J'ai un entretien la semaine prochaine pour un programme en Chine et afin de me préparer j'ai commencé à me mettre dans la littérature un peu. Vu que la plupart des livres à la bibliothèque de l'Assemblée nationale sont en français, j'ai lu une traduction d'un bouquin écrit en anglais par Mark Leonard qui est le directeur exécutif du European Council on Foreign Relations, ce que je trouve assez bête, mais oui.
Le livre m'est fasciné. Leonard essaie de montrer la discussion économique et politique comment elle prend place en Chine. Fascinant, parce que:
Nous ne cessions de nous passionner pour les idées des différentes factions de la vie intellectuelle américaine [...] mais lequel d'entre nous peut nommer plus d'une poignée d'écrivains ou de penseurs chinois contemporain ?
La première clivage discuté est sur le champ économique où la nouvelle droite chinoise est favorable à une continuation de la politique de dérégulation commencée par Deng Xiaoping dans les années 80. Ce groupe se voit opposé par la nouvelle gauche chinoise qui veut accentuer plutôt la inégalité qui a été le prix de la croissance chinoise ces derniers 30 ans. Même si cela semble assez similaire de la discussion européenne voire américaine, elle est évidemment très différente déjà à cause des systèmes politiques incomparable.
Leonard discute les expérimentes démocratique dont la Chine s'engage dans certaines provinces sur des échelles locales (en sort une dictature délibérative). Il montre aussi la discussion au sein des experts des relations internationales. La militarisation asymétrique de la Chine, vu comme la seule tactique valable contre les Etats-Unis. L'accentuation du pouvoir attractif (soft power) sur lequel la Chine pourrait baser sa émergence. Il réclame finalement un monde hérissé de murailles comme la conception de la Chine opposée directement de l'idée américaine d'un monde plat.
De nouveau, très fascinant ce livre. Facile à lire et on a l'impression de gagner un bref aperçu sur la discussion chinoise. Qu'est-ce qu'il y a à critiquer? Leonard reste (nécessairement probablement) très superficiel. Le livre sert comme une introduction mais rien plus que ça. La langage simple est facilement accessible du bouquin aide à la compréhension, mais au même temps j'ai l'impression qu'il oblige à une sur-simplification parfois. Cela est peut-être fait par volonté car il me semble comme si le livre n'est pas nécessairement écrit pour une audience scientifique seulement. En tout cas, il vaut la peine.
Monday, April 20, 2009
Thursday, April 16, 2009
Twilight
I read William Gay's short story collection i hate to see that evening sun go down (the title being a reference to the WC Handy song most famously covered by Bessie Smith with Louis Armstrong playing the cornet) a few years ago and I believe I actually wrote an essay on one of those stories for a literature class of mine back in Austria. More importantly though I had sat in on an interview my dad did with him in Hohenwald, Tennessee (check out this photo if you care to see the friends we made there while having breakfast). Southern, gothic literature at its finest. The old Faulkner comparisons are most definitely overdone, but still valid in this case.
I couldn't resist buying the book while I was in a store getting a present for a friend and considered as a treat in between my regular consumption of French and scientific literature (nothing against either of those, but I have to admit that my heart still lies with good, ol'-fashioned Southern writing). I even read the book the way you would consume a piece of candy that pleases your taste buds and that you are afraid to let go, even while sucking hard on it and getting pleasure out of it will let it fade away far too quick. Sometimes I wish I'd spend my life reading books like this.
Now, in order to actually say something, anything about the novel. It is great. A page-turner without being dumb, exciting without being cheap. Gay's stories are violent. He writes about common folk in the rural South of first half of the 20th century. Yet, his heroes are beset by evil and by the inertia of institutions and public figures. I realize I am not making much sense, but there is a reason I have not become a literary critic of professor. Read him (it), he (it) is worth it.
I couldn't resist buying the book while I was in a store getting a present for a friend and considered as a treat in between my regular consumption of French and scientific literature (nothing against either of those, but I have to admit that my heart still lies with good, ol'-fashioned Southern writing). I even read the book the way you would consume a piece of candy that pleases your taste buds and that you are afraid to let go, even while sucking hard on it and getting pleasure out of it will let it fade away far too quick. Sometimes I wish I'd spend my life reading books like this.
Now, in order to actually say something, anything about the novel. It is great. A page-turner without being dumb, exciting without being cheap. Gay's stories are violent. He writes about common folk in the rural South of first half of the 20th century. Yet, his heroes are beset by evil and by the inertia of institutions and public figures. I realize I am not making much sense, but there is a reason I have not become a literary critic of professor. Read him (it), he (it) is worth it.
Thursday, April 02, 2009
Voyages dans le Reich
J'ai trouvé cette collection par hasard à la bibliothèque de l'Assemblée et je l'aurais jamais lu en français normalement vu que beaucoup des textes ont été traduits de l'allemand ou de l'anglais. Mais, même sous cette considération, l'œuvre, compilée par Oliver Lubrich, est recommandable. Effectivement et comme le titre implique Lubrich a amassé des textes des étrangers voyageant en Allemagne de 1933 à 1945, dont les auteurs connus (C. Isherwood, M. Frisch, V. Woolf, A. Camus) et moins connus (un étudiant chinois, la fille de l'ambassadeur américain, des journalistes).
Les textes soi-même varient beaucoup en longueur et style, ils sont tous plus ou moins littéraire mais certains sont beaucoup plus biographique que des autres. Et, comme toujours dans une collection, certains textes sont simplement meilleur que des autres. Mais en général je peux dire que ces écrivains offrent une perspective fascinante sur l'Allemagne et les allemands de l'époque. Certains entre eux se montre intrigué par le fascisme, mais même leurs descriptions (avec l'intention de flatter) réussissent à faire peur du climat à l'époque.
Depuis toujours, l'être allemand, tant l'individu que le peuple dans son entier, hésite entre la peur de l'infériorité et une confiance en soi exagérée. Je n'adhère pas aux préjugés trop simple comme celle je viens de citer, mais elle m'a fait rire quand même. Et finalement, si vous l'avez pas encore remarqué en lisant ce blog ou en me parlant:
D'habitude, le Berlinoi aime commenter.
Les textes soi-même varient beaucoup en longueur et style, ils sont tous plus ou moins littéraire mais certains sont beaucoup plus biographique que des autres. Et, comme toujours dans une collection, certains textes sont simplement meilleur que des autres. Mais en général je peux dire que ces écrivains offrent une perspective fascinante sur l'Allemagne et les allemands de l'époque. Certains entre eux se montre intrigué par le fascisme, mais même leurs descriptions (avec l'intention de flatter) réussissent à faire peur du climat à l'époque.
Depuis toujours, l'être allemand, tant l'individu que le peuple dans son entier, hésite entre la peur de l'infériorité et une confiance en soi exagérée. Je n'adhère pas aux préjugés trop simple comme celle je viens de citer, mais elle m'a fait rire quand même. Et finalement, si vous l'avez pas encore remarqué en lisant ce blog ou en me parlant:
D'habitude, le Berlinoi aime commenter.
Europe continued
I am actually decently busy at work, so let's keep this short, even if it would be fun to engage in something a bit more fundamental. (IPE)
Europe as a whole does not have a military of course (the battle groups are ready by now, but let's pass on that). It is not true that Europe always has been divided on these issues (even if I of course adhere to the more general point that this is too frequently, if not to say usually, the case), Afghanistan seems to be the most striking counter example. The point I was trying to make here is that Europe's militaries would suffice to act against virtually everyone (with a few notable exceptions that apply to the US as well). Basically, Europe's armies are powerless only when compared to the US and why should Europe even try to compete with its closest ally?
It is clear that the provision of security for Europe by the US has greatly widened the range of possibilities for European social policy decision-making. Europe paid back through a lack of foreign policy independence though (Suez being only the most prominent example).
I did realize that the post was mainly geared towards economics, I guess I just enjoy looking at security and foreign policy more. Anyways. I think it is important to note that most people in Europe don't believe in the necessity of more fiscal stimulus (rightly or wrongly - I tend to believe they are wrong, but that's besides the point really). They are not asking the US to provide further stimulus to their economy even if they will take the continuing exports of course (and the German obliviousness to their problematic status as Exportweltmeister shall not even be further explored). The crisis is seen as having originated in the US alone (again, rightly or wrongly, I tend to believe there is a point to this, but again, that doesn't really matter) and people ask themselves why they should help bail out an unregulated overly-capitalistic giant (it would be a pretty hard political sell as well btw). I am not quite sure then whether it can be called free-riding if you do something I don't think I necessarily need, even when it benefits me to some extent.
The IMF:
diplomats say that the strongest opposition to thorough IMF reforms currently comes from the US – reluctant to give up its de facto ability to veto IMF decisions – rather than Europe. (CER)
I don't remember where I read this, but the US also refuses to discuss supranational structures in order to oversee the international financial system (which is not surprising considering the differing attitudes (modern/post-modern) in the US and Europe). I thus simply have a hard time seeing how the American position is more cooperative than the European one. You can of course argue that the European positions are wrong and that Europe should come around to the American ones, but that's not cooperation anymore then. In fact that'd smell suspiciously like the same old (admittedly benign) coercion.
Europe as a whole does not have a military of course (the battle groups are ready by now, but let's pass on that). It is not true that Europe always has been divided on these issues (even if I of course adhere to the more general point that this is too frequently, if not to say usually, the case), Afghanistan seems to be the most striking counter example. The point I was trying to make here is that Europe's militaries would suffice to act against virtually everyone (with a few notable exceptions that apply to the US as well). Basically, Europe's armies are powerless only when compared to the US and why should Europe even try to compete with its closest ally?
It is clear that the provision of security for Europe by the US has greatly widened the range of possibilities for European social policy decision-making. Europe paid back through a lack of foreign policy independence though (Suez being only the most prominent example).
I did realize that the post was mainly geared towards economics, I guess I just enjoy looking at security and foreign policy more. Anyways. I think it is important to note that most people in Europe don't believe in the necessity of more fiscal stimulus (rightly or wrongly - I tend to believe they are wrong, but that's besides the point really). They are not asking the US to provide further stimulus to their economy even if they will take the continuing exports of course (and the German obliviousness to their problematic status as Exportweltmeister shall not even be further explored). The crisis is seen as having originated in the US alone (again, rightly or wrongly, I tend to believe there is a point to this, but again, that doesn't really matter) and people ask themselves why they should help bail out an unregulated overly-capitalistic giant (it would be a pretty hard political sell as well btw). I am not quite sure then whether it can be called free-riding if you do something I don't think I necessarily need, even when it benefits me to some extent.
The IMF:
diplomats say that the strongest opposition to thorough IMF reforms currently comes from the US – reluctant to give up its de facto ability to veto IMF decisions – rather than Europe. (CER)
I don't remember where I read this, but the US also refuses to discuss supranational structures in order to oversee the international financial system (which is not surprising considering the differing attitudes (modern/post-modern) in the US and Europe). I thus simply have a hard time seeing how the American position is more cooperative than the European one. You can of course argue that the European positions are wrong and that Europe should come around to the American ones, but that's not cooperation anymore then. In fact that'd smell suspiciously like the same old (admittedly benign) coercion.
