and defense and security policy. I thus still need a logically and truly applicable theory to relate to the creation of the CFSP.
Nevertheless, if y'all ever become bored read through Wallerstein's introduction. Highly interesting and logical and applicable to some extent. Definitely food for thought and thus recommendable.
Wallerstein's main point thus accordingly is that the 'endless' accumulation of capital is slowly coming to a natural end (because of an steady increase in taxes, external costs (environmental destruction for example) and the price of resources). I still am not too sure about this point, but am honestly for the time being more occupied with trying to tie this into my master thesis and how European emancipation of American dominance is tied into all this. Obviously, the general point is clear, American hegemony is dwindling (the twilight of the unipolar world to put it more poetic), Wallerstein's theory in the end is based too much on economic theory to be very useful in what I want to focus on in military and defense and security policy. I thus still need a logically and truly applicable theory to relate to the creation of the CFSP.
Nevertheless, if y'all ever become bored read through Wallerstein's introduction. Highly interesting and logical and applicable to some extent. Definitely food for thought and thus recommendable.
Thursday, January 31, 2008
The Decline of American Power
I had been looking for an introduction to world systems theory by Immanuel Wallerstein and stumbled over this accidentally. It looked fitting enough for my topic though, so I picked it up and read it quickly (and superficially) yesterday. The Decline of American Power is not what I thought it was, it is in fact a collection of speeches and essays on very abstract topics such as democracy, race or globalization. Those discourses were highly interesting, but I didn't read them as careful as they deserved to be read, simply because I wanted to get through the book and focus on something more rewarding (in a productivity sense). Fitting for me, were Wallerstein's introduction and closing essays, which were geared a lot more towards current events (American hegemonic decline and response to it).
I especially found his reasoning for the invasion of Iraq intriguing: "the hawks ... believe that the world position of the US has been steadily declining since at least the Vietnam War ... the basic explanation for this decline is the fact that the US governments have been weak and vacillating in their world policies. [As a remedy] the US must assert itself forcefully, to demonstrate its iron will and its overwhelming military superiority. Once that is done, the rest of the world will recognize and accept American primacy in everything. The Europeans will fall in line. The potential nuclear powers will abandon their projects."
This of course works great with my argument that the EU is emancipate itself from the US itself. American primacy has miserably failed (does anyone even fear American invasion anymore?), thus the nuclear powers are still working on their projects and Europe will not fall in line.
Related to Arrighi he also promotes world systems theory (being the creator actually, I believe, have yet to read his oeuvre on that though). In his argument we are nearing a point where not only a hegemonic cycle comes to an end, but a structural end is nearing because the endless accumulation of capital necessary for a capitalist system is coming to an end. This were the case, because taxes, wages, and input costs as shares of profits have risen increasingly over the last centuries, resulting in financial expansion coming to a stop at some point in the near future. I have a hard time countering this argument, but I do not believe in it. First of all, I do not believe that wages' share of profits necessarily have risen as much as he makes out and while taxes have surely risen, this undoubtedly has been countered by an increase in security and safety (against losing goods/freight to robbery or storms). All in all, I do not find his argument very convincing here. Especially because he prefaces it by saying that no one has ever tried to calculate this on a global basis and that it probably would be impossible, to then turn around and claim that capitalists' profits have fallen though. No proof, sorry.
In general the problem with all these economic theories of empire or hegemonic power are complicated to incorporate into what I want to write about, or maybe I just haven't read enough yet and my understanding does not go deep enough yet. Thus, I will continue to spend my life reading (and thoroughly enjoy myself doing so, don't get me wrong).
I especially found his reasoning for the invasion of Iraq intriguing: "the hawks ... believe that the world position of the US has been steadily declining since at least the Vietnam War ... the basic explanation for this decline is the fact that the US governments have been weak and vacillating in their world policies. [As a remedy] the US must assert itself forcefully, to demonstrate its iron will and its overwhelming military superiority. Once that is done, the rest of the world will recognize and accept American primacy in everything. The Europeans will fall in line. The potential nuclear powers will abandon their projects."
This of course works great with my argument that the EU is emancipate itself from the US itself. American primacy has miserably failed (does anyone even fear American invasion anymore?), thus the nuclear powers are still working on their projects and Europe will not fall in line.
Related to Arrighi he also promotes world systems theory (being the creator actually, I believe, have yet to read his oeuvre on that though). In his argument we are nearing a point where not only a hegemonic cycle comes to an end, but a structural end is nearing because the endless accumulation of capital necessary for a capitalist system is coming to an end. This were the case, because taxes, wages, and input costs as shares of profits have risen increasingly over the last centuries, resulting in financial expansion coming to a stop at some point in the near future. I have a hard time countering this argument, but I do not believe in it. First of all, I do not believe that wages' share of profits necessarily have risen as much as he makes out and while taxes have surely risen, this undoubtedly has been countered by an increase in security and safety (against losing goods/freight to robbery or storms). All in all, I do not find his argument very convincing here. Especially because he prefaces it by saying that no one has ever tried to calculate this on a global basis and that it probably would be impossible, to then turn around and claim that capitalists' profits have fallen though. No proof, sorry.
In general the problem with all these economic theories of empire or hegemonic power are complicated to incorporate into what I want to write about, or maybe I just haven't read enough yet and my understanding does not go deep enough yet. Thus, I will continue to spend my life reading (and thoroughly enjoy myself doing so, don't get me wrong).
Tuesday, January 29, 2008
Inequality and Prosperity
Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe Vs. Liberal America by Jonas Pontusson was a book for my second directed reading class (the first one being basically me working on my thesis). In basic terms I already knew a lot of the points that Pontusson made, having taken a class on the American welfare system in Germany right before I left. Still, the amount of data in this book was quite overwhelming (and made for dense and slow reading).
Pontusson's argument basically is that unlike what most Americans (and Europeans it seems for that matter) think there are some lessons to be learned for the USA from European systems (especially the Nordic ones). He firstly, and importantly, refutes the notion that European welfare states are restrictive of growth. This, because those two did go hand in hand during the 1960s and 70s after all, while there is no clear correlation between the two for the 80s and 90s (if the Nordic states are taking out of this equation there is a clear-cut correlation though even if Pontusson never mentions this). The main criticism of the European systems that he puts forward is related to the low employment rate (because of lower female participation rates and early-retirement plans enacted during the last two decades of the 20th century (and still today)).
Yet, his main point I believe is a normative one, specifically, that the USA should try to implement some of the positive aspects of European welfare states. Namely, wage solidarity (possibly through Union negotiation powers) which limits unproductive agencies (due to a kind of convoluted argument that claims that lower wages for unskilled workers subsidize unproductive industries (this because compressed wages due to union activities put a higher premium on capital and thus lead to its more efficient usage)) and prevents social unrest and losses through constant strikes (see France :)). Furthermore, higher investment in public education as a public good (with the German trade school system to some extent being held up as an example) and more active labor market policy. As an extra argument, (I would have included this in the active labor market policies) 'family policies designed to facilitate female labor participation' and, finally, more universalism as opposed to means-tested assistance as a means of increasing public acceptance to welfare programs.
He does make a convincing case for the most part, offering up an incredible amount of data, even if some of his statistics seem doubtful (significance at 90%?). Yet, he stays very much on the ground analytically, meaning he mostly refrains from deeper analysis, which does not necessarily detract from his main argument (see above), but leaves the reader exasperated at times. Also, some of his theories make an impression of containing at least some wishful-thinking. Thus, he argues that the EU unemployment rate is artificially high, because the current account balance (as % of GDP) needs to be deducted from it. While in theory, the long-term current account balance needs to rest at an equilibrium, this does not mean that its effect would necessarily be lower unemployment, adjustments could also take place through wages.
Lastly, one fun fact on the USA: If the prison population is included American unemployment rises from 5.6% to 7.5%. For the EU the same change in people considered results in an increase from 8.3% to 8.5% only.
Pontusson's argument basically is that unlike what most Americans (and Europeans it seems for that matter) think there are some lessons to be learned for the USA from European systems (especially the Nordic ones). He firstly, and importantly, refutes the notion that European welfare states are restrictive of growth. This, because those two did go hand in hand during the 1960s and 70s after all, while there is no clear correlation between the two for the 80s and 90s (if the Nordic states are taking out of this equation there is a clear-cut correlation though even if Pontusson never mentions this). The main criticism of the European systems that he puts forward is related to the low employment rate (because of lower female participation rates and early-retirement plans enacted during the last two decades of the 20th century (and still today)).
Yet, his main point I believe is a normative one, specifically, that the USA should try to implement some of the positive aspects of European welfare states. Namely, wage solidarity (possibly through Union negotiation powers) which limits unproductive agencies (due to a kind of convoluted argument that claims that lower wages for unskilled workers subsidize unproductive industries (this because compressed wages due to union activities put a higher premium on capital and thus lead to its more efficient usage)) and prevents social unrest and losses through constant strikes (see France :)). Furthermore, higher investment in public education as a public good (with the German trade school system to some extent being held up as an example) and more active labor market policy. As an extra argument, (I would have included this in the active labor market policies) 'family policies designed to facilitate female labor participation' and, finally, more universalism as opposed to means-tested assistance as a means of increasing public acceptance to welfare programs.
He does make a convincing case for the most part, offering up an incredible amount of data, even if some of his statistics seem doubtful (significance at 90%?). Yet, he stays very much on the ground analytically, meaning he mostly refrains from deeper analysis, which does not necessarily detract from his main argument (see above), but leaves the reader exasperated at times. Also, some of his theories make an impression of containing at least some wishful-thinking. Thus, he argues that the EU unemployment rate is artificially high, because the current account balance (as % of GDP) needs to be deducted from it. While in theory, the long-term current account balance needs to rest at an equilibrium, this does not mean that its effect would necessarily be lower unemployment, adjustments could also take place through wages.
