Arnaud Leparmentier est un des rédacteur en chef du Monde et un éditorialiste que je 'aime beaucoup. Son livre Ces Français, fossoyeurs de l'euro a gagné une prix pour la livre politique de l'année 2013 en France et le sujet m’intéressait. C'était un peu un évidence que je me le suis procuré alors. Il ne m'a pas vraiment convaincu par contre. Déjà, le texte donne plus l’impression d'être une collection des courtes essais sur l'histoire de l'euro que d'avoir une fil conducteur. Ce qui est de plus, j'ai du mal à croire à une version de l'histoire si concentré sur des individus (des hommes et femmes politiques) et leurs interactions. C'est intéressant de lire ces anecdotes mais je ne sais pas à quel point ils sont décisifs pour avoir vraiment déterminé la façon que l'histoire s'est développé. Une lecture intéressante alors, mais je m'attendais à un point de vue plus globale, un récit moins anecdotique et plus révélateur.
Showing posts with label EU. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EU. Show all posts
Sunday, December 29, 2013
Monday, January 28, 2013
Making the European Monetary Union
Harold James' history of the Euro, Making the European Monetary Union - The Role of the Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Origins of the European Central Bank was directly commissioned by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) both of whom made their archives containing protocols and minutes available for the author. I have no idea to what extent the Euro crisis played a role in this commission, but it is what makes a rather tedious piece of bureaucratic history a fascinating read.
What is maybe the most important lesson of this history, is how little the issues discussed in years leading up to EMU have fundamentally changed. The following clearly applies to the situation today as much as it refers to the 1950s and the following decades:
"One way of thinking about these imbalances is as a reflection of changes in relative competitiveness. Thus a German surplus was a reflection of favourable development of productivity gains and of wage costs contained by a collaborative and collective approach to wage setting."
What still escapes me to some extent is that "there was a clear economic as well as as political logic behind the creation of a single European economy." James describes this economic logic as the forefathers of the ECB (the aforementioned Committee of Central Bank Governors (the CoG)) looking to overcome "genuine problems of currency instability and misalignment at the international level [meaning the dollar]." Yet, this logic of course contrasts starkly with the misalignments at the European level clearly visible today and also directly runs counter the Bundesbank's preference, expressed here by the President of the New York Fed as late as 1992, for "what they think is the single most important principle
of the mechanism [the ESM], i.e., that it be flexible."
People clearly understood the problems associated with a common currency, see the Bundesbank's President Karl Otto Pöhl:
"In a monetary union with irreversibly fixed exchange rates the weak would become ever weaker and the strong ever stronger. We would thus experience great tensions in the real economy of Europe. [...] In order to create a European currency, the governments and parliaments of Europe would have to be prepared to transfer sovereign rights to a supranational institution."
Or the the Italian Finance Minister Giuliano Amato:
"Indeed, there is a "fundamental problem" in the EMS; which can be attributed to the fact that there is no "engine of growth." Not only is the pivot currency of the system fundamentally undervalued, but the growth of domestic demand in Germany is lower than the average; the result is that the country has structural surpluses also vis-à-vis the rest of the EEC. These surpluses, both commercial and current, on the one hand induce tension within the exchange system, pushing up the D-mark, particularly when the dollar drops, and, on the other hand, they remove growth potential from the other nations. In the long run, the cohesion of the system could suffer."
"Pöhl [...] thought that the best option was for the European
governments to call on the CoG to investigate a currency union
as the endpoint of a process of economic integration,"a point that is still off into the future then. Yet, the Delors Committee, which paved the way for EMU really and of which the European central banks' presidents were members, believed that the "maximum possible extent adjustment
should occur by way of market mechanisms" with a Community budget of around 3% providing an additional escape valve. The problem of course today is that the EU's budget still hovers near the 1% mark.
The ECB to large extent has to be seen as the successful upload of the Bundesbank's preferences to the European level ("astonishingly all the committee members agreed with the
German position") including central bank independence, the absence of an "explicit
role for the ECB in supervising banks," and strict inflation targeting.
Harold James describes the Bundesbank's support for EMU very interestingly - and convincingly - as a way for German central bankers to preserve their independence, which was constantly being threatened by the international agreements German politicians entered into and which undercut the Bundesbank's control over the DM's money supply figures.
"The Bundesbank was really not strong enough to stand up to such an orchestration of demands, so it needed to cast around for allies. [...] the Bundesbank needed to look more to a European mechanism for building support for its bargaining position in a German context."
History is an inaccurate social science. It is far from clear what lessons James' detailed account offers us then. Most interestingly maybe is the repetitiveness of the arguments we believe to be du jour and the conclusions which were drawn from them then (banking union, reinforced intra-EU financial support mechanisms, deeper economic integration/convergence) as much as today without truly having been put into place neither then nor now.
Friday, November 25, 2011
Publius Abroad Update
Just a few updates on what I've written on my Publius Abroad blog:
On the Eurozone, don't expect this to be over before 2013 and reconsidering it. Additionally, Germany's Master Plan for Europe or rather lack of it.
And a statistical and graphical breakdown of final electoral results in Tunisia.
On the Eurozone, don't expect this to be over before 2013 and reconsidering it. Additionally, Germany's Master Plan for Europe or rather lack of it.
And a statistical and graphical breakdown of final electoral results in Tunisia.
Tuesday, November 01, 2011
Publius Abroad
I am running a new endeavor by the way. Publius Abroad
Here my first three posts on Tunisian elections, the Bundestag's decision on the Eurozone crisis last week, and the following summit.
Here my first three posts on Tunisian elections, the Bundestag's decision on the Eurozone crisis last week, and the following summit.
Thursday, January 21, 2010
The European Union's Strategic Partnerships
In case any of you guys need an update on what the strategic partnerships of the EU are up to. Not the most exciting read of all times maybe, but it was interesting to research and write and even if I'd prefer to do more of my own analysis I felt it was a valuable exercise.
Monday, July 20, 2009
Magisterarbeit
I should have posted this a while ago, but things were kind of busy and I just didn't think of it anymore. Here is my master's thesis, betitled: The ESDP and its Impact on Transatlantic Relations.
I still like the topic. I know it could be better. I would write it very differently if I had to do it over again. It still is the longest piece I've ever written and unlike most people I know I didn't cheat in the bibliography. I actually read all of that.
I still like the topic. I know it could be better. I would write it very differently if I had to do it over again. It still is the longest piece I've ever written and unlike most people I know I didn't cheat in the bibliography. I actually read all of that.
Monday, July 23, 2007
The OMC
This is definitely one of the more weaker papers I've written (it is kind of crappy actually, but I had to write it in three days and stil hope I'll get a decent grade for it). It deals with the Open Method of Coordination which is a relatively new mode of governance in the European Union, very technical.
Sunday, April 22, 2007
Le Non
Ich hatte vor 2 Semestern ein Seminar über den EU-Verfassungsvertrag und wollte damals in den Semesterferien eine Hausarbeit über das gescheiterte Referendum in Frankreich schreiben. Ich schaffte es irgendwie nie diese Arbeit zu schreiben und hatte mir dann versprochen sie in Frankreich zu schreiben und dem Professor mit dem Argument, daß ich französische Literatur benötigt hätte, noch zu geben. Lange Rede, kurzer Sinn, am Mittwoch (oder Dienstag) gehe ich in seine Sprechstunde und gucke was dabei herauskommt, die Arbeit könnt Ihr Euch hier runterladen falls Interesse besteht. Nur als kleine Warnung, es gibt relativ viele Zitate auf französisch.
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