Wednesday, April 01, 2009
Bashing Europe
Well, well, well.
Now I am the last one not to criticize European leaders for their lack of action and coordination, but I do feel that some criticism leveled at Europe from the US (conveniently?) forgets to put into account some aspects of European contributions.
1 - Europe (as a whole) has by far the second most impressive military in the world. Would Americans really want the EU to start competing with them too?
2 - American security provision exists only when American (hegemonic if you want) interests are concerned (see the lack of activity in Albania and Macedonia). Plus, if that provision includes starting (or continuing) unnecessary wars all over the place (Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Iraq to name just a few) I have to wonder why European accounts should even be charged for it.
3 - For the war that Europe supported (Afghanistan) Europeans have provided nearly as many troops as the US did.
4 - If you put development aid into account, European spending on world affairs is not really all that much smaller than that of the US.
5 - Without European support (intelligence, infrastructure) wars such as in Iraq would be virtually impossible for the US or in the least far more expensive (in political and financial terms).
What else? Criticism from the US that Europe is only willing to coordinate on their terms is quite amusing of course (Kyoto anyone? the ICC?), I am not even going to really comment on that.
I could try to respond to some of the more specific accusations against the European (non-)activities on economic/financial questions. Let it suffice to say that some American beliefs simply are not shared by a large majority of European politicians (fiscal stimulus!) so why should they adapt their policies in order to please a partner with whom they disagree? And that the difference between $99,7 million and $100 million is not something that I would describe with the word chunk.
One last, and more important, note though. I understand some of the criticism leveled at Europe (if not its tone), but all those people clamoring for more European contributions hopefully realize one thing: It'll come at a cost. Europe having its own security/defense forces will not let itself be pushed around by the US on foreign policy issues. The same is true for virtually every policy field. Be sure you know what you wish for is all I can say. Me, I think Iraq, this crisis, the G20 all mark very much the twilight of the American unipolar moment.
Now I am the last one not to criticize European leaders for their lack of action and coordination, but I do feel that some criticism leveled at Europe from the US (conveniently?) forgets to put into account some aspects of European contributions.
1 - Europe (as a whole) has by far the second most impressive military in the world. Would Americans really want the EU to start competing with them too?
2 - American security provision exists only when American (hegemonic if you want) interests are concerned (see the lack of activity in Albania and Macedonia). Plus, if that provision includes starting (or continuing) unnecessary wars all over the place (Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Iraq to name just a few) I have to wonder why European accounts should even be charged for it.
3 - For the war that Europe supported (Afghanistan) Europeans have provided nearly as many troops as the US did.
4 - If you put development aid into account, European spending on world affairs is not really all that much smaller than that of the US.
5 - Without European support (intelligence, infrastructure) wars such as in Iraq would be virtually impossible for the US or in the least far more expensive (in political and financial terms).
What else? Criticism from the US that Europe is only willing to coordinate on their terms is quite amusing of course (Kyoto anyone? the ICC?), I am not even going to really comment on that.
I could try to respond to some of the more specific accusations against the European (non-)activities on economic/financial questions. Let it suffice to say that some American beliefs simply are not shared by a large majority of European politicians (fiscal stimulus!) so why should they adapt their policies in order to please a partner with whom they disagree? And that the difference between $99,7 million and $100 million is not something that I would describe with the word chunk.
One last, and more important, note though. I understand some of the criticism leveled at Europe (if not its tone), but all those people clamoring for more European contributions hopefully realize one thing: It'll come at a cost. Europe having its own security/defense forces will not let itself be pushed around by the US on foreign policy issues. The same is true for virtually every policy field. Be sure you know what you wish for is all I can say. Me, I think Iraq, this crisis, the G20 all mark very much the twilight of the American unipolar moment.
Friday, March 20, 2009
AIG-Bonuses
The House has passed a bill taxing the bonuses AIG gave out after it had passed into the government's hands 90% (NY Times). This kind of retroactive action seems problematic to me (apart from the fact that it is nothing but populist policy and additionally unimportant in the big scheme of things (Drezner) from a credibility point of view. The Economist criticizes it from a political point of view, IPE at UNC for more economical reasons (it were to encourage excessive risk-taking; drive the best and brightest employees from firms under government control and set a [dangerous?] precedent of retroactive punitive tax policy).
While I agree with the assessment that this macroeconomically irrelevant, I believe that symbolic politics matter and I also have a hard time believing in the danger of driving the best and the brightest away, if only because it reminds of Kennedy's administration which delivered so far less than it had promised it's not even funny anymore. On a more general level I simply don't believe there is a big difference in quality at the top of any game or profession. You might have a few dominating people (Jordan, King James), but the difference between some random power forward playing in Spain and the guy on the bench behind David Lee is just not that big I believe. If you apply this to the business world, it follows that the guys driven away from AIG (or any other government owned/funded financial company) will only marginally (if at all) be better than those taking over. This especially considering that the best and the brightest, did not really produce.
To make a final and larger point, I believe that this whole discussion points out an apparently system-inherent problematic of the capitalist system as it exists in the United States. Abstracting from the macroeconomic irrelevance of this issue and the potentially negative impact of this retroactive decision, I think it is obvious that the AIG-employees did not deserve these bonuses, after all their company failed and had to be bailed out by the government. How is it possible that they receive bonuses for their work if they fail at it? Do go back to an illustrative example, does a construction worker receive a bonus after the building he worked on crumbles? Does the UNC team of last year receive an extra car per player from some booster because they lost against Kansas? This evidently is a problematic situation and this is the case, because there is no sufficient oversight in these financial (and other business) institutions. Evidently, if I determine my own salary and that of my colleagues and friends I will pay myself more than I am worth, after all that is a normal human reflex. I am not familiar enough with the administrative construction of these companies to suggest anything here or even to criticize them in a more precise manner, but it seems obvious that something is afoul (and not just morally) in a systematic manner if something like these bonuses are given out. Especially, because this is not the first time something like this takes place.
While I agree with the assessment that this macroeconomically irrelevant, I believe that symbolic politics matter and I also have a hard time believing in the danger of driving the best and the brightest away, if only because it reminds of Kennedy's administration which delivered so far less than it had promised it's not even funny anymore. On a more general level I simply don't believe there is a big difference in quality at the top of any game or profession. You might have a few dominating people (Jordan, King James), but the difference between some random power forward playing in Spain and the guy on the bench behind David Lee is just not that big I believe. If you apply this to the business world, it follows that the guys driven away from AIG (or any other government owned/funded financial company) will only marginally (if at all) be better than those taking over. This especially considering that the best and the brightest, did not really produce.
To make a final and larger point, I believe that this whole discussion points out an apparently system-inherent problematic of the capitalist system as it exists in the United States. Abstracting from the macroeconomic irrelevance of this issue and the potentially negative impact of this retroactive decision, I think it is obvious that the AIG-employees did not deserve these bonuses, after all their company failed and had to be bailed out by the government. How is it possible that they receive bonuses for their work if they fail at it? Do go back to an illustrative example, does a construction worker receive a bonus after the building he worked on crumbles? Does the UNC team of last year receive an extra car per player from some booster because they lost against Kansas? This evidently is a problematic situation and this is the case, because there is no sufficient oversight in these financial (and other business) institutions. Evidently, if I determine my own salary and that of my colleagues and friends I will pay myself more than I am worth, after all that is a normal human reflex. I am not familiar enough with the administrative construction of these companies to suggest anything here or even to criticize them in a more precise manner, but it seems obvious that something is afoul (and not just morally) in a systematic manner if something like these bonuses are given out. Especially, because this is not the first time something like this takes place.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Lettres à un ami allemand
Je suis tombé sur ce livre l'autre jour par hasard et vu qu'il n'a que ~80 pages, je l'ai lu ces derniers jours. Il est très sympa. Albert Camus écrit des lettres à un ami allemand, quelqu'un avec qui il avait une relation amicale avant la guerre, avec qui il avait discuté sur la politique, sur la nation, sur le monde. Il montre comment et dans quelle mesure lui (et son peuple en général) aurait été tenté par quelques aspects de la philosophie de cet ami allemand (sans doute un militant des Nazis), mais il montre surtout pourquoi cette perception du monde a tort. Comment elle va inévitablement perdre et pourquoi la France (ou l'occident démocrate) va finir par vaincre son ennemi. Les essais (il y a quatre lettres en total) sont d'une beauté remarquable, je les ai trouvé très agréable à lire et très persuadant sur nu niveau philosophique.
Mon seul problème avec cet oeuvre est lié à mon point de vue cynique habituel. Cela veut dire que même si je suis bien d'accord sur la suprématie de la pensée de Camus envers la pensée des Nazis je ne suis pas convaincu que la victoire de la France (ni les alliés en général) a été inévitable. Je ne crois pas à une victoire nécessaire du bien sur le mal. Je voudrais bien y croire évidemment, mais je ne peux pas.
Mon seul problème avec cet oeuvre est lié à mon point de vue cynique habituel. Cela veut dire que même si je suis bien d'accord sur la suprématie de la pensée de Camus envers la pensée des Nazis je ne suis pas convaincu que la victoire de la France (ni les alliés en général) a été inévitable. Je ne crois pas à une victoire nécessaire du bien sur le mal. Je voudrais bien y croire évidemment, mais je ne peux pas.
Thursday, March 05, 2009
Currency Appreciation and the Iraqi Insurgency
I had already linked to this paper (props to IPE at UNC for making me aware of its existence) a few days ago and only got around to truly reading it this morning. Amazing paper. Seriously. Read it! It might very well have no validity, or its underlying thesis might be accurate yet have had no true impact or not a big one, in any case its impact is not measurable. But fascinating concept
The authors argue that the decline in insurgency activity in Iraq (measured by for example the number of American and Iraqi (solider and civilian) deaths) has been accompanied by a strong appreciation of the Iraqi and that the two are in fact linked. Why? The underlying assumption is that the civilian population will be willing to aid (if passively as in not aiding the counter-insurgency forces) an insurgency if they accrue a net benefit through its activities. The insurgents need to provide social welfare to civilians in effect (see Hamas or Hezbollah as examples of organizations that have perfectioned this mixture of guerrilla warfare and social welfare provider). In order for them do this efficiently (and provide a net benefit to the population) the insurgent group needs to receive financial assistance from abroad. If it were to finance itself domestically some kind of a tax needs to be raised and considering the costs of running an organization and the efficiency losses accompanied through the raising of taxes (and even more so of taxes not enforceable through a true government) no net benefit would accrue to the population.
If this is taken for granted, and the argument seems intellectually sound, then the increase in real value of the Iraqi Dinar versus the Dollar (and the Saudi currency which is pegged to the Dollar) had a direct (and negative) impact on the insurgency's capacity to buy hearts and minds in Iraq. This especially in a country where a large number of insurgents simply became such in order to provide for a living for themselves and their families. For the authors this was not a result that the US (or the Iraqi government) expected and had tried to achieve, but simply an accidental by-product of the currency appreciation due to the lift of sanctions and the massive inflow of cash through the American occupying forces.
Evidently it seems preposterous to argue that this was the only reason for the diminution in insurgent activities. The surge, changes in strategic thinking (the Awakening Councils) and tactical measures on the ground (the US forces realizing that peace-making is different from war-making) played important roles. But the thesis of the paper seems valid, important and relevant for a variety of other conflicts as well. Definitely some food for thought.