Lastly, one fun fact on the USA: If the prison population is included American unemployment rises from 5.6% to 7.5%. For the EU the same change in people considered results in an increase from 8.3% to 8.5% only.
Colossus - The Price of America's Empire
In a concentrated effort I finished my next book for my master thesis in two days. Colossus - The price of America's Empire by Niall Ferguson. I wanted to get a different outlook on power, empire and hegemony than the ones that Arrighi relied on and that Wallerstein (whom I will look into soon, some dumbass borrowed the book from Davis library though, and the second one is missing) apparently invented (World Systems Theory).
Ferguson makes an argument for a liberal American empire being needed. He thus criticizes the USA not on account of its invasion of Iraq but rather condemns it for not being willing to stay long enough, for not devoting enough financial assets and manpower. Even while he, justly, considers the US the biggest military power of all times (even in relative terms, the absolute numbers are just mind-boggling), he argues that the US is a weaker empire (he refutes the usage hegemony as a self-deception on behalf of the Americans) than Britain was one. This, for three reasons: its economic deficit (resulting in an American reliance of capital lent to it by the rest of the world), its manpower deficit (due to a lack of commitment in sending soldiers (who might die) and highly-educated civil servants abroad) and finally its attention deficit (the phrasing of this argument positively cracked me up as I have been preaching this mantra continuously ever since I got here) with which he is referring to the Americans' lack of commitment to their foreign interventions. He makes a very solid case for this third argument (his main one), as he shows how long-term commitments historically tended to result in economically and stable democracies (West Germany, Japan and South Korea (with the latter's democratization obviously having coming very late)), unlike the short-term ones in Central America, which did nothing to improve people's lives in those countries.
The main problem with his argument to me is, that it is based on a perception of colonialism as a historical asset for the better of the colonized countries. His examples for this mostly are the white British colonies of the 19th and 20th century (Australia, Canada, South Africa). Yet, he himself mentions India, which barely grew over its period of colonization, and Egypt (which suffered the same plight). He argues that in India a rapid population growth was to blame, while for Egypt he enumerates positive developments (education, political stability among others) to then claim that it also did not 'experience an economic disaster, which the fiscal irresponsibility of successive Egyptian rulers might well have caused. The question we need to ask is what Egyptian incomes would have been' without British control. His implication of course being that Egyptian governments would have performed worse. This, to me, is pure speculation and while I can offer no proof for this (not knowing enough about British colonial governments), but it seems at least odd that all the white colonies developed more or less rapidly, while the non-white ones did so poorly. I would think that countries settled by expatriate Britons received preferential treatment. His argument then of course still could have validity for colonization of, for example, Liberia by the United States, if these possible colonies were treated in the same manner the British Dominions were. I have my doubts about this. Realpolitisch an American government would have a hard time justifying increased spending and devotion to these countries to which (unlike say Canada and the UK) no special 'blood'-relationship exists (arguably of course there is one to Liberia, but it seems questionable in how far the American electorate would agree to this).
All in all then, Ferguson thus offered some interesting ideas, even if his main argument is not one I would agree to.
Ferguson makes an argument for a liberal American empire being needed. He thus criticizes the USA not on account of its invasion of Iraq but rather condemns it for not being willing to stay long enough, for not devoting enough financial assets and manpower. Even while he, justly, considers the US the biggest military power of all times (even in relative terms, the absolute numbers are just mind-boggling), he argues that the US is a weaker empire (he refutes the usage hegemony as a self-deception on behalf of the Americans) than Britain was one. This, for three reasons: its economic deficit (resulting in an American reliance of capital lent to it by the rest of the world), its manpower deficit (due to a lack of commitment in sending soldiers (who might die) and highly-educated civil servants abroad) and finally its attention deficit (the phrasing of this argument positively cracked me up as I have been preaching this mantra continuously ever since I got here) with which he is referring to the Americans' lack of commitment to their foreign interventions. He makes a very solid case for this third argument (his main one), as he shows how long-term commitments historically tended to result in economically and stable democracies (West Germany, Japan and South Korea (with the latter's democratization obviously having coming very late)), unlike the short-term ones in Central America, which did nothing to improve people's lives in those countries.
The main problem with his argument to me is, that it is based on a perception of colonialism as a historical asset for the better of the colonized countries. His examples for this mostly are the white British colonies of the 19th and 20th century (Australia, Canada, South Africa). Yet, he himself mentions India, which barely grew over its period of colonization, and Egypt (which suffered the same plight). He argues that in India a rapid population growth was to blame, while for Egypt he enumerates positive developments (education, political stability among others) to then claim that it also did not 'experience an economic disaster, which the fiscal irresponsibility of successive Egyptian rulers might well have caused. The question we need to ask is what Egyptian incomes would have been' without British control. His implication of course being that Egyptian governments would have performed worse. This, to me, is pure speculation and while I can offer no proof for this (not knowing enough about British colonial governments), but it seems at least odd that all the white colonies developed more or less rapidly, while the non-white ones did so poorly. I would think that countries settled by expatriate Britons received preferential treatment. His argument then of course still could have validity for colonization of, for example, Liberia by the United States, if these possible colonies were treated in the same manner the British Dominions were. I have my doubts about this. Realpolitisch an American government would have a hard time justifying increased spending and devotion to these countries to which (unlike say Canada and the UK) no special 'blood'-relationship exists (arguably of course there is one to Liberia, but it seems questionable in how far the American electorate would agree to this).
All in all then, Ferguson thus offered some interesting ideas, even if his main argument is not one I would agree to.
Sunday, January 27, 2008
The Confessions of Nat Turner
I read a book about this a while ago, and I had back then printed out the original confessions from 1831 that the book was based on. Because I took today off and devoted it to pleasure reading I managed to not only finish my French novel, which I had been reading for quite some time, but also got through this (it is pretty short).
The surprising (if you don't know anything about Turner, check here, but I assume most of you will be more or less familiar with him) thing was that Styron in his fictional account had stayed very close to the actual facts as recounted by Turner. This was disappointing for me in the sense that I did not really learn anything new from the text. I again found it shocking how little attention was given to the extraordinary high amount of black people killed in retaliation (there is an introduction and some explanatory remarks by the person recording this confession) in comparison to the 55 whites killed by his followers. One also cannot help but be amazed by a plantation slave during that time who managed to stir an uprising with over 70 participants, and even if their acts evidently were despicable and they put up no serious fight as soon as armed militias began opposing them, a certain heroism cannot be denied. These were people after all whose life had no meaning or value, who were constatly living under the threat of being raped or whipped, killed or sold and seperated from their loved ones.
Nat Turner himself clearly was a religous fanatic, a man who thought Spirits were talking to him in guidance, who saw himself as some kind of a prophet, but what I wonder about in his case is whether he was just another one of these religous murderous nutcases (see Bin Laden for example I guess) or whether he was a highly intelligent human being (who after all was considered somekind of a miracle by his fellow slaves and some poor whites because he could read and write) who completely cracked living under circumstances so dire that no escape seemed possible. Is Nat Turner, thus, the product of a slave-planter society, a true son of the American South if you so will, or was he just one of those disgusting historic nutcases? I tend to believe he was the former, which is really just a feeling based on reading is confessions though. He did not drink alcohol, basically taught himself how to read and write, and (ironically) only killed one of the murdered whites himself (and only after having been pressured to do so), I have too much respect for the man in the end to believe that he was just a crazy person.
This to some extent is a radical position to take, I realize that, I am basically defending the ideological propagator of mass murder here (and if anyone tried to do the same with, say, the Nazis I would kill him (argumentatively of course)). I just feel like institutions to a large extent determine people and the slave system of the pre-civil war American South would have a massive impact on anyone growing up in it.
If you want to read the confessions, check here.
The surprising (if you don't know anything about Turner, check here, but I assume most of you will be more or less familiar with him) thing was that Styron in his fictional account had stayed very close to the actual facts as recounted by Turner. This was disappointing for me in the sense that I did not really learn anything new from the text. I again found it shocking how little attention was given to the extraordinary high amount of black people killed in retaliation (there is an introduction and some explanatory remarks by the person recording this confession) in comparison to the 55 whites killed by his followers. One also cannot help but be amazed by a plantation slave during that time who managed to stir an uprising with over 70 participants, and even if their acts evidently were despicable and they put up no serious fight as soon as armed militias began opposing them, a certain heroism cannot be denied. These were people after all whose life had no meaning or value, who were constatly living under the threat of being raped or whipped, killed or sold and seperated from their loved ones.
Nat Turner himself clearly was a religous fanatic, a man who thought Spirits were talking to him in guidance, who saw himself as some kind of a prophet, but what I wonder about in his case is whether he was just another one of these religous murderous nutcases (see Bin Laden for example I guess) or whether he was a highly intelligent human being (who after all was considered somekind of a miracle by his fellow slaves and some poor whites because he could read and write) who completely cracked living under circumstances so dire that no escape seemed possible. Is Nat Turner, thus, the product of a slave-planter society, a true son of the American South if you so will, or was he just one of those disgusting historic nutcases? I tend to believe he was the former, which is really just a feeling based on reading is confessions though. He did not drink alcohol, basically taught himself how to read and write, and (ironically) only killed one of the murdered whites himself (and only after having been pressured to do so), I have too much respect for the man in the end to believe that he was just a crazy person.