The authors argue that the decline in insurgency activity in Iraq (measured by for example the number of American and Iraqi (solider and civilian) deaths) has been accompanied by a strong appreciation of the Iraqi and that the two are in fact linked. Why? The underlying assumption is that the civilian population will be willing to aid (if passively as in not aiding the counter-insurgency forces) an insurgency if they accrue a net benefit through its activities. The insurgents need to provide social welfare to civilians in effect (see Hamas or Hezbollah as examples of organizations that have perfectioned this mixture of guerrilla warfare and social welfare provider). In order for them do this efficiently (and provide a net benefit to the population) the insurgent group needs to receive financial assistance from abroad. If it were to finance itself domestically some kind of a tax needs to be raised and considering the costs of running an organization and the efficiency losses accompanied through the raising of taxes (and even more so of taxes not enforceable through a true government) no net benefit would accrue to the population.
If this is taken for granted, and the argument seems intellectually sound, then the increase in real value of the Iraqi Dinar versus the Dollar (and the Saudi currency which is pegged to the Dollar) had a direct (and negative) impact on the insurgency's capacity to buy hearts and minds in Iraq. This especially in a country where a large number of insurgents simply became such in order to provide for a living for themselves and their families. For the authors this was not a result that the US (or the Iraqi government) expected and had tried to achieve, but simply an accidental by-product of the currency appreciation due to the lift of sanctions and the massive inflow of cash through the American occupying forces.
Evidently it seems preposterous to argue that this was the only reason for the diminution in insurgent activities. The surge, changes in strategic thinking (the Awakening Councils) and tactical measures on the ground (the US forces realizing that peace-making is different from war-making) played important roles. But the thesis of the paper seems valid, important and relevant for a variety of other conflicts as well. Definitely some food for thought.
Tuesday, March 03, 2009
Au bonheur des dames
J'ai voulu écrire une critique du livre Au bonheur des dames d'Émile Zola depuis longtemps. Maintenant, il fait un peu trop de temps que je l'ai lu, seulement quelques remarques courts alors.
Zola dans ce bouquin détaille l'émergence d'une grande magasin à Paris (comme le Bon Marché) et ses effets sur les petits vendeurs au quartier. Peu surprenant, sa description est loin d'être flatteuse. Il montre le patron du magasin, sa clientèle accro, et ses vendeurs traités uniquement comme des sources de revenues. D'une certaine façon le livre peut être lu comme une critique anti-moderne seulement, mais au même temps un caractère fort sympa qui ne réussit pas à s'adapter au magasin disparaît inglorieusement au contraste avec le patron qui trouve son bonheur (même si ce bonheur n'est plus basé sur les aspects financières). Je peux carrément recommandé le livre, je l'ai bien aimé, même si j'avais du mal à comprendre certains partis descriptives sur le tissus vendus par exemple. Les seuls choses critiquables de mon points de vue ont été les constants références aux caractéristiques 'juives' (l'avarice, la capacité de devenir riche), mais au même temps il semble impossible d'accuser Zola de l'antisemitisme. Deuxièmement, il serait très instructive de lire une critique féministe de cette œuvre - vu que l'idée structurelle est que les grands magasins réussirent parce que les femmes sont très faibles de résister les prix à bon marché.
Zola dans ce bouquin détaille l'émergence d'une grande magasin à Paris (comme le Bon Marché) et ses effets sur les petits vendeurs au quartier. Peu surprenant, sa description est loin d'être flatteuse. Il montre le patron du magasin, sa clientèle accro, et ses vendeurs traités uniquement comme des sources de revenues. D'une certaine façon le livre peut être lu comme une critique anti-moderne seulement, mais au même temps un caractère fort sympa qui ne réussit pas à s'adapter au magasin disparaît inglorieusement au contraste avec le patron qui trouve son bonheur (même si ce bonheur n'est plus basé sur les aspects financières). Je peux carrément recommandé le livre, je l'ai bien aimé, même si j'avais du mal à comprendre certains partis descriptives sur le tissus vendus par exemple. Les seuls choses critiquables de mon points de vue ont été les constants références aux caractéristiques 'juives' (l'avarice, la capacité de devenir riche), mais au même temps il semble impossible d'accuser Zola de l'antisemitisme. Deuxièmement, il serait très instructive de lire une critique féministe de cette œuvre - vu que l'idée structurelle est que les grands magasins réussirent parce que les femmes sont très faibles de résister les prix à bon marché.
Europe
One of my professors at UNC last year, Thomas Oatley, generally takes a rather critical view of monetary aspects of European integration. In his IPE textbook for one his outlook on the future of a common European currency without an accompanying economic government is rather pessimistic (or realistic, but in any case not rosy). Recent events seem to provide evidence that he is right (and the € doomed) and even mainstream European publications have picked up on the possibility of monetary union failing. On his blog there now is a post mocking (criticizing if you want) review of European leaders' responses to the monetary crisis.
I do not have much to say in defence of European governments, I wholeheartedly agree with Mr Oatley's implication that these national responses are not sufficient in fact. Especially Germany needs to step up to the plate and help its neighbors in need, simply because it is one of the few countries (if not the only European one) that can, because of its own interests (preserving the €) even coming at a short-term price, but also out of interest in the higher ideals of European integration and the amazing progress we have made on this continent ever since 1945.
What I think needs to be stressed are the underlying reasons for this lack of European coordination. The main (philosophical) problem as far as I am concerned is that there is no European identity. The news, the discussion, the political leaders in Europe (or in the two countries, France and Germany, where I follow the news in any case) are French or German and nothing else. There is not enough acceptance of an overriding European frame-work. Merkel is a German politician that has to deal with the impact of her policies on a German electorate (federal elections in September!) that is not willing to pay for the 'spend-thrift' countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. She has to furthermore deal with an inner-party rival in Seehofer (who recently emerged as the new leader of the Bavarian section of the Union (CDU/CSU) (imagine the Dixiecrats having formed their own party at some point and constantly winning by large percentages in the South while still working as part of the Democrats in Washington; it's not a good situation as anyone familiar with Strom Thurgood can attest)) who through populist attacks is trying to make up for the recent electoral losses of the CSU. National politics and posturing simply pays more than European solidarity (see Sarkozy's initiatives at the outbreak of the Gaza War for example, completely ignoring its effects on the perception of the Czech EU-presidency).
On a more structural level two aspects seem to be of relevance to me.
As part of a realist approach, Germany ever since its reunification (and the disappearance of the dinosaur Kohl) has shown more willingness to assert itself on the European political scene. A mixture of a bad conscience (and thus genuine conviction) and a perception of it being the only way leading to international acceptance after the Second World War, made the Federal Republic willing to foot a large part of the bill of European integration. This is not the case anymore. Constrained budgets in Germany (and an obsession with a debt-free budget) and the difficult economic period following the reunification, further increased this aversion to pay for developments perceived as emanating from other countries only.
On a cultural level, the problem quite simply is that there are not enough Europeans governing Europeans countries. The descriptive aspects enumerated above concerning Merkel could easily be transferred to Sarkozy or any other European national leader. The politicians of this generation have not had the same exposure to Europe as (some) members of my generation did. Merkel never spent a significant amount of time abroad, neither did Sarkozy. I had a course with Hubert Védrine (Secretary of State in France under the Jospin government; came up with the controversial term of hyperpuissance) here in France and his point of view is also extremely nationalist. I honestly feel like there is a disconnect between the EU as it has evolved over the years, between the reality of European life and interdependence and the people that actually govern it (above the EU-bureaucrat level that is). If I look at the members of my generation that care about European (and international) politics, then I see a group of people that speaks three languages at least (English and the respective mother tongue being a given) that has friends and significant others' of different nationalities and different origins. These circumstances of life shape decisions and perspectives. European leaders today lack this perspective.
Yet, to be slightly more optimistic (weird position for me to be in admittedly) and even though I really like Alexandre Dumas, it is not unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno of course, but rather the ever deeper union. Even the United States needed 21 years from independence to the ratification of its constitution and that took place in a union far smaller and diverse than today's EU. We need some more time for any kind of true European solidarity to emerge.
I personally hope that the current crisis will lead to an extension and deepening of European integration. But then maybe I am a hopelessly naive federalist.
I do not have much to say in defence of European governments, I wholeheartedly agree with Mr Oatley's implication that these national responses are not sufficient in fact. Especially Germany needs to step up to the plate and help its neighbors in need, simply because it is one of the few countries (if not the only European one) that can, because of its own interests (preserving the €) even coming at a short-term price, but also out of interest in the higher ideals of European integration and the amazing progress we have made on this continent ever since 1945.
What I think needs to be stressed are the underlying reasons for this lack of European coordination. The main (philosophical) problem as far as I am concerned is that there is no European identity. The news, the discussion, the political leaders in Europe (or in the two countries, France and Germany, where I follow the news in any case) are French or German and nothing else. There is not enough acceptance of an overriding European frame-work. Merkel is a German politician that has to deal with the impact of her policies on a German electorate (federal elections in September!) that is not willing to pay for the 'spend-thrift' countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. She has to furthermore deal with an inner-party rival in Seehofer (who recently emerged as the new leader of the Bavarian section of the Union (CDU/CSU) (imagine the Dixiecrats having formed their own party at some point and constantly winning by large percentages in the South while still working as part of the Democrats in Washington; it's not a good situation as anyone familiar with Strom Thurgood can attest)) who through populist attacks is trying to make up for the recent electoral losses of the CSU. National politics and posturing simply pays more than European solidarity (see Sarkozy's initiatives at the outbreak of the Gaza War for example, completely ignoring its effects on the perception of the Czech EU-presidency).
On a more structural level two aspects seem to be of relevance to me.
As part of a realist approach, Germany ever since its reunification (and the disappearance of the dinosaur Kohl) has shown more willingness to assert itself on the European political scene. A mixture of a bad conscience (and thus genuine conviction) and a perception of it being the only way leading to international acceptance after the Second World War, made the Federal Republic willing to foot a large part of the bill of European integration. This is not the case anymore. Constrained budgets in Germany (and an obsession with a debt-free budget) and the difficult economic period following the reunification, further increased this aversion to pay for developments perceived as emanating from other countries only.
On a cultural level, the problem quite simply is that there are not enough Europeans governing Europeans countries. The descriptive aspects enumerated above concerning Merkel could easily be transferred to Sarkozy or any other European national leader. The politicians of this generation have not had the same exposure to Europe as (some) members of my generation did. Merkel never spent a significant amount of time abroad, neither did Sarkozy. I had a course with Hubert Védrine (Secretary of State in France under the Jospin government; came up with the controversial term of hyperpuissance) here in France and his point of view is also extremely nationalist. I honestly feel like there is a disconnect between the EU as it has evolved over the years, between the reality of European life and interdependence and the people that actually govern it (above the EU-bureaucrat level that is). If I look at the members of my generation that care about European (and international) politics, then I see a group of people that speaks three languages at least (English and the respective mother tongue being a given) that has friends and significant others' of different nationalities and different origins. These circumstances of life shape decisions and perspectives. European leaders today lack this perspective.
Yet, to be slightly more optimistic (weird position for me to be in admittedly) and even though I really like Alexandre Dumas, it is not unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno of course, but rather the ever deeper union. Even the United States needed 21 years from independence to the ratification of its constitution and that took place in a union far smaller and diverse than today's EU. We need some more time for any kind of true European solidarity to emerge.
I personally hope that the current crisis will lead to an extension and deepening of European integration. But then maybe I am a hopelessly naive federalist.
Thursday, February 26, 2009
News update
Haven't done this in a while and am really too busy to be doing it, but there were quite a few interesting ones today.
- Paul Krugman's insistence on the duration of the economic crisis, leading to a lost decade (similar to Japan's experience in the 1990s) is one of the more depressing subplots not sufficiently discussed today. I hope that he (and Adam Posen one of the experts on Japan's deflationary period) is wrong, but I feel like that might not be true and it is people like Bernanke proclaiming the economy will pick up again this year that delude themselves. I, II
- Can Obama's policies even succeed theoretically? Increased spending and a balanced budget? Drezner
- I didn't really read anything on Mr Jindal's speech, but Mr Krugman definitely didn't like it. Also it seems quite funny how the Republicans are trying to prove that they are not the least bit racist these days. A black secretary general (or whatever their part leader officially is called) and the main against-Obama speaker of Indian origin. Are these guys supposed to be representative?
- The impact of economics on the success of the surge in Iraq. Crazy, crazy theory. Read it.
- Manche Leute sind einfach zu blöd. Nicht wahr Herr Mahler? taz
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Change we can believe in
I guess I should be a classy winner and cynic and just let it go. But I still have some hope left to convert some of my younger and more naive American friends to a more realistic view of their new President. NY Times
Friday, January 30, 2009
Gold and the Dollar Crisis
I have to admit that I get some kind of a bizarre (sadomasochistic?) joy out of these intellectually challenging economics books. But then I like to read for Faulkner for fun and devote a significant chunk of time to the upkeep of a blog whose number of hits (aka readers) is, well, not overly impressive, maybe I simply am bizarre when it comes down to it. In any case, Robert Triffin's Gold and the Dollar Crisis - The Future of Convertibility was fun, even if I only read the first half (the second half deals with his proposed changes to the Bretton Woods system finally truly in place in 1958 - analyzing never enacted reforms to a system not in place anymore felt a little bit too hardcore).
Triffin of course is the source of the famous (maybe my perception has become a little bit skewed here) Triffin dilemma, which states that a continued American capital deficit is necessary in order to provide the liquidity needed in an economically expanding world, while it will at the same time undermine the dollar's credibility as the global reserve currency because of the increasing gap between American gold reserves and greenbacks circulating (metaphorically speaking).
In his own words:
'The gold exchange standard may but does not necessarily, help in relieving a shortage of world monetary reserves. It does so only to the extent that the key currency countries are willing to let their net reserve position decline through increases in their short-term monetary liabilities unmatched by corresponding increases in their own gross reserves. If they allow this to happen, however, and to continue indefinitely they tend to bring about a collapse of the system itself through the gradual weakening of foreigners’ confidence in the key currencies.'
Very similar to Eichengreen's analysis at times, he argues that up to 1914 the gold standard worked and provided stability (to major Western countries in any case) because of cushioning, private financial flows (because of the expectancy that problems would be solved and currencies not depreciated) as well as 'higher endurance of macroeconomic suffering' (unemployment namely) feasible due to very restrictive voting rights (and in turn a lack of democratic accountability). He differs from Eichengreen in the sense that these explanations do not suffice in his opinion. He thus adds the 'widespread acceptance of long-term deficits' and the fact that major imbalances were prevented ex ante before its impacts on employment or growth could be felt. Finally, 'financing of expenditures over production did not exist in any dangerous manner.'
All of this changed after WWI. Especially private financial flows became accentuating rather than cushioning of the impact of current account imbalances simply because the belief that currencies would not depreciate had evaporated (here his and Eichengreen's analyses are congruent again). Basically the same situation developed around the Dollar (not the Pound Sterling of the interwar years) after WWII.
Triffin's dilemma of course perfectly summed up the situation and his definition quoted above describes perfectly what 'happened to the UK in 1931' and (unbeknownst to him in 1960 of course) to the USA in 1971 and 1973. Ironic in retrospective is that Triffin shows himself convinced that this situation would not arise again. 'Only an incredible complacency on our part could [...] force us to suspend or modify the legal gold cover requirements of the Federal Reserve System.' His main concern lies with the deflationary consequences of an adjustment to the American balance of payments deficit instead.
His suggestion to solve this problem lies with an international lender of last resort, more powerful and better financed than the current (or historic) IMF since 'the basic absurdity of the gold exchange standard is that it makes the international monetary system highly dependent on individual countries’ decisions about the continued use of one or a few national currencies as monetary reserves.'
Triffin of course is the source of the famous (maybe my perception has become a little bit skewed here) Triffin dilemma, which states that a continued American capital deficit is necessary in order to provide the liquidity needed in an economically expanding world, while it will at the same time undermine the dollar's credibility as the global reserve currency because of the increasing gap between American gold reserves and greenbacks circulating (metaphorically speaking).
In his own words:
'The gold exchange standard may but does not necessarily, help in relieving a shortage of world monetary reserves. It does so only to the extent that the key currency countries are willing to let their net reserve position decline through increases in their short-term monetary liabilities unmatched by corresponding increases in their own gross reserves. If they allow this to happen, however, and to continue indefinitely they tend to bring about a collapse of the system itself through the gradual weakening of foreigners’ confidence in the key currencies.'
Very similar to Eichengreen's analysis at times, he argues that up to 1914 the gold standard worked and provided stability (to major Western countries in any case) because of cushioning, private financial flows (because of the expectancy that problems would be solved and currencies not depreciated) as well as 'higher endurance of macroeconomic suffering' (unemployment namely) feasible due to very restrictive voting rights (and in turn a lack of democratic accountability). He differs from Eichengreen in the sense that these explanations do not suffice in his opinion. He thus adds the 'widespread acceptance of long-term deficits' and the fact that major imbalances were prevented ex ante before its impacts on employment or growth could be felt. Finally, 'financing of expenditures over production did not exist in any dangerous manner.'
All of this changed after WWI. Especially private financial flows became accentuating rather than cushioning of the impact of current account imbalances simply because the belief that currencies would not depreciate had evaporated (here his and Eichengreen's analyses are congruent again). Basically the same situation developed around the Dollar (not the Pound Sterling of the interwar years) after WWII.
Triffin's dilemma of course perfectly summed up the situation and his definition quoted above describes perfectly what 'happened to the UK in 1931' and (unbeknownst to him in 1960 of course) to the USA in 1971 and 1973. Ironic in retrospective is that Triffin shows himself convinced that this situation would not arise again. 'Only an incredible complacency on our part could [...] force us to suspend or modify the legal gold cover requirements of the Federal Reserve System.' His main concern lies with the deflationary consequences of an adjustment to the American balance of payments deficit instead.
His suggestion to solve this problem lies with an international lender of last resort, more powerful and better financed than the current (or historic) IMF since 'the basic absurdity of the gold exchange standard is that it makes the international monetary system highly dependent on individual countries’ decisions about the continued use of one or a few national currencies as monetary reserves.'
Manias, Panics, and Crashes
Continuing my preparation for my last university exam (assuming I am not going the PhD route that is) as well as my self-education concerning economics. I finished Manias, Panics, and Crashes - A History of Financial Crises by Charles P. Kindleberger a few days ago. While the edition I read dated from the mid-90s and did not include the financial crisis of our times a few weeks ago, Kindleberger's book did provide for an interesting analysis of the nature of crises in general. In fact, it was quite the spooky read at times simply because some of the quotes on, say, the Tulip crisis of the 17th century seemed like a perfect description of the recently exploded bubble.
In more general terms, Kindleberger presents a model and an analysis of crises over the last 400 years that leaves the reader stunned due to the lack of singularity of our financial crisis. Evidently, this one was bigger, as far as countries hit by it as well as sheer numbers, than most other crises but the basic underlying principles are the same. Kindleberger sees an exogenous event such as a new invention (.com bubble!) at the origin of every speculative bubble (I am not quite sure what this could have been in our case, 9/11 and the fact that (turning the non-existence of something negative into a positive element) nothing bad (economically speaking) resulted from it?). This is followed by a monetary expansion (global low interest rates, especially in the USA; massive capital imports into the US from especially China) including the emergence of new credit instruments (sub primes!) multiplying this expansion. Finally, 'overtrading', the creation of a speculative bubble takes place.
Describing a housing boom in Chicago in 1857(sic!):
'In the ruin of all collapsed booms is to be found the work of men who bought property at prices they knew perfectly well were fictitious, but who were willing to pay such prices simply because they knew that some still greater fool could be depended on to take the property off their hands and leave them with a profit.' Putting it more succinctly: 'The first taste is for high interest, but that taste soon becomes secondary. There is a second appetite for large gains to be made by selling the principal.'
When this bubble bursts, everyone tries to get out as fast as possible and prices fall only faster. Individual rational actors and decisions result in collectively irrational results. Or, 'the actions of each individual is rational – or would be, were it not for the fact that others are behaving in the same way.'
Talking about bad omens for today's situation (not that we need any considering we're already in a recession in any case): 'A 'financial crisis [can be][...] the culmination of a period of expansion and lead[...] to downturn.' The only piece of good news would be that Kindleberger believes that a 'lender of last resort shortens depressions.' Yet, here Keynes (and Krugman today) comes in arguing that in the special circumstances of deflation combined with a zero interest rate monetary policy becomes ineffective (1, 2 book reviews on this topic). I definitely do not want to open this Pandora's box right now though.
A fun quote on the irrationality of economics to end this post instead (even when I am not certain as to the validity or importance of this part of his argument):
'A competent driver of an automobile, for example, or an expert chess player [or an experienced basketball player I might add] has moved beyond the stage of calculating what needs to be done at a given time. That individual sees the situation and does what is required without pausing to reason out the optimal course of action [...] The notion that asset markets are made up of [...] intelligent, well-informed [...] speculators who calculate by rational steps is [...] not [necessarily true].'
In more general terms, Kindleberger presents a model and an analysis of crises over the last 400 years that leaves the reader stunned due to the lack of singularity of our financial crisis. Evidently, this one was bigger, as far as countries hit by it as well as sheer numbers, than most other crises but the basic underlying principles are the same. Kindleberger sees an exogenous event such as a new invention (.com bubble!) at the origin of every speculative bubble (I am not quite sure what this could have been in our case, 9/11 and the fact that (turning the non-existence of something negative into a positive element) nothing bad (economically speaking) resulted from it?). This is followed by a monetary expansion (global low interest rates, especially in the USA; massive capital imports into the US from especially China) including the emergence of new credit instruments (sub primes!) multiplying this expansion. Finally, 'overtrading', the creation of a speculative bubble takes place.