This to some extent is a radical position to take, I realize that, I am basically defending the ideological propagator of mass murder here (and if anyone tried to do the same with, say, the Nazis I would kill him (argumentatively of course)). I just feel like institutions to a large extent determine people and the slave system of the pre-civil war American South would have a massive impact on anyone growing up in it.
If you want to read the confessions, check here.
La place de l'étoile
Écrit par Patrick Modiano, La place de l'étoile est un des livres que j'avais pris par hasard en occasion il y a quelques temps. Pour être honnête ce bouquin était super-compliqué à comprendre pour moi. Modiano fait beaucoup des allusions aux auteurs, philosophes et personnes historiques (pétainiste ou nazi-allemande surtout) et je n'en connais pas tous (ou même pas beaucoup). Aussi, il écrit dans une façon très postmoderne, alors on ne sait jamais, s'il agit du présent, passé ou future, de la réalité ou de l'imagination.
En bref, Modiano raconte l'histoire d'un juif français qui est né après 1945. Même s'il n'a pas dû souffrir sous le régime nazi, c'est ça qui lui occupe le plus, les Nazis, la collaboration (surtout la collabo juive), et la question d'identité d'être juif européen après le holocauste. Même, si je suis sûr, que j'ai compris même pas la moitié des allusions ou des événements, j'aimais bien ce livre. Le narrateur est très, très cynique, il n'a plus d'illusions sur l'humanité (j'aime bien cette vue foncée), il n'a presque pas de scrupule, et surtout il n'a pas de faux respect devant les autorités prétendues. Je vous recommande ce livre sincèrement, je suis sûr qu'avec une meilleur commande de français, plus de savoir de la littérature française (Proust, je l'avais lu il y a longtemps, mais j'en sais rien) le bouquin deviendrais même plus intéressant.
En bref, Modiano raconte l'histoire d'un juif français qui est né après 1945. Même s'il n'a pas dû souffrir sous le régime nazi, c'est ça qui lui occupe le plus, les Nazis, la collaboration (surtout la collabo juive), et la question d'identité d'être juif européen après le holocauste. Même, si je suis sûr, que j'ai compris même pas la moitié des allusions ou des événements, j'aimais bien ce livre. Le narrateur est très, très cynique, il n'a plus d'illusions sur l'humanité (j'aime bien cette vue foncée), il n'a presque pas de scrupule, et surtout il n'a pas de faux respect devant les autorités prétendues. Je vous recommande ce livre sincèrement, je suis sûr qu'avec une meilleur commande de français, plus de savoir de la littérature française (Proust, je l'avais lu il y a longtemps, mais j'en sais rien) le bouquin deviendrais même plus intéressant.
Friday, January 25, 2008
Scary Stuff
So I got up at 6 this morning as I tend to do on Fridays and went swimming. Granted, I had a hard time getting out of bed this morning, and it was more like 6-30, but whatever, you get the drift. Peacefully I am strolling along, humming a song (literary reference, anyone who catches it wins something, or maybe not, we'll see), when all of a sudden out of the early-morning mist I see a troop of guys in camouflage, all loaded with guns (these hand machine gun things I believe) and massive backpacks, being led by some dude with an American flag in the front. Scary stuff man. I mean just ROTC (some weird army preparation program they have here for y'all Europeans) probably, but still, scary stuff.
So, while ploughing through the pool I was thinking, what is scary about the US? I came up with some things:
As I was saying, scary stuff. If you think I am just some stupid America-bashing European now, read this post.
Finally, the joke of the day: Wolfowitz has been named to head a high-level advisory panel on arms control and disarmament. Wolfowitz. Good thing this president will be gone soon.
So, while ploughing through the pool I was thinking, what is scary about the US? I came up with some things:
- People at sports events who actually become teary-eyed because some random guys in uniform hold a flag and someone (more or less well) sings a song about a military victory in 1814, instead of cracking up about the pathetic situation they are involved in. Post modernism anyone?
- Twenty to thirty people standing in a circle, clutching their respective neighbors shoulders, singing some kind of a bizarre song in order to join some honors fraternity or sorority or whatever
- Ten to fifteen guys (or girls, they meet independently of each other) sitting in my dorm's study lounge doing a bible study.
- Finally, the complete loss of dignity when it comes to the acquirement of crappy free goods (not so much different from large segments of European society actually, but still). Everybody wave their vic-card (some stupid discount card at the local supermarket here) in order to receive a t-shirt we paid 50 cents to produce and that is full of advertisement for us (the company and the sports team). Yeah, great idea, why don't I do that? I mean it sounds like a good deal, what is some sense of dignity and appropriateness (and I realize how stiff I come across here, sorry, that's how I am) for a free t-shirt after all?
As I was saying, scary stuff. If you think I am just some stupid America-bashing European now, read this post.
Finally, the joke of the day: Wolfowitz has been named to head a high-level advisory panel on arms control and disarmament. Wolfowitz. Good thing this president will be gone soon.
Thursday, January 24, 2008
The Long Twentieth Century
The second book for my master thesis Giovanni Arrighi's The Long Twentieth Century definitely was one of the more difficult books I have ploughed through (quite suitable for someone quoting Marx frequently I guess). I also found it to be very interesting even if I am having a hard time figuring out how it applies to my master thesis' specific topic (see today's earlier post). Trying to sum this book up in one blog post seems like a highly audacious task (if not to say vain), but I will try.
Arrighi develops a hegemonic theory based on economic aspects mainly (capital accumulation to be precise). The rise and fall of hegemonic powers according to him relates directly to the development of the capitalist system. Thus, the predominance of high finance determines political power on a world scale. He details this through the rise and fall of (in this order) Genoa, the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and finally the USA. (Just as a sidenote, I will not even pretend to be truly capable of explaining his whole economic argumentation. I have not read Marx, nor Braudel, both of whom he quotes extensively. Plus I went through the book looking for juicy thoughts and ideas that would help me in writing my thesis. Talking about a failed endeavor.) All in all, I have a better understanding of Italian city states as well as the Dutch and British empire than I ever thought necessary. Most interesting is his argument of cyclical hegemons being brought about by the distribution of high finance with the pinnacle of hegemonic power equaling the beginning of the decline. This high point according to him is reached when the respective hegemon increaingly refrains from commerce (trade and industrial production) and instead relies on investments (FDIs in modern terms) as its main source of income. This he calls the stage of financial expansion which "in some sense announce[s][...] its [the hegemons] maturity: it[s] sign of autumn."
Ignoring this historical development, the question is how this applies to today's world. Clearly, American hegemony is in decline (or is anyone still trying to argue with this?) and Arrighi agrees with this. Yet, according to his theory the United States at this point should be financing the rise of some possible new hegemon (China, India? Arrighi focuses on Japan which at that time (1994) made a lot more sense than it does now). Evidently, this is not the case, instead Japanese, Chinese and Arabic investments finance American consumption (and thus indirectly their own growth through gigantic trade imbalances). While this is similar to American support for its hegemonic predecessor during the First and (even more so) Second World War, it Arrighi (as far as I am concerned or maybe better: the way I understood it least) does not succeed to solve this inherent dilemma of a hegemon receiving capital instead of "flows of capital [going] from declining to rising centers." Arguably, the US became the hegemon at some point during the First World War and it was before then that British capital had flowed into the USA. The argument that American hegemony during the 1980s had already declined as much (not brought forward by Arrighi either) as to compare it to the imperial overstretch of Britain after the Second World War runs counter to anything I ever heard about this. Thus, either my understanding of Arrighi is lacking here or his argument is missing an important point.
Finally, Arrighi brings up the interesting development of a separation of military and economic hegemony. He does not focus on this, it is really just a suggestion for a possible future that he brings up, but it seems like a very sensible projection considering the dominance of the American military.
Summing up, I do not really know how this helps me with my thesis. There are interesting ideas in the book, but few of them seem to be directly applicable. Hopefully my next read will be more helpful.
Arrighi develops a hegemonic theory based on economic aspects mainly (capital accumulation to be precise). The rise and fall of hegemonic powers according to him relates directly to the development of the capitalist system. Thus, the predominance of high finance determines political power on a world scale. He details this through the rise and fall of (in this order) Genoa, the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and finally the USA. (Just as a sidenote, I will not even pretend to be truly capable of explaining his whole economic argumentation. I have not read Marx, nor Braudel, both of whom he quotes extensively. Plus I went through the book looking for juicy thoughts and ideas that would help me in writing my thesis. Talking about a failed endeavor.) All in all, I have a better understanding of Italian city states as well as the Dutch and British empire than I ever thought necessary. Most interesting is his argument of cyclical hegemons being brought about by the distribution of high finance with the pinnacle of hegemonic power equaling the beginning of the decline. This high point according to him is reached when the respective hegemon increaingly refrains from commerce (trade and industrial production) and instead relies on investments (FDIs in modern terms) as its main source of income. This he calls the stage of financial expansion which "in some sense announce[s][...] its [the hegemons] maturity: it[s] sign of autumn."
Ignoring this historical development, the question is how this applies to today's world. Clearly, American hegemony is in decline (or is anyone still trying to argue with this?) and Arrighi agrees with this. Yet, according to his theory the United States at this point should be financing the rise of some possible new hegemon (China, India? Arrighi focuses on Japan which at that time (1994) made a lot more sense than it does now). Evidently, this is not the case, instead Japanese, Chinese and Arabic investments finance American consumption (and thus indirectly their own growth through gigantic trade imbalances). While this is similar to American support for its hegemonic predecessor during the First and (even more so) Second World War, it Arrighi (as far as I am concerned or maybe better: the way I understood it least) does not succeed to solve this inherent dilemma of a hegemon receiving capital instead of "flows of capital [going] from declining to rising centers." Arguably, the US became the hegemon at some point during the First World War and it was before then that British capital had flowed into the USA. The argument that American hegemony during the 1980s had already declined as much (not brought forward by Arrighi either) as to compare it to the imperial overstretch of Britain after the Second World War runs counter to anything I ever heard about this. Thus, either my understanding of Arrighi is lacking here or his argument is missing an important point.