Describing a housing boom in Chicago in 1857(sic!):
'In the ruin of all collapsed booms is to be found the work of men who bought property at prices they knew perfectly well were fictitious, but who were willing to pay such prices simply because they knew that some still greater fool could be depended on to take the property off their hands and leave them with a profit.' Putting it more succinctly: 'The first taste is for high interest, but that taste soon becomes secondary. There is a second appetite for large gains to be made by selling the principal.'
When this bubble bursts, everyone tries to get out as fast as possible and prices fall only faster. Individual rational actors and decisions result in collectively irrational results. Or, 'the actions of each individual is rational – or would be, were it not for the fact that others are behaving in the same way.'
Talking about bad omens for today's situation (not that we need any considering we're already in a recession in any case): 'A 'financial crisis [can be][...] the culmination of a period of expansion and lead[...] to downturn.' The only piece of good news would be that Kindleberger believes that a 'lender of last resort shortens depressions.' Yet, here Keynes (and Krugman today) comes in arguing that in the special circumstances of deflation combined with a zero interest rate monetary policy becomes ineffective (1, 2 book reviews on this topic). I definitely do not want to open this Pandora's box right now though.
A fun quote on the irrationality of economics to end this post instead (even when I am not certain as to the validity or importance of this part of his argument):
'A competent driver of an automobile, for example, or an expert chess player [or an experienced basketball player I might add] has moved beyond the stage of calculating what needs to be done at a given time. That individual sees the situation and does what is required without pausing to reason out the optimal course of action [...] The notion that asset markets are made up of [...] intelligent, well-informed [...] speculators who calculate by rational steps is [...] not [necessarily true].'
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Capitalism
Macroeconomically speaking this is completely irrelevant of course. What are $18 billion when Congress will spend over $800 billion after all. Plus I guess this recession needs high incomes in order to kick-start consumption again. But, talking symbolic politics (which I admittedly criticized a mere two days ago), how am I supposed to develop any kind of respect toward these leaders of global capitalism (that's what these people are after all to some extent)? How am I supposed to respect this thing called capitalism in the first place, if the immediate response to the biggest financial crash since 1929 is a massive payout to the people responsable for just that crash?
I guess Churchill must have been right, capitalism is clearly the wort imaginable economic system, except for all the others.
I guess Churchill must have been right, capitalism is clearly the wort imaginable economic system, except for all the others.
Monday, January 26, 2009
Obama's challenges
Afghanistan seems to be ignored to some extent when compared to the financial crisis, the recession, Guantanamo or the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. But, now that Iraq seems to be more or less established as a semi-democracy (good-bye model for the greater Middle East, good-bye all you idealistic neo-cons), it represents the biggest challenge of Western (aka American) credibility and it's not looking good. This is one place where political symbolism (closing Guantanamo, Geithner commenting on China, increased governmental transparency) doesn't even do the slightest good. It's a question of putting your money (troops, actual money, but also ideas, nation-building not war-making) where your mouth is.
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
The War over Iraq
I guess this was my personal goodbye to the Bush administration book. Lawrence Kaplan & William Kristol: The War over Iraq - Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission. A very short booklet, written on the eve of the American invasion, it does for a very entertaining reading (for a cynic such as myself in any case). The two neocons argue for invasion of Iraq and criticize American foreign policy by Bush (the father) and Clinton along the way. Basically, Bush should have marched into Baghdad during the Gulf War when he had the chance but his realistic convictions (and Powell's reservations as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) prevented from endeavoring this course not directly linked to American's vital interests. Clinton on the other hand out of an exaggerated moralism (and liberalism), the perception that every display of American power is a bad thing as such, refused to become more active in Iraq than with a few missiles here and there, never truly threatening Saddam's hold on power. Bush (the son) on other hand represents a glorious mixture of a hard-handed approach (from the realists' school) and moralism (taken from the liberals), something that the authors call a distinctively American internationalism (aka neoconservatism).
An American invasion of Iraq will end Saddam's tyranny and torture chambers (some of the descriptions eerily resemble the ones about American soldiers in Abu Ghraib, even when in Saddam's case these are the low-intensity ones), will create a liberal democracy to Iraq which will act as an ally to Israel and the US in the region, as a counterweight to Iran and maybe most importantly be a kind of city upon a hill showing that democracy is possible in the Middle East. All this can be achieved with 75.000 soldiers, staying in Iraq at most one or two years and at the cost of $16 billion only. Definitely sounds like a good deal if you ask me.
Some of the more amusing arguments:
- American spending on military capabilities is far too low
- civil war in Iraq cannot erupt because there is no historic precedent for it
- Iraq is a safe haven for international terrorism as the PKK is operating from its territory
- quotes from the Bush administration during the gulf war explaining their decision not to march on Baghdad ('the Lebanonization of Iraq' for example) that are being mocked
An American invasion of Iraq will end Saddam's tyranny and torture chambers (some of the descriptions eerily resemble the ones about American soldiers in Abu Ghraib, even when in Saddam's case these are the low-intensity ones), will create a liberal democracy to Iraq which will act as an ally to Israel and the US in the region, as a counterweight to Iran and maybe most importantly be a kind of city upon a hill showing that democracy is possible in the Middle East. All this can be achieved with 75.000 soldiers, staying in Iraq at most one or two years and at the cost of $16 billion only. Definitely sounds like a good deal if you ask me.
Some of the more amusing arguments:
- American spending on military capabilities is far too low
- civil war in Iraq cannot erupt because there is no historic precedent for it
- Iraq is a safe haven for international terrorism as the PKK is operating from its territory
- quotes from the Bush administration during the gulf war explaining their decision not to march on Baghdad ('the Lebanonization of Iraq' for example) that are being mocked
The Paradox of American Power
Joseph Nye's The Paradox of American Power deals with the American dilemma in today's world. Too strong to be truly challenged, yet too weak to go at it alone (as a quick glance at Bush's policies and failures confirms). According to Nye this is the case for a variety of reasons, most importantly the fading unipolar world. Remnants still exist, militarily most of all, but Nye separates the world in three chess boards (a military one, an economic one and a transnational one) only one of which features a dominating USA on top (you can guess which). Further eroding American power are transnational developments such as information flow, which lead to states in general being less capable of solving problems on their own.
The only way to preserve American (benign of course) hegemony is a concept Nye introduced in the 1990s called soft power (as opposed to hard military power). Soft power describes one's capability to 'get[...] others to want what you want.' Considering the impressive array of cultural and political appeal that the United States still possesses (apart from the usually cited Hollywood movies, one need only glance at the fuss made of Obama's inauguration outside of the US), Nye sees a distinct possibility that American hegemony can be prolonged significantly in this manner. For me personally, a large part of this argument is wishful thinking, beginning with the benign American hegemony (examples of its far less benign aspects abound I believe) soft power is exactly not what the US owns in abundance currently. In fact the Bush administration has been highly successful in eroding this kind of power and the good-will extended to Obama as of right now will undoubtedly change with the first unpopular decision of his government (say American support of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites or extended excursions into Waziristan in order to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan).
While I find the concept of soft power and its impact on international relations quite appealing (Zivilmacht Europa) and relevant and agree with Nye's basis of analysis, his criticism of American emphasis on defense over diplomatic budgets (16:1) for example, I cannot share his optimistic view concerning American capabilities to preserve their hegemony. Even assuming that Obama will reclaim some (or all) of the soft power lost under his predecessor, that will not change the fact that a variety of actors have begun to act as regional hegemons (the EU, China, Brazil). The US cannot counter this movement and while it will remain the most important voice on the international scene for a long time to come it cannot allow itself to even try to go at it alone anymore.
The only way to preserve American (benign of course) hegemony is a concept Nye introduced in the 1990s called soft power (as opposed to hard military power). Soft power describes one's capability to 'get[...] others to want what you want.' Considering the impressive array of cultural and political appeal that the United States still possesses (apart from the usually cited Hollywood movies, one need only glance at the fuss made of Obama's inauguration outside of the US), Nye sees a distinct possibility that American hegemony can be prolonged significantly in this manner. For me personally, a large part of this argument is wishful thinking, beginning with the benign American hegemony (examples of its far less benign aspects abound I believe) soft power is exactly not what the US owns in abundance currently. In fact the Bush administration has been highly successful in eroding this kind of power and the good-will extended to Obama as of right now will undoubtedly change with the first unpopular decision of his government (say American support of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites or extended excursions into Waziristan in order to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan).
While I find the concept of soft power and its impact on international relations quite appealing (Zivilmacht Europa) and relevant and agree with Nye's basis of analysis, his criticism of American emphasis on defense over diplomatic budgets (16:1) for example, I cannot share his optimistic view concerning American capabilities to preserve their hegemony. Even assuming that Obama will reclaim some (or all) of the soft power lost under his predecessor, that will not change the fact that a variety of actors have begun to act as regional hegemons (the EU, China, Brazil). The US cannot counter this movement and while it will remain the most important voice on the international scene for a long time to come it cannot allow itself to even try to go at it alone anymore.
Les États-Unis ont-ils besoin d'alliés?
Recommandé par un de mes professeurs à Sciences Po Yves Haine développe une théorie des relations entre les États-Unis et l'europe très intéressant dans Les États-Unis ont-ils besoin d'alliés? - Les États-Unis et leurs alliés européens, de la guerre froide à l'Irak. Le titre du livre est un peu trompeur parce que Haine n'est commence pas en 1989 (ou 1991) mais en 1949 (le fondement de l'Otan) et revient même plus tôt à Washington, Madison et Wilson et leur impact sur la politique étrangère des États-Unis.
Haine se prouve très lettré en montrant comme le libéralisme et le réalisme ne réussit pas à expliquer l'existence et (surtout) la continuation de l'Alliance après la disparition du danger soviétique. Il est persuadé qu'il y a un aspect de personnalité, de caractéristique personnelle ainsi que nationale qui a contribué à la création et la persévérance de l'Otan. Haine n'essaie pas d'expliquer trop mais se contente à montrer les défauts du raisonnement libéral et réaliste suivi par une descriptions de quelques situation fondamentale dans l'histoire de l'Otan (Cuba, la réunification allemande, le Kosovo).
Il est persuadé que la guerre en Kosovo marque un 'tournant dans l'évaluation de l'outil atlantique par Washington' et qu'en conséquence les américains ont préféré de mener l'attaque en Afghanistan hors de la structure de l'Alliance même vu la volonté de ses alliés à contribuer à cause des mauvaises expériences de 'la guerre en comité.' Pour moi, et en considération de l'inauguration d'Obama hier, je ne suis pas convaincu si cet éloignement n'a pas été une phase temporaire à cause d'une situation et un Président exceptionel(le). Haine lui-même admet que les alliés aujourd'hui contribuent en Afghanistan dans le cadre de l'Otan, qu'il y avait un processus d'apprentissage de l'administration Bush déjà. Il craint surtout un 'partenariat [qui] [...] se réduisait à une division du travail entre une Amérique se chargeant de la haute intensité technologique et une Europe réduite au rôle de gardien de la paix'. Je partage cette analyse d'un avenir probable, mais ne réussis pas à voir le problème dans cela. Vu le capability gap existant aujourd'hui dans le cadre de la révolution militaire entre les États-Unis et le reste du monde (dont Europe), la rattrapage des européens coûterait beaucoup trop chère. Pourquoi pas profité de l'avantage comparative des européens, le peace-making ou nation-building, alors? Même l'administration Bush vient de réaliser que la dominance des américains dans la seule dimension unipolaire au monde aujourd'hui (la dimension militaire) suffit pour gagner n'importe quelle guerre, mais ne pas assez pour assurer la paix après. Sous Obama une alliance plus équilibré pourrait bien redevenir un contributeur important dans la sécurité occidentale.