Finally, Arrighi brings up the interesting development of a separation of military and economic hegemony. He does not focus on this, it is really just a suggestion for a possible future that he brings up, but it seems like a very sensible projection considering the dominance of the American military.
Summing up, I do not really know how this helps me with my thesis. There are interesting ideas in the book, but few of them seem to be directly applicable. Hopefully my next read will be more helpful.
Monday, January 14, 2008
Oil Crusade
Oil Crusade - America Through Arab Eyes by Abdulhay Yahya Zalloum. A great book. Well, not really. I found this to be horrible in fact. Super shallow, super superficial, the world conspiracy with all relevant ingredients present (the US, Jews...you know the deal). Zalloum tries to explain how the US is dominating world politics, how it tries to ensure that this will be true for the future as well. He fails miserably at convincing the reader.
The sad thing about this really is that he has a point. He touches on a lot of issues that need to be explored further and reevaluated in their meaning as to whether the West is hypocritical or not. American one-sided support for Israel, the dominance of lobbyists in Washington, big-name companies in the Middle East, the purpose of proxy wars that the US has (and is) lead(ing) all over the world. Lots of topics to discuss. The problem just is that Zalloum discredits himself through abstruse connections (seemingly every misterious death over the last 50 years was committed by Mossad, I mean I knew they were good, but that good?), over-simplifications and simple factual errors (Adenauer got voted out of office? Really now?). I read this as part of the preparation for my master thesis, let's just hope that future books will be more rewarding and less pointless.
I speed-walked through this, if you read it, race through it, and pick up something better quickly.
The sad thing about this really is that he has a point. He touches on a lot of issues that need to be explored further and reevaluated in their meaning as to whether the West is hypocritical or not. American one-sided support for Israel, the dominance of lobbyists in Washington, big-name companies in the Middle East, the purpose of proxy wars that the US has (and is) lead(ing) all over the world. Lots of topics to discuss. The problem just is that Zalloum discredits himself through abstruse connections (seemingly every misterious death over the last 50 years was committed by Mossad, I mean I knew they were good, but that good?), over-simplifications and simple factual errors (Adenauer got voted out of office? Really now?). I read this as part of the preparation for my master thesis, let's just hope that future books will be more rewarding and less pointless.
I speed-walked through this, if you read it, race through it, and pick up something better quickly.
Tuesday, January 08, 2008
Mozart and Leadbelly
Bought this by accident (I had never heard of the author, Ernest J. Gaines) because of the title only and it was well worth it too. The book is split in three parts, the first consists of essays describing his (Gaines') upbringing and how it influenced his writing, the second short stories, and the third is a transcribed interview. Gaines hails from the Deep South, Louisiana to be precise, and that is where he draws his writing material and inspiration as well. The whole thing isn't all that long, but his essays, the material that he draws on (with references to Lighnin' Hopkins for example, I did find it weird that a self-proclaimed country-blues fanatic mainly referred to jazz artists as sources of inspiration, but then maybe that was due to the intended readership), in combination with his short stories really made me want to read more by him.
As old as the Faulkner comparison is, as relevant is it when talking about Southern writers, and seemingly every promising Southerner has been compared at some point (it seems similar to the NBA searching for a new Jordan in every young star (starting with Grant Hill to now LeBron James)), the interesting twist in this case of course is that Gaines is black and thus has an inherent different outlook on the South. No, I don't think he has come even close to dethroning the great Faulkner for me, but I will read more by him if I find the time, that's for sure.
As old as the Faulkner comparison is, as relevant is it when talking about Southern writers, and seemingly every promising Southerner has been compared at some point (it seems similar to the NBA searching for a new Jordan in every young star (starting with Grant Hill to now LeBron James)), the interesting twist in this case of course is that Gaines is black and thus has an inherent different outlook on the South. No, I don't think he has come even close to dethroning the great Faulkner for me, but I will read more by him if I find the time, that's for sure.
Sunday, January 06, 2008
Top 5 of 2007
I did a list of the best 10 records that came out in 2006 last year. This year I didn't listen to new music as much, or maybe not that many great new albums came out, in any case, it'll be only a Top 5:
5 - Vieux Farke Touré - Vieux Farka Touré
I loved his Dad's stuff (may he rest in peace) and I thought at first this was just a son cashing in on his father's talent, wile having none of his own (say Julian Lennon, what little I have heard of him). Not true. Granted he does sound a lot like Ali Farka Touré, but he simply does a good job himself and that Niafunké sound is just wonderful.
4 - Porter Wagoner - Wagonmaster
I didn't know anything of this guy until me and a friend from Kansas saw him on CMT in a motel in Nashville by accident. Considering the bullshit they play on that station usually I was struck by his voice, his age, his experience, his wisdom that he expressed through it. A reflective, quiet old man's album, wonderful. And the guy went to Hank William's first appearence in the Grand Ol' Opry for God's sake, so sad that all these old-timers are dying out.
3 - Steve Earle - Washington Square Serenade
Definitely one of the strongest singers still alive and kickin' today. His outlaw, hick music speaks to me in ways that I have a hard time explaining (considering I am a German (Berliner) city slicker). He moved to New York last year and his album is a less politicized affaire, more a personal narration of Greenwich Village. Not his best album (but then to be fair is it even possible to top Copperhead Road or Christmas in Washington?), but very enjoyable and I felt like it grows on you too.
2 - Dion - Son of Skip James
Ever heard of Dion & The Belmonts? A Teenager in Love? The Wanderer? Catchy 50s Doo Wop tunes? Rings a bell? Well, that guy has produced the best blues album of the year (granted I didn't listen to that many this year and this is the second year in a row this award goes to a white guy, not quite sure what that means). It seems to be a weird career path true, but this is actually his second blues album (Bronx in Blue in 2006 was the other one) and he is superb. He apparently got exposed to the blues on the folk circuit during the 60s, which explains the reference to Skip James with whom he played, and he definitely learned his lesson well. A great bluesified cover of Chuck Berry's Nadine for example.
1 - Levon Helm - Dirt Farmer
So, I flew home for Christmas and my Dad once I get there hands me this CD and says: 'Heard this one? Very good one. You need to check it out.' And I did, think I listened to it for the whole following week without becoming tired of his whiny voice. Did I mention that I love rural American music? No logical explanation, sorry. Helm whom I had never heard of (he was the drummer for the Band and sang some for them too, I did thus kind of know him already) covers ol'-timey music on this album. Great, great country-rock. One Steve Earle cover, The Mountain, that is simply a stunner. Wonderful album, you need to listen to it, trust me.
The poor old dirt farmer he's lost all his corn,
and now where's the money to pay off his loan?
Honorable mentions and albums that could be good but that I haven't listened to enough yet (in no particular order):
Guru - Jazzmatazz - Volume 4 - The Hip Hop Jazz Messenger - Back to the Future
Devin The Dude - Waitin' To Inhale
Prodigy - Return Of The Mac
Wu-Tang Clan - 8 Diagrams
Tiken Jah Fakoly - L'Africain
Ry Cooder - My Name is Buddy
John Fogerty - Revival
The Holmes Brothers - State of Grace
5 - Vieux Farke Touré - Vieux Farka Touré
I loved his Dad's stuff (may he rest in peace) and I thought at first this was just a son cashing in on his father's talent, wile having none of his own (say Julian Lennon, what little I have heard of him). Not true. Granted he does sound a lot like Ali Farka Touré, but he simply does a good job himself and that Niafunké sound is just wonderful.
4 - Porter Wagoner - Wagonmaster
I didn't know anything of this guy until me and a friend from Kansas saw him on CMT in a motel in Nashville by accident. Considering the bullshit they play on that station usually I was struck by his voice, his age, his experience, his wisdom that he expressed through it. A reflective, quiet old man's album, wonderful. And the guy went to Hank William's first appearence in the Grand Ol' Opry for God's sake, so sad that all these old-timers are dying out.
3 - Steve Earle - Washington Square Serenade
Definitely one of the strongest singers still alive and kickin' today. His outlaw, hick music speaks to me in ways that I have a hard time explaining (considering I am a German (Berliner) city slicker). He moved to New York last year and his album is a less politicized affaire, more a personal narration of Greenwich Village. Not his best album (but then to be fair is it even possible to top Copperhead Road or Christmas in Washington?), but very enjoyable and I felt like it grows on you too.
2 - Dion - Son of Skip James
Ever heard of Dion & The Belmonts? A Teenager in Love? The Wanderer? Catchy 50s Doo Wop tunes? Rings a bell? Well, that guy has produced the best blues album of the year (granted I didn't listen to that many this year and this is the second year in a row this award goes to a white guy, not quite sure what that means). It seems to be a weird career path true, but this is actually his second blues album (Bronx in Blue in 2006 was the other one) and he is superb. He apparently got exposed to the blues on the folk circuit during the 60s, which explains the reference to Skip James with whom he played, and he definitely learned his lesson well. A great bluesified cover of Chuck Berry's Nadine for example.
1 - Levon Helm - Dirt Farmer
So, I flew home for Christmas and my Dad once I get there hands me this CD and says: 'Heard this one? Very good one. You need to check it out.' And I did, think I listened to it for the whole following week without becoming tired of his whiny voice. Did I mention that I love rural American music? No logical explanation, sorry. Helm whom I had never heard of (he was the drummer for the Band and sang some for them too, I did thus kind of know him already) covers ol'-timey music on this album. Great, great country-rock. One Steve Earle cover, The Mountain, that is simply a stunner. Wonderful album, you need to listen to it, trust me.