Haine se prouve très lettré en montrant comme le libéralisme et le réalisme ne réussit pas à expliquer l'existence et (surtout) la continuation de l'Alliance après la disparition du danger soviétique. Il est persuadé qu'il y a un aspect de personnalité, de caractéristique personnelle ainsi que nationale qui a contribué à la création et la persévérance de l'Otan. Haine n'essaie pas d'expliquer trop mais se contente à montrer les défauts du raisonnement libéral et réaliste suivi par une descriptions de quelques situation fondamentale dans l'histoire de l'Otan (Cuba, la réunification allemande, le Kosovo).
Il est persuadé que la guerre en Kosovo marque un 'tournant dans l'évaluation de l'outil atlantique par Washington' et qu'en conséquence les américains ont préféré de mener l'attaque en Afghanistan hors de la structure de l'Alliance même vu la volonté de ses alliés à contribuer à cause des mauvaises expériences de 'la guerre en comité.' Pour moi, et en considération de l'inauguration d'Obama hier, je ne suis pas convaincu si cet éloignement n'a pas été une phase temporaire à cause d'une situation et un Président exceptionel(le). Haine lui-même admet que les alliés aujourd'hui contribuent en Afghanistan dans le cadre de l'Otan, qu'il y avait un processus d'apprentissage de l'administration Bush déjà. Il craint surtout un 'partenariat [qui] [...] se réduisait à une division du travail entre une Amérique se chargeant de la haute intensité technologique et une Europe réduite au rôle de gardien de la paix'. Je partage cette analyse d'un avenir probable, mais ne réussis pas à voir le problème dans cela. Vu le capability gap existant aujourd'hui dans le cadre de la révolution militaire entre les États-Unis et le reste du monde (dont Europe), la rattrapage des européens coûterait beaucoup trop chère. Pourquoi pas profité de l'avantage comparative des européens, le peace-making ou nation-building, alors? Même l'administration Bush vient de réaliser que la dominance des américains dans la seule dimension unipolaire au monde aujourd'hui (la dimension militaire) suffit pour gagner n'importe quelle guerre, mais ne pas assez pour assurer la paix après. Sous Obama une alliance plus équilibré pourrait bien redevenir un contributeur important dans la sécurité occidentale.
Friday, January 16, 2009
NY Times article
Haven't posted a simple link to a news article in quite some time, but I found this one really interesting. I have of course written a decent amount of posts on the question of race in the United States here, one very positive, others more negative (1, 2, 3, 4) plus a variety of book reviews (1, 2, 3, 4). The article deals with Obama's impact on social interracial relations in the US:
Two studies on strategic colorblindness [...] concluded that whites, including children as young as 10, may attempt to avoid talking about race with blacks, or even acknowledging racial differences, so as not to appear prejudiced.
The studies also found that blacks viewed that tactic as evidence of prejudice.
I don't luckily have that kind of sensitivity, timidity or whatever you might call it. Maybe always being the foreigner helps, in any case I never encountered a negative response to my curious question or remarks.
Two studies on strategic colorblindness [...] concluded that whites, including children as young as 10, may attempt to avoid talking about race with blacks, or even acknowledging racial differences, so as not to appear prejudiced.
The studies also found that blacks viewed that tactic as evidence of prejudice.
I don't luckily have that kind of sensitivity, timidity or whatever you might call it. Maybe always being the foreigner helps, in any case I never encountered a negative response to my curious question or remarks.
Saturday, January 10, 2009
Operation Walküre
Hollywood celebrates German resistance against Hitler with a widely publicized movie featuring Tom Cruise as Claus Graf von Stauffenberg as the principal character in a coup d'état against Germany's Nazi-government. Not just an attempt to assassinate Hitler, there were numerous, the 20th July of 1944 represents the biggest and most threatening uprising to the NSDAP's reign.
Me, I am here to tell you why you should not watch this movie.
On the face of it, Stauffenberg seems to be a hero of German resistance. He plants a bomb near Hitler during a high command meeting, assumes he is dead after that bomb explodes (he was wrong of course), and sets in motion Operation Walküre which was the government's emergency plan. A circle of up to 600 people were (to some extent or another) involved in the planning of this takeover (that's how many the Nazis killed afterwards in any case), a civilian government stood ready to take over, a new army high command as well. Yet, Hitler didn't die and managed to establish contact with a young SS-leader stationed in Berlin who entered the Bendlerblock (where the German army's high command was/is stationed) and swiped out the main conspirators.
You might ask yourself now why you should not watch this movie now. The one example of a well-prepared challenge to Hitler's government after 1933 and a militantly anti-fascist, left-wing German tells you not to watch it?
Quite simply, history (and thus the movie) glorifies the wrong person. Stauffenberg is a perfect example of a representative of the conservative nobility of Prussia. An elite group of rural landowners that ran Germany until 1918, a group believing in a class society (remember that Prussia had a three-tier voting system until 1918), emphasizing social hierarchies, in general clamoring for the glorious days of the 19th century. These conservatives fought the Weimarer Republik (1918-1933) with a passion and brought about its final downfall when they coalesced with Hitler against the Communists.
Now, when does these people start rebelling against the NSDAP-regime? Think about the timing here for a second, the Soviet Union is steadily progressing towards Germany, the Battle of Normandy has been lost and Anglo-American forces have secured their foothold in France. Basically, these officers start their famed opposition against the NSDAP only when it becomes clear that Germany cannot win the war anymore. Their rebellion is not one of principle against an unjust regime, it is not even directed against the mass murder of Jews and other minority groups. No, instead it is simply an attempt to limit the effects of a possible disastrous defeat. Plans were made to offer the Allies an immediate armistice and in that way preserve Germany's existence in the border of 1914 (not even 1918!).
What these guys wanted was not a democratic, just Germany. Nor did they truly care about the mass extermination of Jews in Auschwitz et al. They were not going to reestablish the rights of Communists and Social Democrats. I could go on with this, but I feel like the point is obvious. Stauffenberg supposedly died in front of a firing squad yelling for the preservation of unser heiliges Deutschland (our holy Germany).
Yes, what they did courageous but it was not enough and most importantly it came far too late. If you want a hero of German resistance have a look at Georg Elser. But don't lend your support to the glorification of Stauffenberg. He already gets far too much credit as it is.
As Friedrich Reck-Malleczewen put it more eloquently than I ever could:
Ah, wirklich also? Ein wenig spät, ihr Herren, die ihr diesen Erzzerstörer Deutschlands gemacht habt, die ihr ihm nachliefet, solange alles gutzugehen schien, die ihr, alle Offiziere der Monarchie, unbedenklich jeden von euch verlangten Treueid schwort, die ihr euch zu armseligen Mamelucken des mit hunderttausend Morden, mit dem Jammer und dem Fluch der Welt belasteten Verbrecher erniedrigt habt und ihn jetzt verratet, wie ihr vorgestern die Monarchie und gestern die Republik verraten habt.
Me, I am here to tell you why you should not watch this movie.
On the face of it, Stauffenberg seems to be a hero of German resistance. He plants a bomb near Hitler during a high command meeting, assumes he is dead after that bomb explodes (he was wrong of course), and sets in motion Operation Walküre which was the government's emergency plan. A circle of up to 600 people were (to some extent or another) involved in the planning of this takeover (that's how many the Nazis killed afterwards in any case), a civilian government stood ready to take over, a new army high command as well. Yet, Hitler didn't die and managed to establish contact with a young SS-leader stationed in Berlin who entered the Bendlerblock (where the German army's high command was/is stationed) and swiped out the main conspirators.
You might ask yourself now why you should not watch this movie now. The one example of a well-prepared challenge to Hitler's government after 1933 and a militantly anti-fascist, left-wing German tells you not to watch it?
Quite simply, history (and thus the movie) glorifies the wrong person. Stauffenberg is a perfect example of a representative of the conservative nobility of Prussia. An elite group of rural landowners that ran Germany until 1918, a group believing in a class society (remember that Prussia had a three-tier voting system until 1918), emphasizing social hierarchies, in general clamoring for the glorious days of the 19th century. These conservatives fought the Weimarer Republik (1918-1933) with a passion and brought about its final downfall when they coalesced with Hitler against the Communists.
Now, when does these people start rebelling against the NSDAP-regime? Think about the timing here for a second, the Soviet Union is steadily progressing towards Germany, the Battle of Normandy has been lost and Anglo-American forces have secured their foothold in France. Basically, these officers start their famed opposition against the NSDAP only when it becomes clear that Germany cannot win the war anymore. Their rebellion is not one of principle against an unjust regime, it is not even directed against the mass murder of Jews and other minority groups. No, instead it is simply an attempt to limit the effects of a possible disastrous defeat. Plans were made to offer the Allies an immediate armistice and in that way preserve Germany's existence in the border of 1914 (not even 1918!).
What these guys wanted was not a democratic, just Germany. Nor did they truly care about the mass extermination of Jews in Auschwitz et al. They were not going to reestablish the rights of Communists and Social Democrats. I could go on with this, but I feel like the point is obvious. Stauffenberg supposedly died in front of a firing squad yelling for the preservation of unser heiliges Deutschland (our holy Germany).
Yes, what they did courageous but it was not enough and most importantly it came far too late. If you want a hero of German resistance have a look at Georg Elser. But don't lend your support to the glorification of Stauffenberg. He already gets far too much credit as it is.
As Friedrich Reck-Malleczewen put it more eloquently than I ever could:
Ah, wirklich also? Ein wenig spät, ihr Herren, die ihr diesen Erzzerstörer Deutschlands gemacht habt, die ihr ihm nachliefet, solange alles gutzugehen schien, die ihr, alle Offiziere der Monarchie, unbedenklich jeden von euch verlangten Treueid schwort, die ihr euch zu armseligen Mamelucken des mit hunderttausend Morden, mit dem Jammer und dem Fluch der Welt belasteten Verbrecher erniedrigt habt und ihn jetzt verratet, wie ihr vorgestern die Monarchie und gestern die Republik verraten habt.
Thursday, January 08, 2009
La France de Vichy
I read this book for three reasons. Firstly, I had to write a fiche de lecture in French on a book written in another language (aka either German or English for me). Secondly, I am doing an exposé (oral presentation) tomorrow about Vichy. Thirdly, the book is considered the classic on Vichy-France, it changed perceptions of France under German domination significantly (in France in any case) and after my disappointing book written by a Communist I felt an outsider's point of view would be interesting. The book kept its promise, a really good and interesting reading, it took me 2 days and some, but was decidedly worth it. My French teacher didn't really believe me that I had simply read it because it interested me, which is quite ironic since it had been on my reading list for a while, but whatever. I'll simply write another summary, not like I don't read enough books.
The text is in French because I had written it for my class and just a tad too long for me to translate, but I assume most non-French speakers don't really care enough about Vichy and German occupation here to read even a two-page summary anyway.
The text is in French because I had written it for my class and just a tad too long for me to translate, but I assume most non-French speakers don't really care enough about Vichy and German occupation here to read even a two-page summary anyway.
Hitler, Nazis and so on and forth
So, I've been spending too much time on the Third Reich lately, but what can I do, it's fascinating, the dark side of human existence, whatever. Maybe I'm just dumb and incapable to devote my attention to more current and relevant(?) events. In any case, I spent a decent amount of time on youtube and ina.fr today looking at old footage, after having read 3-4 books on this topic the last few weeks. Youtube being what it is, there is a massive amount of crap on there (old and new songs celebrating Pétain for example, and no I didn't even look for any of these on Hitler, no tolerance for that kind of shit).
To make a long story short, I found this video (or refound it, I had known about it). It was done by a German comedian who also made a comic about Hitler who has survived the war and is confronted with life as we know it. Moers (the author, writer) makes me chuckle I have to admit it. But is that legitimate? Am I even allowed to laugh at this (not that I really do, but you get my point I think/hope)? Can you poke fun at this man by making him seemingly ridiculous and pitiable. I mean he was ridiculous, but not in the sense conveyed here. Definitely more questions than answers, I wish I had some (answers that is).
To make a long story short, I found this video (or refound it, I had known about it). It was done by a German comedian who also made a comic about Hitler who has survived the war and is confronted with life as we know it. Moers (the author, writer) makes me chuckle I have to admit it. But is that legitimate? Am I even allowed to laugh at this (not that I really do, but you get my point I think/hope)? Can you poke fun at this man by making him seemingly ridiculous and pitiable. I mean he was ridiculous, but not in the sense conveyed here. Definitely more questions than answers, I wish I had some (answers that is).
Saturday, January 03, 2009
De Munich à Vichy
Germaine Willard De Munich à Vichy - la drôle de guerre est ma première introduction dans la France de la guerre (hors de Sartre est ses oeuvres littéraires La Mort dans l'âme et Le Sursis). Le livre m'a deçu, Willard est peut-être une historienne forte mais elle est aussi une communiste et cela se voit trop. Parfois son livre est plutôt une défense de la PCF qu'un bouquin sur la France de ces années. Je suis sûr que beaucoup de ces idées ont beaucoup de validité, mais comment est-ce que on peut défendre Stalin en 1969? Ou ignorer la politique de rien faire de la PCF entre 1939 et 1941 (jusqu'au début de la guerre d'Allemagne contre l'URSS)? Je n'aime pas les auteurs qui sont incapable de se libérer un peu au moins de leurs conviction politique, cela leur vole la crédibilité à mon avis.
Ayant dit cela, il faut admettre qu'il est choquant de voir que le Parti communiste a été interdit en France avant même l'attaque des allemands en 1940 et que ses députés ont été arrêtés. Je n'avais pas réalisé combien de temps cette drôle de guerre a duré non plus, presque rien se passer sur le front franco-allemand dès septembre 1939 jusqu'au mai 1940. La thèse de Willard est que l'accentuation sur la campagne menée contre les communistes (en France et en Finnlande contre qui l'URSS avait déclaré la guerre) affaiblissait la France et ses forces militaires autant que sa conquête devenue facile. L'armistice devient une acte basée sur la peur d'une révolution populaire et communiste. Les capitalistes profitent de la vente des produits en Allemagne et soutiennent l'occupation (et Vichy) à cause de cela, même s'ils ont refusé de changer leur production pour assurer l'effort de guerre de la France avant. Je ne peux pas juger ces opinions, mais la partialité évidente de Willard m'oblige à douter sa version de l'histoire.
Ayant dit cela, il faut admettre qu'il est choquant de voir que le Parti communiste a été interdit en France avant même l'attaque des allemands en 1940 et que ses députés ont été arrêtés. Je n'avais pas réalisé combien de temps cette drôle de guerre a duré non plus, presque rien se passer sur le front franco-allemand dès septembre 1939 jusqu'au mai 1940. La thèse de Willard est que l'accentuation sur la campagne menée contre les communistes (en France et en Finnlande contre qui l'URSS avait déclaré la guerre) affaiblissait la France et ses forces militaires autant que sa conquête devenue facile. L'armistice devient une acte basée sur la peur d'une révolution populaire et communiste. Les capitalistes profitent de la vente des produits en Allemagne et soutiennent l'occupation (et Vichy) à cause de cela, même s'ils ont refusé de changer leur production pour assurer l'effort de guerre de la France avant. Je ne peux pas juger ces opinions, mais la partialité évidente de Willard m'oblige à douter sa version de l'histoire.
Top 8 of 2008
I had posted my personal album charts during the last two years already (2006, 2007), welcome to the third installement thus. As last year I haven't actually discovered enough good music (or, more accurately, haven't actually listened to enough music published during the course of 2008) for a Top 10 and will have to limit myself to 8 albums only.
8 - Solomon Burke - Like A Fire
On a roll ever since Nashville (2006), just another beautiful soul production by Solomon Burke.
7 - Otis Taylor - Recapturing the Banjo
A black blues musician repossesses the banjo which today is associated virtually only with white musicians. I am not quite sure what kind of music this is. Blues? Folk? Americana, yes, but what does that even mean? A wonderful, modern folksy artist.
6 - GZA - Pro Tools
A Wu-Tang album in 2008? Yes, and it's a good one too. The ODB might be dead, but the GZA is still around. Great beats, great rhymes. As simple as that.
5 - Dr John & The Lower 911 - City That Care Forgot
By now one of the elder statesmen of New Orleans piano music, Dr John seems to be like a fine wine, he only gets better with age. Ever since Katrina he basically sings about New Orleans having disappeared, which, culturally speaking, seems brutally true and sad at the same time. What would modern American music even be like without New Orleans? And from everything I've read and heard about this, New Orleans will only come back as a kind of Disneyland or Las Vegas with the touristy parts of the French Quarter dominating a once thriving (if poor and violent) city. Dr John laments his demise and he does so beautifully.
4 - Nas - Untitled
Nas always seems to suffer from the simple fact that he recorded some of the best rap albums ever, in comparison some of his other stuff simply cannot compete. This is a great album though when compared to virtually everything else. Political as always (the original title was supposed to be a 6-letter word starting with N, his record company refused to release it as such), Nas (luckily) is not going away.
3 - BB King - One Kind of Favor
How old is BB King by now? 80 something? 83 actually, I looked it up. Can one still record great records at that age? Hell, some people cannot even walk anymore at that age, but evidently this is not a problem for the Blues Boy (or is he too old for this moniker by now?). Covering the immortal Blind Lemon Jefferson, Lonnie Johnson and even the Mississippi Sheiks, BB King seems to move back to a more traditional sound on this album, away from some of the more poppy Blues that made him so famous, and obviously I appreciate this. Finally, Dr John's presence on and T-Bone Burnett's production of this record are noticeable and positively so.
2 - Immortal Technique - The 3rd World
One of the most politically aware rappers is back. Hailing from New York, Puerto Rican, Technique gives us that rare breed of socially conscious rap, I wish this kind of stuff would actually chart every once in a while. Sampling the early (and sadly unknown) Wailers (I Made a Mistake), my personal highlight of the album is a song about learning processes (Mistakes)
1 - John Hiatt - Same Old Man
I never knew much about John Hiatt, nor do I particularly like some of his older stuff, I deleted one of his older albums a few days ago in fact, but his two most recent albums are great (Master of Disaster in 2005, Same Old Man in 2008). How did a friend of mine describe it once? Old men picking a guitar, singing about dying. John Hiatt sings about the Old Days, about the men he toured with, he encountered, who have passed on ever since. Wonderful.
This then leaves us with some honourable mentions that I have not listened to sufficiently yet, in a few months they could have very well made or prolonged this list:
Atmosphere - When Life Gives You Lemons, You Paint That Shit Gold
Black Milk - Tronic
Devin the Dude - Landing Gear
Justin Townes Earle - The Good Life
Nach - Un Dia En Suburbia
Q Tip - The Renaissance
Scarface - Emeritus
Snoop Dogg - Ego Trippin'
The Blind Boys of Alabama - Down in New Orleans
Willie Nelson & Wynton Marsalis - Two Men With The Blues
8 - Solomon Burke - Like A Fire
On a roll ever since Nashville (2006), just another beautiful soul production by Solomon Burke.
7 - Otis Taylor - Recapturing the Banjo
A black blues musician repossesses the banjo which today is associated virtually only with white musicians. I am not quite sure what kind of music this is. Blues? Folk? Americana, yes, but what does that even mean? A wonderful, modern folksy artist.
6 - GZA - Pro Tools
A Wu-Tang album in 2008? Yes, and it's a good one too. The ODB might be dead, but the GZA is still around. Great beats, great rhymes. As simple as that.
5 - Dr John & The Lower 911 - City That Care Forgot
By now one of the elder statesmen of New Orleans piano music, Dr John seems to be like a fine wine, he only gets better with age. Ever since Katrina he basically sings about New Orleans having disappeared, which, culturally speaking, seems brutally true and sad at the same time. What would modern American music even be like without New Orleans? And from everything I've read and heard about this, New Orleans will only come back as a kind of Disneyland or Las Vegas with the touristy parts of the French Quarter dominating a once thriving (if poor and violent) city. Dr John laments his demise and he does so beautifully.
4 - Nas - Untitled
Nas always seems to suffer from the simple fact that he recorded some of the best rap albums ever, in comparison some of his other stuff simply cannot compete. This is a great album though when compared to virtually everything else. Political as always (the original title was supposed to be a 6-letter word starting with N, his record company refused to release it as such), Nas (luckily) is not going away.
3 - BB King - One Kind of Favor
How old is BB King by now? 80 something? 83 actually, I looked it up. Can one still record great records at that age? Hell, some people cannot even walk anymore at that age, but evidently this is not a problem for the Blues Boy (or is he too old for this moniker by now?). Covering the immortal Blind Lemon Jefferson, Lonnie Johnson and even the Mississippi Sheiks, BB King seems to move back to a more traditional sound on this album, away from some of the more poppy Blues that made him so famous, and obviously I appreciate this. Finally, Dr John's presence on and T-Bone Burnett's production of this record are noticeable and positively so.
2 - Immortal Technique - The 3rd World
One of the most politically aware rappers is back. Hailing from New York, Puerto Rican, Technique gives us that rare breed of socially conscious rap, I wish this kind of stuff would actually chart every once in a while. Sampling the early (and sadly unknown) Wailers (I Made a Mistake), my personal highlight of the album is a song about learning processes (Mistakes)
1 - John Hiatt - Same Old Man
I never knew much about John Hiatt, nor do I particularly like some of his older stuff, I deleted one of his older albums a few days ago in fact, but his two most recent albums are great (Master of Disaster in 2005, Same Old Man in 2008). How did a friend of mine describe it once? Old men picking a guitar, singing about dying. John Hiatt sings about the Old Days, about the men he toured with, he encountered, who have passed on ever since. Wonderful.