The poor old dirt farmer he's lost all his corn,
and now where's the money to pay off his loan?
Honorable mentions and albums that could be good but that I haven't listened to enough yet (in no particular order):
Guru - Jazzmatazz - Volume 4 - The Hip Hop Jazz Messenger - Back to the Future
Devin The Dude - Waitin' To Inhale
Prodigy - Return Of The Mac
Wu-Tang Clan - 8 Diagrams
Tiken Jah Fakoly - L'Africain
Ry Cooder - My Name is Buddy
John Fogerty - Revival
The Holmes Brothers - State of Grace
Saturday, January 05, 2008
Germany: Jekyll & Hyde
Wieder einmal Sebastian Haffner, ich weiß. Was soll ich machen? Hatte das Buch auf meiner Leselisten und dann mitgebracht bekommen. Germany: Jekyll & Hyde. 1939 - Deutschland von innen betrachtet. Auf Deutsch geschrieben, ins Englische übersetzt, in Großbritannien veröffentlicht, jetzt wieder ins Deutsche zurückübersetzt, weil das Original verloren ging.
Leider hat mir dieses Buch nicht so gut gefallen wie viele der Bücher von Haffner die ich vorher gelesen hatte (1, 2). Warum? Ich weiß es nicht so genau. Sein Schreibstil schien weniger flüssig und fesselnd, was aber wohl entweder an der doppelten Übersetzung oder den besonderen Umständen (als Emigrant in England, mit schwangerer Freundin, keinem Job und von der Schutzhaft bedroht) liegen könnte. Gerade diese Umstände, immerhin erdreistet sich ein Deutscher hier den Briten zu erklären wie sie den Krieg gegen Deutschland zu führen zu haben, sollten nicht unterschätzt werden.
Haffner beschreibt verschiedene Gruppen, welche zum Verständnis Nazideutschlands bekannt sein sollten: Hitler, die Nazis (von Göring bis zu den Blockwarten), die loyalen Deutschen (die stille, willig gehorchende Mehrheit), die illoyalen Deutschen (die stille, unwillig gehorchende Minderheit, welche das Ziel der englischen Propaganda sein sollte), die Opposition (KPD, SPD...er beschreibt sie als desaströs und hat damit wohl recht) und letzten Endes die Emigranten (welche er wohl als zu relevant bewertet auch weil er natürlich Teil derselben ist und deswegen nicht gerade objektiv in Bezug auf dieselben).
Das Problem des Buches ist zweigeteilt. Erstens, sind einige der Dikussionen einfach nicht mehr zeitgemäß. So braucht heute keinem mehr erklärt zu werden wie verbrecherisch die Nazis wirklich waren. Zweitens, versucht Haffner der englischen Politik Vorschläge zu machen, wie der Krieg zu führen sei. Diese sind aus der heutigen Perspektive gelesen einfach nicht mehr so relevant. Ein Kompromissfrieden mit Göring als Reichskanzler mag damals eine Möglichkeit gewesen sein, heutzutage ist die Diskussion darüber eher müßig.
Interessant ist sein Konzept einer Kontinuität von Friedrich dem Großen und seinem expansiven Preußen über das Deutsche Reich zum Dritten Reich ("es sind nur Nuancen, die das Dritte Reich und das Deutsche Reich voneinander unterscheiden"). Auch wenn gerade durch den Holocaust stark relativiert (der Vergleich) eine faszinierende Idee. Sein Lösungsvorschlag für nach dem krieg ist außerdem eine Art Europa der Regionen, mit Deutschland zurückfallend in seine Kleinstaaterei, aber wirtschaftlich und politisch eingebunden in ein größeres Europa.
Fast schon prophetisch ist seine Prognose über Hitler: "Er besitzt genau den Mut und die Feigheit für einen Selbstmord."
Abschließend läßt sich im Allgemeinen sagen, daß ich seiner Konzentration auf Personnen zum Nachteil von Strukturen und wirtschaftlichen und politischen Umständen nicht immer zustimme. "Wer vermag, ohne die Augen vor der Hauptursache zu verschließen, auch um eine der großen welterschütternden Krisen unseres Jahrhunderts zu erklären?" Auf den ersten Weltkrieg mag dies zustimmen, auf den zweiten? Wäre Hitler ohne die Weltwirtschaftskrise überhaupt je an die Macht gekommen? In der gleichen Stoßrichtung versucht Haffner Hitlers Politik nur als Resultat seiner eigenen Lebenserfahrungen zu verkaufen. Wie gesagt, ich finde diese Erklärungsansätze zu persönlich.
Was ich sehr begrüße ist seine kritische Begutachtung des Patriotismus, welchen ich ja eigentlich nur belustigend oder sogar abstoßend finde (jeweils auf meine Stimmung und die andere Person darauf ankommend): "Es ist normal ... die eigene Heimat und die eigenen Landsleute zu lieben [wo ich nur begrenzt zustimme, aber das ist ein ganz anderes Thema, was ich heute eher nicht anschneide]...aber je mehr im sillen, um so besser." Schreibts Euch hinter die Ohren, Ihr Flaggenschwenker der Welt.
Also, lesen oder nicht lesen? Ich würde sagen ja, aber nur für Haffnerfans und -kenner und garantiert nicht als erstes Buch.
Leider hat mir dieses Buch nicht so gut gefallen wie viele der Bücher von Haffner die ich vorher gelesen hatte (1, 2). Warum? Ich weiß es nicht so genau. Sein Schreibstil schien weniger flüssig und fesselnd, was aber wohl entweder an der doppelten Übersetzung oder den besonderen Umständen (als Emigrant in England, mit schwangerer Freundin, keinem Job und von der Schutzhaft bedroht) liegen könnte. Gerade diese Umstände, immerhin erdreistet sich ein Deutscher hier den Briten zu erklären wie sie den Krieg gegen Deutschland zu führen zu haben, sollten nicht unterschätzt werden.
Haffner beschreibt verschiedene Gruppen, welche zum Verständnis Nazideutschlands bekannt sein sollten: Hitler, die Nazis (von Göring bis zu den Blockwarten), die loyalen Deutschen (die stille, willig gehorchende Mehrheit), die illoyalen Deutschen (die stille, unwillig gehorchende Minderheit, welche das Ziel der englischen Propaganda sein sollte), die Opposition (KPD, SPD...er beschreibt sie als desaströs und hat damit wohl recht) und letzten Endes die Emigranten (welche er wohl als zu relevant bewertet auch weil er natürlich Teil derselben ist und deswegen nicht gerade objektiv in Bezug auf dieselben).
Das Problem des Buches ist zweigeteilt. Erstens, sind einige der Dikussionen einfach nicht mehr zeitgemäß. So braucht heute keinem mehr erklärt zu werden wie verbrecherisch die Nazis wirklich waren. Zweitens, versucht Haffner der englischen Politik Vorschläge zu machen, wie der Krieg zu führen sei. Diese sind aus der heutigen Perspektive gelesen einfach nicht mehr so relevant. Ein Kompromissfrieden mit Göring als Reichskanzler mag damals eine Möglichkeit gewesen sein, heutzutage ist die Diskussion darüber eher müßig.
Interessant ist sein Konzept einer Kontinuität von Friedrich dem Großen und seinem expansiven Preußen über das Deutsche Reich zum Dritten Reich ("es sind nur Nuancen, die das Dritte Reich und das Deutsche Reich voneinander unterscheiden"). Auch wenn gerade durch den Holocaust stark relativiert (der Vergleich) eine faszinierende Idee. Sein Lösungsvorschlag für nach dem krieg ist außerdem eine Art Europa der Regionen, mit Deutschland zurückfallend in seine Kleinstaaterei, aber wirtschaftlich und politisch eingebunden in ein größeres Europa.
Fast schon prophetisch ist seine Prognose über Hitler: "Er besitzt genau den Mut und die Feigheit für einen Selbstmord."
Abschließend läßt sich im Allgemeinen sagen, daß ich seiner Konzentration auf Personnen zum Nachteil von Strukturen und wirtschaftlichen und politischen Umständen nicht immer zustimme. "Wer vermag, ohne die Augen vor der Hauptursache zu verschließen, auch um eine der großen welterschütternden Krisen unseres Jahrhunderts zu erklären?" Auf den ersten Weltkrieg mag dies zustimmen, auf den zweiten? Wäre Hitler ohne die Weltwirtschaftskrise überhaupt je an die Macht gekommen? In der gleichen Stoßrichtung versucht Haffner Hitlers Politik nur als Resultat seiner eigenen Lebenserfahrungen zu verkaufen. Wie gesagt, ich finde diese Erklärungsansätze zu persönlich.
Was ich sehr begrüße ist seine kritische Begutachtung des Patriotismus, welchen ich ja eigentlich nur belustigend oder sogar abstoßend finde (jeweils auf meine Stimmung und die andere Person darauf ankommend): "Es ist normal ... die eigene Heimat und die eigenen Landsleute zu lieben [wo ich nur begrenzt zustimme, aber das ist ein ganz anderes Thema, was ich heute eher nicht anschneide]...aber je mehr im sillen, um so besser." Schreibts Euch hinter die Ohren, Ihr Flaggenschwenker der Welt.
Also, lesen oder nicht lesen? Ich würde sagen ja, aber nur für Haffnerfans und -kenner und garantiert nicht als erstes Buch.
Friday, January 04, 2008
On Obama
The New York Times claims that: "Mr. Obama’s victory in this [Iowa for those of you living in holes] overwhelmingly white state was a powerful answer to the question of whether America was prepared to vote for a black person for president. What was remarkable was the extent to which race was not a factor in this contest."
I would love to believe that, cannot bring myself to do so though for two reasons. First, it seems evident that the willingness of white Democratic voters to elect black officials is higher than that of white Republican voters. A victory in this Democratic caucus is thus no indication of his chances in a general, national election. Second (from a paper I recently wrote ):
Clearly, Iowa falls in the latter category, for other stats or the nation as a whole this is a completely different story.
I would love to believe that, cannot bring myself to do so though for two reasons. First, it seems evident that the willingness of white Democratic voters to elect black officials is higher than that of white Republican voters. A victory in this Democratic caucus is thus no indication of his chances in a general, national election. Second (from a paper I recently wrote ):
"The greater the district's racial composition tips in blacks' favor the more inclined whites are to project […] racial fears […] onto [the] […] officeseeker." In districts were blacks are a minuscule minority the chances of a black candidate to win the white vote rises because African Americans issues are less relevant, causing less anxiety in white voters."
Clearly, Iowa falls in the latter category, for other stats or the nation as a whole this is a completely different story.
Sunday, December 30, 2007
La France, est-elle devenue folle?
Évidemment, oui.
Alors, pour follier (une création cool, eh?) un pays on a besoin de quoi? Un nouveau Président qui aime trop la présence publique qui est trop nombriliste enfin, un divorce, un drame publique (nous sommes un couple, nous ne le sommes pas...), une nouvelle petite amie qui en plus est célèbre soi-même et des vacances publique dans un endroit plus ou moins exotique. Putain, suis-je heureux que nous avons une chancelière moche avec un mari qui refuse se montre en publique et est professeur en physique, comme ça on peut discuter sa politique au lieu de sa libido.
Alors, pour follier (une création cool, eh?) un pays on a besoin de quoi? Un nouveau Président qui aime trop la présence publique qui est trop nombriliste enfin, un divorce, un drame publique (nous sommes un couple, nous ne le sommes pas...), une nouvelle petite amie qui en plus est célèbre soi-même et des vacances publique dans un endroit plus ou moins exotique. Putain, suis-je heureux que nous avons une chancelière moche avec un mari qui refuse se montre en publique et est professeur en physique, comme ça on peut discuter sa politique au lieu de sa libido.
Saturday, December 29, 2007
One Hundred Years of Solitude
Gabriel Garcia Márquez was one of the many unknown known writers, that I had heard mentioned a lot, but had never been interested enough to pick up a book by. The most impressive person I ever met gave me One Hundred Years of Solitude then, after she had read it, even if her review, if I remember correctly, wasn't exactly glowing.
I personally very much enjoyed it. Márquez writes in a very distinctive manner, even if I am sure that due to the translation much has been lost, also I am not certain in how far what I consider to be specific to Márquez is just a Latin American or Spanish trait. He tells the story of a family through six generations (and 100 years), making the premise strikingly similar to the Buddenbrooks, even if the two seem to offer no other possible link, making the comparison all the more intriguing to some extent.
I find it hard to really develop anykind of thoughts on this book. I did enjoy it. I found the usage of witch craft and other aspects of superstitous nature in a 20th century serious novel interesting (and comparable to Kenan in that regard). The negative outlook on human beings and what they really are capable of achieving in their lives, their failings in interhuman relationships, humans being too human for their own (and others') good in the end resounded with me. This always has been the case (Faulkner!), but I feel like recent experiences have allowed me a better understanding of these failings, of these imperfections, of the utter hopelessness of living a life in any pre-conceived manner.
Yet, in the end, I read the book and had a good time doing so, I feel like there is not a lot I will draw out of it though. It didn't touch me the way Quentin Thomas, Holden Caulfield or Lucas Beauchamp did. Maybe there are too many characters, whose characterization remains too flat. Maybe it is a question of pre-identification with a region, an author, a certain kind of character.
Ok, where was this going? Nowhere apparently. Sorry, my last post was confusing enough in his lack of lucidity. Read One Hundred Years of Solitude in any case. It is a good book.
I personally very much enjoyed it. Márquez writes in a very distinctive manner, even if I am sure that due to the translation much has been lost, also I am not certain in how far what I consider to be specific to Márquez is just a Latin American or Spanish trait. He tells the story of a family through six generations (and 100 years), making the premise strikingly similar to the Buddenbrooks, even if the two seem to offer no other possible link, making the comparison all the more intriguing to some extent.
I find it hard to really develop anykind of thoughts on this book. I did enjoy it. I found the usage of witch craft and other aspects of superstitous nature in a 20th century serious novel interesting (and comparable to Kenan in that regard). The negative outlook on human beings and what they really are capable of achieving in their lives, their failings in interhuman relationships, humans being too human for their own (and others') good in the end resounded with me. This always has been the case (Faulkner!), but I feel like recent experiences have allowed me a better understanding of these failings, of these imperfections, of the utter hopelessness of living a life in any pre-conceived manner.
Yet, in the end, I read the book and had a good time doing so, I feel like there is not a lot I will draw out of it though. It didn't touch me the way Quentin Thomas, Holden Caulfield or Lucas Beauchamp did. Maybe there are too many characters, whose characterization remains too flat. Maybe it is a question of pre-identification with a region, an author, a certain kind of character.
Ok, where was this going? Nowhere apparently. Sorry, my last post was confusing enough in his lack of lucidity. Read One Hundred Years of Solitude in any case. It is a good book.
Wednesday, December 26, 2007
America sucks
So, we had dinner tonight with my Dad's cousin's family. He lived in the US for a while, has travelled - due to his work mostly - extensively abroad, has a decent education and is in general a sensible human being. When we leave, he shakes my hand and tells me: "Give 'em some culture over there in the US, eh?!"
I don't think I will ever know how to deal with this kind of ignorance. I simply don't understand it. The United States of America, home of Faulkner, of Hemingway, of Twain, I could keep on going, home to some of the best literature written since the early 19th century. A country that produced not only the Declaration of Independence, but also the Constitution and a commentary called Publius which is one of the most beautiful examples of democracy in action while at the same time a piece of political science art. A country that has given the world not one but many absolutely stunning music styles - let alone musicians. What would the world be like without Jazz, Blues, Rock 'n' Roll, Hip Hop?
Now, isn't it astonishing, that a society that has produced so many wonders and beauties receives such a bad rep not only in Europe but pretty much all over the world? Can such illogical (because that's what it is if you look at the facts and I dare pretty much anyone to try to argue this with me) hatred and despisal really have been caused by politics (aka Bush) alone? Or was it here before? Did Vietnam, Nixon, and LBJ play a part? Or is it maybe more general the fear of the hegemon which makes one despise or hate him? I cannot answer these questions, I wish I could at least offer up some better hypotheses.
In the it just makes me sad. I have devoted part of my life to studying this culture, this society, this country. I have done so, because it has proven itself to be interesting and captivating over and over again, and continues to do so, all while my knowledge and understanding of it grows (or diminishes with the acknowledgment that it is too big to ever fully understand, whatever you prefer). People that claim the US doesn't have a culture (or similar statements along those lines), just show themselves to be ignorant. They miss out on some of the most amazing pieces of art produced over the last 200 years. I feel sorry for you.
I feel also sorry for you, my dear 5 readers :), because of the abstractness and lack of logic in this text. I had to express this somehow, I had to get it off my chest, but I am not philosophical enough to be able to do a good job of detailing or answering questions as abstract as this one.
I don't think I will ever know how to deal with this kind of ignorance. I simply don't understand it. The United States of America, home of Faulkner, of Hemingway, of Twain, I could keep on going, home to some of the best literature written since the early 19th century. A country that produced not only the Declaration of Independence, but also the Constitution and a commentary called Publius which is one of the most beautiful examples of democracy in action while at the same time a piece of political science art. A country that has given the world not one but many absolutely stunning music styles - let alone musicians. What would the world be like without Jazz, Blues, Rock 'n' Roll, Hip Hop?
Now, isn't it astonishing, that a society that has produced so many wonders and beauties receives such a bad rep not only in Europe but pretty much all over the world? Can such illogical (because that's what it is if you look at the facts and I dare pretty much anyone to try to argue this with me) hatred and despisal really have been caused by politics (aka Bush) alone? Or was it here before? Did Vietnam, Nixon, and LBJ play a part? Or is it maybe more general the fear of the hegemon which makes one despise or hate him? I cannot answer these questions, I wish I could at least offer up some better hypotheses.
In the it just makes me sad. I have devoted part of my life to studying this culture, this society, this country. I have done so, because it has proven itself to be interesting and captivating over and over again, and continues to do so, all while my knowledge and understanding of it grows (or diminishes with the acknowledgment that it is too big to ever fully understand, whatever you prefer). People that claim the US doesn't have a culture (or similar statements along those lines), just show themselves to be ignorant. They miss out on some of the most amazing pieces of art produced over the last 200 years. I feel sorry for you.
I feel also sorry for you, my dear 5 readers :), because of the abstractness and lack of logic in this text. I had to express this somehow, I had to get it off my chest, but I am not philosophical enough to be able to do a good job of detailing or answering questions as abstract as this one.
Sunday, December 23, 2007
Buddenbrooks
Meine Schwester schenkte mir Thomas Manns Buddenbrooks zu meinem Geburtstag, damit ich mehr deutsche Literatur kennenlernen würde. Ich brauchte ein wenig bis ich anfing es zu lesen, besitze einfach noch zu viele ungelesene Bücher, habe es dann aber trotz seiner Länge in weniger als einer Woche gelesen (hauptsächlich wegen der 4 Stunden auf dem Frankfurter Flughafen, die ich zwischen einschlafen und lesen pendelnd verbrachte).
Von Thomas Mann, als einem der Klassiker deutscher Literatur, hatte ich vorher kaum etwas gelesen (nur Der Tod In Venedig eigentlich) und war damals nicht einmal so sehr angetan. Dies war diesmal anders. Ein ganz tolles Buch, grausam in seiner Unabwendlichkeit, aber immer gut zu lesen und fesselnd. Ich hatte ursprünglich mit einem komplizierteren postmodernen Werk gerechnet, wo jeder Satz zweimal gelesen werden muß um nur der Geschichte so halb zu folgen, aber weitgefehlt, Buddenbrooks ist eine - sprachlich - simple Erzählung. Es geht um eine Lübecker (auch wenn der Name der Stadt nie erwähnt wird) großbürgerliche Handelsfamilie, deren langsamer aber stetiger Abstieg über drei Generationen beschrieben wird.
Man leidet also mit den Charakteren, sogleich diese nicht unbedingt immer die sympathischsten sind, aber gerade darin - ihren Fehlern - eben sehr menschlich sind - Tonis Arroganz und Hochnäsigkeit wäre ein Beispiel. Was mich überraschte war die fehlende Gesamtgesellschaftliche Aussage, ich war von amerikanischen Autoren (Faulkner, Kenan, Mailer, Steinbeck, Twain....) gewöhnt, daß diese oftmals durch ihre Romane etwas Zeitgenössisches kritisierten, ihre jeweilige Gesellschaft konterkarierten (Faulkern: The South!, Twain: race relations in Huck Finn). Mann will dies wohl nicht, seine Familie ist nicht wirklich exemplarisch und ihre Fehler sind auch wohl nicht der Grund für ihren Niedergang. Buddenbrooks sind zwar weniger modern als Hageströms (eine aufstrebende Kaufmannsfamilie am Ort), aber das alleine ist nicht der Grund für das auseinanderweisenden Glück dieser Familien. So schwierig es mit fiel, das Buch ist wohl wirklich nur als Buch zu sehen, nicht als Gesellschaftskritik (anscheinend studiere ich wirklich schon zu lange Politikwissenschaft) und als solches ist es einfach gut.
Lest es!
Von Thomas Mann, als einem der Klassiker deutscher Literatur, hatte ich vorher kaum etwas gelesen (nur Der Tod In Venedig eigentlich) und war damals nicht einmal so sehr angetan. Dies war diesmal anders. Ein ganz tolles Buch, grausam in seiner Unabwendlichkeit, aber immer gut zu lesen und fesselnd. Ich hatte ursprünglich mit einem komplizierteren postmodernen Werk gerechnet, wo jeder Satz zweimal gelesen werden muß um nur der Geschichte so halb zu folgen, aber weitgefehlt, Buddenbrooks ist eine - sprachlich - simple Erzählung. Es geht um eine Lübecker (auch wenn der Name der Stadt nie erwähnt wird) großbürgerliche Handelsfamilie, deren langsamer aber stetiger Abstieg über drei Generationen beschrieben wird.
Man leidet also mit den Charakteren, sogleich diese nicht unbedingt immer die sympathischsten sind, aber gerade darin - ihren Fehlern - eben sehr menschlich sind - Tonis Arroganz und Hochnäsigkeit wäre ein Beispiel. Was mich überraschte war die fehlende Gesamtgesellschaftliche Aussage, ich war von amerikanischen Autoren (Faulkner, Kenan, Mailer, Steinbeck, Twain....) gewöhnt, daß diese oftmals durch ihre Romane etwas Zeitgenössisches kritisierten, ihre jeweilige Gesellschaft konterkarierten (Faulkern: The South!, Twain: race relations in Huck Finn). Mann will dies wohl nicht, seine Familie ist nicht wirklich exemplarisch und ihre Fehler sind auch wohl nicht der Grund für ihren Niedergang. Buddenbrooks sind zwar weniger modern als Hageströms (eine aufstrebende Kaufmannsfamilie am Ort), aber das alleine ist nicht der Grund für das auseinanderweisenden Glück dieser Familien. So schwierig es mit fiel, das Buch ist wohl wirklich nur als Buch zu sehen, nicht als Gesellschaftskritik (anscheinend studiere ich wirklich schon zu lange Politikwissenschaft) und als solches ist es einfach gut.
Lest es!
Tuesday, December 18, 2007
German Jews in the Resistance 1933-1945
I picked this up on a vist to the German Resistance Memorial Center (worth a visit for anyone coming to Berlin btw, free entry, super interesting and huge exhibition). It was slightly dumb to have it in English, because the original was in German, but that's what I happened to pick up, so that's what I read.
Arnold Paucker in German Jews in the Resistance 1933-1945. The Facts and the Problems gives a historigraphy of the role of German Jews in the Resistance, and with that answers charges that the German Jewry like lambs obeyingly slowly walked into doom. I am not such a big fan of historigraphies usually, they are written too dense, they have too many footnotes, because of their breadth they don't provide enough depth, in the end they are not too pleasant to read. The only pleasures you derive out of having gone through one of them, is the overview, the amount of additional information you have obtained. In this case then, the reading itself was not too much fun, but I found it highly interesting how many Jews were fighting against the Nazi Regime in all kinds of ways possible. The Allies employed a lot in their armies, resistance movements all over Europe had Jewish-German brigades, as did most Communist Groups inside of Germany.
The only problem with this kind of leaflet (70 pages) is of course its briefness, most of the stories hinted at would have been highly interesting to explore further. Hopefully, I will have time for that at some point. The general point is clear though, Jews did fight back, quite massively in fact.
Arnold Paucker in German Jews in the Resistance 1933-1945. The Facts and the Problems gives a historigraphy of the role of German Jews in the Resistance, and with that answers charges that the German Jewry like lambs obeyingly slowly walked into doom. I am not such a big fan of historigraphies usually, they are written too dense, they have too many footnotes, because of their breadth they don't provide enough depth, in the end they are not too pleasant to read. The only pleasures you derive out of having gone through one of them, is the overview, the amount of additional information you have obtained. In this case then, the reading itself was not too much fun, but I found it highly interesting how many Jews were fighting against the Nazi Regime in all kinds of ways possible. The Allies employed a lot in their armies, resistance movements all over Europe had Jewish-German brigades, as did most Communist Groups inside of Germany.
The only problem with this kind of leaflet (70 pages) is of course its briefness, most of the stories hinted at would have been highly interesting to explore further. Hopefully, I will have time for that at some point. The general point is clear though, Jews did fight back, quite massively in fact.
Friday, December 14, 2007
Finals
Two final papers today, one is a take-home essay consisting of three parts. Quite honestly, I am not a huge fan of it, if you care about my estimate of what has happened in the US (and through the US outside of it) since 9/11 read it, otherwise don't bother. The other, is a research paper for my Legislative Systems class. Very difficult class (really tough readings every week and a lot of it too), difficult paper, very interesting and fun though. Basically, I try to show that:
I really tried with this paper, would have liked more time, but I am kind of proud anyway. Hope my professor will actually notice and reward this.
- white people don't elect black representatives
- substantively there is virtually no difference in the representation of African-Americans' concerns when they are represented either by blacks or white non-Southern Democrats, all others (Republicans and Southern Democrats) vote significantly less often for black interest legislation
- while not uniform, it can and has to be argued that African-Americans with all their divergences still do form one large interest group to some extent
I really tried with this paper, would have liked more time, but I am kind of proud anyway. Hope my professor will actually notice and reward this.
Thursday, December 13, 2007
L'enfant de Noé
Apparament je suis de nouveau fixé sur la deuxième guerre mondiale. Cette fois-ci, un petite livre, même pas 150 pages en fait, sur un garçon juif, qui est caché par un prêtre catholique. Ce garçon, Joseph raconte son histoire d'une perspective parfois naïve, parfois sage, toujours intéressant. Même si l'histoire soi-même n'est pas trop originale, en lisant j'avais toujours l'impression d'avoir regardé un film sur le même sujet, le livre offert un divertissement agréable. Surtout les discussions religieux, qui aurait pu prendre plus de place à mon avis, étaient très intéressant. La citation laquelle j'ai remarqué le plus, et celle-ci est bien en accord avec mon obsession secret du judaisme:
"La religion juive insiste sur le respect, la chrétienne sur l'amour. Or je m'interroge: le respect n'est-il pas plus fondamental que l'amour? Et plus réalisable aussi [...] Selon le grands rabbins, le respect est superieur à l'amour. Il est une obligation continue. Ça me semble possible. Je peux respecter ceux que je n'aime pas ou ceux qui m'indiffèrent. Mais les aimer? D'ailleurs, ai-je autant besoin de les aimer si je les respecte? C'est difficile, l'amour, on ne peut ni le provoquer, ni le contrôler, ni le contraindre à durer."
"La religion juive insiste sur le respect, la chrétienne sur l'amour. Or je m'interroge: le respect n'est-il pas plus fondamental que l'amour? Et plus réalisable aussi [...] Selon le grands rabbins, le respect est superieur à l'amour. Il est une obligation continue. Ça me semble possible. Je peux respecter ceux que je n'aime pas ou ceux qui m'indiffèrent. Mais les aimer? D'ailleurs, ai-je autant besoin de les aimer si je les respecte? C'est difficile, l'amour, on ne peut ni le provoquer, ni le contrôler, ni le contraindre à durer."
Churchill
Ich habe als Jugendlicher sehr viele Biographien gelesen, vor allem historische über Tecumseh, Hannibal und ähnliche Helden. Churchill war nicht unbedingt Teil meines heroischen Kanons, der Grund, weswegen ich das Buch las, lag allein beim Autor, Sebastian Haffner. Ich habe nämlich, wenn ich mich recht entsinne, noch kein schlechtes Buch von ihm gelesen, seine historischen Betrachtungen sind zwar zum Teil stark simplifiziert und vor allem wohl zu sehr auf historische Persönlichkeiten als institutionelle, wirtschaftliche oder politische Umstände bezogen. Aber trotzdem, oder gerade deswegen, macht es immer wieder Spaß etwas von ihm zu lesen. Nicht nur, weil seine Argumentation letzten Endes meistens überzeugt.
Winston Churchill also, ich wußte nicht viel über ihn, außer die Schlagwörter Premier Englands im 2. Weltkrieg und abgewählt vor Ende des Krieges, Haffner hat ihn mir näher gebracht. Ich war zum Beispiel geschockt von seinem Alter, mir war nicht klar gewesen, daß er in England im Prinzip seit der Jahrhundertwende einen gewissen Bekanntheitsgrad inne hatte, im 1. Weltkrieg schon Kriegs- und Rüstungsminister gewesen war. Außerdem war mir seine Bedeutung als Journalist und Historiker nicht klar – interessanterweise in diesen Betätigungen dem Porträtierenden ähnelnd. Das Buch war also perfekt geeignet als Kurzbiographie (nicht mal mehr 200 Seiten) und ist unbedingt empfehlenswert.
Schade fand ich nur, daß Haffner viele Dinge anspricht und nur wenige weiterspinnt, wohl hauptsächlich aus Platzgründen. So betont er, daß der Churchill 'der zwanziger Jahre ein Faschist [war], nur seine Nationalität verhinderte, daß er es auch dem Namen nach wurde.' Ich kann mir hierüber natürlich kaum ein Urteil erlauben, hätte es aber für nötig befunden, solche Aussagen ein wenig stärker zu belegen und erklären.
Abschließend läßt sich sagen, daß Churchill wohl der Typ rechter harter Hund war, welchen ich in der heutigen Politik verachten würde (Franz Josef Strauß vielleicht, oder Joe Lieberman). Nun kann man darüber diskutieren, ob Notzeiten wie die Englands 1940 einen solchen Typ geradezu verlangen – die Römer hatten nicht grundlos eine Diktatur auf Zeit in Kriegszeiten – und deswegen ist es eigentlich unmöglich für mich von meiner ursprünglichen Sympathie von Churchill wegzukommen. Auch gerade weil dieser in seiner Jugend einen sehr bravourösen Eindruck macht. Aber dies ist ja auch nicht unbedingt nötig, angesichts der Tatsache, daß Haffners Argument ohne Churchill wäre es möglicherweise zu einem traurigen und desaströsen Frieden Englands und Deutschlands gekommen durchaus Sinn ergibt.
Winston Churchill also, ich wußte nicht viel über ihn, außer die Schlagwörter Premier Englands im 2. Weltkrieg und abgewählt vor Ende des Krieges, Haffner hat ihn mir näher gebracht. Ich war zum Beispiel geschockt von seinem Alter, mir war nicht klar gewesen, daß er in England im Prinzip seit der Jahrhundertwende einen gewissen Bekanntheitsgrad inne hatte, im 1. Weltkrieg schon Kriegs- und Rüstungsminister gewesen war. Außerdem war mir seine Bedeutung als Journalist und Historiker nicht klar – interessanterweise in diesen Betätigungen dem Porträtierenden ähnelnd. Das Buch war also perfekt geeignet als Kurzbiographie (nicht mal mehr 200 Seiten) und ist unbedingt empfehlenswert.
Schade fand ich nur, daß Haffner viele Dinge anspricht und nur wenige weiterspinnt, wohl hauptsächlich aus Platzgründen. So betont er, daß der Churchill 'der zwanziger Jahre ein Faschist [war], nur seine Nationalität verhinderte, daß er es auch dem Namen nach wurde.' Ich kann mir hierüber natürlich kaum ein Urteil erlauben, hätte es aber für nötig befunden, solche Aussagen ein wenig stärker zu belegen und erklären.
Abschließend läßt sich sagen, daß Churchill wohl der Typ rechter harter Hund war, welchen ich in der heutigen Politik verachten würde (Franz Josef Strauß vielleicht, oder Joe Lieberman). Nun kann man darüber diskutieren, ob Notzeiten wie die Englands 1940 einen solchen Typ geradezu verlangen – die Römer hatten nicht grundlos eine Diktatur auf Zeit in Kriegszeiten – und deswegen ist es eigentlich unmöglich für mich von meiner ursprünglichen Sympathie von Churchill wegzukommen. Auch gerade weil dieser in seiner Jugend einen sehr bravourösen Eindruck macht. Aber dies ist ja auch nicht unbedingt nötig, angesichts der Tatsache, daß Haffners Argument ohne Churchill wäre es möglicherweise zu einem traurigen und desaströsen Frieden Englands und Deutschlands gekommen durchaus Sinn ergibt.
Wednesday, December 05, 2007
Incompetence
I haven't done a political commentary in a while, but today's New York Times put two ideas in my head that I wanted to put out there:
- I am sorry to say this, just because too many people agree (never a good thing that) without being able to say why (even worse), but George W. Bush really is a moron. Maybe presidents like Ruther B. Hayes or Herbert Hoover were stand-outs in regard to incompetence, but Bush apparently can run with the best of them. The recent NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) compiled by all 16 (Does Germany even have two btw? Does anyone know this? Please help if you do.) American intelligence agencies stated that its 2005 report claiming that Iran was trying to acquire nuclear weapons was wrong and that they now are highly confident that Iran has not had a nuclear weapons program since 2003, when they supposedly caved in to pressure and halted it.
Now, this is a 180 degree turn-around (and quite embarrassing considering the intelligence failure of the Iraq war), so how does the American President respond? Quite simply, he stays course. Obviously, why would you want to change policy in light of a change in intelligence, "what's to say they couldn't start another covert nuclear weapons program" after all? Please don't misunderstand me, I am not saying that no pressure should be applied on Iran, especially now that it seems to have worked in 2003, but a direct reversal of intelligence estimates should at least provide some incentive to reconsider old positions (like not negotiating directly with Iran) to sensible human beings, shouldn't it?
Leaving the content side of this, Bush also apparently is either a liar or not in charge of his administration. He claims to have been informed of this new estimate LAST WEEK (sorry about the caps, had to let off steam), defending his recent gloomy predictions of World War III coming up soon because of Iran in that way. Now, let's assume for a second he isn't lying about this (That is a sin after all, isn't it? And a religious man like George W. wouldn't want to go to hell would he?), what does this say about the state of his administration? Barring some intelligence agency having stumbled over one piece of information changing everything last week (and that is not how the NY Times describes the change in assessment) this has been a slow process or reevaluating positions and intelligence. Did no one inform the President of this? Did they think it would be a good idea to just let him keep on babbling about World War III, while they were completely (literally completely) reassessing their intelligence estimate? Something is amiss in the state of Denmark. Aaaeh. Washington DC. - Interestingly enough the second monumental failure award of the day goes out to....al-Qaeda. One of the reasons for the increased security situation - or relative calm which might be more appropriate, the emphasis being on relative - (the other two main ones being the surge (which I supported back in the day btw) and Sadr's militias keeping quiet for now) is the - temporary - coalition between Sunni neighborhood groups and the Americans. This has brought - again, temporarily - the native part of the insurgency to a stand still and has been caused by what? By al-Qaeda's stupidity. Through their indiscriminate bombings and murder of Iraqi civilians they have seemingly alienated the local Sunni population enough to get them to side with an occupying force against whom they were fighting only a few months ago. Good job guys (not that that is not good news, I guess we should be happy that the bad guys have as many morons making strategic decisions as the 'good' ones).
Monday, December 03, 2007
Aimez-vous Brahms...
Un cadeau de mes parents pour mon anniversaire, je n'avais jamais entendu parler de Françoise Sagan avant de lire ce bouquin. Je l'ai lu dans une version avec des vocabulaires en bas. Ça a été très utile, je suis loin de comprendre tous de mots dans un livre français et je déteste lire en ayant un dictionnaire à côté.
Le livre raconte l'histoire d'une femme ni jeune ni vieille qui vit tristement à côté d'un copain qui la trompe regulièrement. Elle rencontre un jeune garçon qui tombe amoureux d'elle et soudain elle a la choix entre les deux. Je n'aime pas trop les histoires d'amour normalement, je suis un mec typique enfin apparemment. Mais j'ai trouvé ce livre très intéressent, peut-être parce que je pouvais m'identifier dans une façon triste (pour moi) avec son copain. Ses pensées (de la femme), ses raisons de prendre une décision enfin étaient très banales, tristes peut-être ou décevants, mais très humains.
Si vous ne connaissez pas Sagan, je peux vous recommander de lire quelque chose d'elle.
Le livre raconte l'histoire d'une femme ni jeune ni vieille qui vit tristement à côté d'un copain qui la trompe regulièrement. Elle rencontre un jeune garçon qui tombe amoureux d'elle et soudain elle a la choix entre les deux. Je n'aime pas trop les histoires d'amour normalement, je suis un mec typique enfin apparemment. Mais j'ai trouvé ce livre très intéressent, peut-être parce que je pouvais m'identifier dans une façon triste (pour moi) avec son copain. Ses pensées (de la femme), ses raisons de prendre une décision enfin étaient très banales, tristes peut-être ou décevants, mais très humains.
Si vous ne connaissez pas Sagan, je peux vous recommander de lire quelque chose d'elle.
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