This then leaves us with some honourable mentions that I have not listened to sufficiently yet, in a few months they could have very well made or prolonged this list:
Atmosphere - When Life Gives You Lemons, You Paint That Shit Gold
Black Milk - Tronic
Devin the Dude - Landing Gear
Justin Townes Earle - The Good Life
Nach - Un Dia En Suburbia
Q Tip - The Renaissance
Scarface - Emeritus
Snoop Dogg - Ego Trippin'
The Blind Boys of Alabama - Down in New Orleans
Willie Nelson & Wynton Marsalis - Two Men With The Blues
Wednesday, December 31, 2008
Holidays on Ice
Eines meiner Weihnachtsgeschenke, Holidays on Ice ist kurze Sammlung von Kurzgeschichten von David Sedaris. Der amerikanische Autor gibt satirische Weihnachtsgeschichten zum Besten. Satire erscheint noch ein zu schwaches Wort, seine Helden (Heldinnen) sind bitterböse, betrachten das sie umgebende Weihnachtsgefühl mit einem Zynismus der kaum zu überbieten ist. Eigentlich scheinen diese Zutaten zu einem vergnüglichen Leseabend zu führen, aber leider ist dies nicht wirklich der Fall. Ich fand seine Charaktere einfach zu zynisch, zu bitter, zu böse und dadurch nicht mehr glabwürdig. Sedaris nahm dadurch allem ein wenig zu sehr die Spitze. Soweit ich Weihnachten verstehe gibt es kaum ein süßeres, stärker überzuckertes Ereignis in unserer (westlichen) Gesellschaft, warum sollte man dieses überziehen um sich dessen zu belustigen? Weihnachten als solches ist überzogen genug um, zynisch betrachtet, zu amüsieren. Indem ich diese Situation gnadenlos übertrieben darstelle, impliziere ich (in meinen Augen), das das normale, reelle Weihnachten nicht bereits kitschig genug wäre. Dies ist aber nicht der Fall. Etwas mehr Bodenhaftung wäre infolgedessen erfolgreicher gewesen.
Thursday, December 25, 2008
Survival in Auschwitz
Primo Levi's account of his time in Auschwitz might be the best known novel by a holocaust survivor. Se questo è un uomo (If This Is a Man), as the book is called in its more poetic original title, is horrifying book. Levi tells of his life in a death/work camp, of how he got there, of what happens to him once he is there it and of how he survives in the end. It is a strong book, I can only recommend it to anyone. Levi is not begging for your pity, he does not even look for an explanation, he simply makes a picture of reality, he gives us a glimpse of life in the camps.
I am young (well, more or less), interested in history and have a German passport, all my ancestors and relatives are German, how can I not be obsessed with the Holocaust? I feel my understanding (in the broadest terms I don't think the word understanding can truly be used in regard to the Shoah, see also the quote at the end) of the Third Reich in general and the attempted destruction of European Jews is still lacking and no matter what I read this knowledge does not disappear. Maybe it never will.
A few more observations from the text. No particular order, just some food for thought.
Leitmotif: Ne pas chercher à comprendre
So I guess this is my Christmas post. Frohe Weihnachten everyone. Whatever that may mean.
I am young (well, more or less), interested in history and have a German passport, all my ancestors and relatives are German, how can I not be obsessed with the Holocaust? I feel my understanding (in the broadest terms I don't think the word understanding can truly be used in regard to the Shoah, see also the quote at the end) of the Third Reich in general and the attempted destruction of European Jews is still lacking and no matter what I read this knowledge does not disappear. Maybe it never will.
A few more observations from the text. No particular order, just some food for thought.
- That curt, barbaric barking of Germans in command. I wonder whether this stereotype (reality?) existed before the 1930s, whether it is a perception of the German language that was created through the evils of the past or whether it had always been there. Is it a subconscious connection of the language to a deed thus or is it simply an objective observation?
- The Nazis ran these camps with very few people, mostly it was self-organized through an internal hierarchy from criminals, over political prisoners (these first two being mainly of German nationality) to Jews. Interestingly enough, a Kapo makes [less] trouble, [when] he is not a Jew and has no fear of losing his part.
- A KZ in some sense seems to have precursor to some of the international meeting points of today with up to 15-20 languages swirling around with Yiddish, Polish and German being the most important ones. Levi at some point claims that survival depended at least to some extent (luck of course being another big factor) on one's ability to speak German.
- Life in these camps portrays to some extent the social origins Hobbes or Montesquieue talk about. There is no justice, there are no morals, just a survival of the fittest. At the same time there was a booming economy revolving around bread, tobacco and any kind of usable tool.
- The Greeks (Saloniki Jews of Spanish heritage which apparently spoke a mixture of Greek and Spanish) stuck together more than any other group and kept their inner-group morals intact the most. Maybe this was the case because they were less integrated in their society as for example the Italian Jews? I have no idea whether this is true, but it sounds like a decent explanation.
- Was it even possible to survive Auschwitz without becoming a criminal yourself? Without turning from an upstanding citizen into a 'bad', selfish person?
- The Germans love order, systems bureaucracy. Funny how nothing ever really seems to change.
Leitmotif: Ne pas chercher à comprendre
So I guess this is my Christmas post. Frohe Weihnachten everyone. Whatever that may mean.
Sunday, December 21, 2008
Réflexions sur la question juive
Un petit livre (même pas 200 pages) Réflexions sur la question juive de Jean Paul Sartre n'est rien que son titre promet. Sartre essaie de montrer que l'antisémitisme n'est pas seulement un avis politique (et légitime). J'ai trouvé cette discussion plus actuel parfois, peut-être je ne les connais pas seulement, mais je ne suis pas trop sûr s'il y a toujours beaucoup des gens (en Europe d'ouest en tout cas) qui pensent que l'antisémitisme est valable comme une façon de croyance politique.
Après il discute les effets du antisémitisme sur les juifs. Je trouve sa théorie ici comparable à celle de W.E.B. DuBois et son 'double veil.' Les juifs inauthentiques (ceux qui veulent s'assimiler et ne sont plus religieux) suppriment les caractéristiques qui on pourrait identifier comme typiquement juives. Important à la fin, ce n'est pas comment ils se voient mais surtout comment les antisémites les voient.
Même si j'ai trouvé la discussion intéressant, j'ai pensé qu'elle ne serait plus très important dans notre société d'aujourd'hui. Sauf qu'il y a deux/trois jours Le Monde avait un article sur Mandoff et les effets antisémite de la plus grande chaîne de Ponzi ayant été mené par un juif. Choquant, et peut-être Satre est toujours plus valide que je ne l'ai pensé.
Après il discute les effets du antisémitisme sur les juifs. Je trouve sa théorie ici comparable à celle de W.E.B. DuBois et son 'double veil.' Les juifs inauthentiques (ceux qui veulent s'assimiler et ne sont plus religieux) suppriment les caractéristiques qui on pourrait identifier comme typiquement juives. Important à la fin, ce n'est pas comment ils se voient mais surtout comment les antisémites les voient.
Même si j'ai trouvé la discussion intéressant, j'ai pensé qu'elle ne serait plus très important dans notre société d'aujourd'hui. Sauf qu'il y a deux/trois jours Le Monde avait un article sur Mandoff et les effets antisémite de la plus grande chaîne de Ponzi ayant été mené par un juif. Choquant, et peut-être Satre est toujours plus valide que je ne l'ai pensé.
Friday, December 12, 2008
Keynes, Steinbrueck and other follies
Three posts in one hour, all virtually about the same thing, I know. They are all different at the same time that they resemble each other so much though. I also should mention that I absolutely love the fact that for the first time in my academic career (wrong word, existence) actual political discussion has caught up to what I spend my days reading. Quite fun really.
The German government (notably Herr Steinbrueck and Frau Merkel) these days are criticized by virtually everyone for their economic management and I figured I should for once actually join the chorus. Let's disregard the fact for a second that Steinbrueck was still preaching about the fundamental soundness of the German economy when the financial crisis first appeared (reminding me of Hoover in an eerie manner) and concentrate instead on today's fiscal policy.
The whole world is clamoring for deficit spending only Germany, the third biggest economy in the world and the key to prevent a recession from taking off (great metaphor I know), remains fixated on fiscal austerity. The world currently seems to be headed towards a deflationary recession (the Great Depression and Japan are the most famous predecessors) with interest rates already low (especially in the United States) and the European Central Bank fixated on its fear of inflation (inherited from the Bundesbank by the way) a monetary expansion saving the day seems doubtful. Especially because such an expansion already took place in response to the financial crisis. What is needed then according to Keynes (and Posen and Krugman, even Milton Friedman agrees) is a massive fiscal spending program.
Now, why the only German government that could push this through without much fears of electoral punishment (the current grand coalition, which really doesn't seem as grand all of a sudden) refuses to even consider this simply because it wants to balance the budget in 2011(?), something which will become impossible anyway assuming a deep recession has arrived. Why a Finance Minister who is a social-democrat would attack a labour Prime Minister for his Keynesian policies. I have no idea. The only thing I like about this is that the German problem has become an economic one only.
So, Herr Steinbrueck, Frau Merkel, Herr Glos (where are you anyway?), I'll need to find a job in the summer. Doing so in a recession won't be fun. Listen to what virtually everyone else is saying for once (trust me I have a hard time with that too usually).
The German government (notably Herr Steinbrueck and Frau Merkel) these days are criticized by virtually everyone for their economic management and I figured I should for once actually join the chorus. Let's disregard the fact for a second that Steinbrueck was still preaching about the fundamental soundness of the German economy when the financial crisis first appeared (reminding me of Hoover in an eerie manner) and concentrate instead on today's fiscal policy.
The whole world is clamoring for deficit spending only Germany, the third biggest economy in the world and the key to prevent a recession from taking off (great metaphor I know), remains fixated on fiscal austerity. The world currently seems to be headed towards a deflationary recession (the Great Depression and Japan are the most famous predecessors) with interest rates already low (especially in the United States) and the European Central Bank fixated on its fear of inflation (inherited from the Bundesbank by the way) a monetary expansion saving the day seems doubtful. Especially because such an expansion already took place in response to the financial crisis. What is needed then according to Keynes (and Posen and Krugman, even Milton Friedman agrees) is a massive fiscal spending program.
Now, why the only German government that could push this through without much fears of electoral punishment (the current grand coalition, which really doesn't seem as grand all of a sudden) refuses to even consider this simply because it wants to balance the budget in 2011(?), something which will become impossible anyway assuming a deep recession has arrived. Why a Finance Minister who is a social-democrat would attack a labour Prime Minister for his Keynesian policies. I have no idea. The only thing I like about this is that the German problem has become an economic one only.
So, Herr Steinbrueck, Frau Merkel, Herr Glos (where are you anyway?), I'll need to find a job in the summer. Doing so in a recession won't be fun. Listen to what virtually everyone else is saying for once (trust me I have a hard time with that too usually).
Restoring Japan's Economic Growth
The wonders of inter-library loans. I am not sure why I did not discover them early on in my academic career. Anyway, Adam Posen disects Japan's lack of growth through-out most of the 1990s after having given a scarce to the American right with its rapid qnd constant growth only a decade earlier. Basically, he applies Keynes to Japan and thoroughly analyzes why a fiscal push would help jump-start the country's economy. I don't want to go into too much detail on this, but he shows in a very convincing manner how what has been called fiscal expansions in Japan have in fact been mere collections of spendings already planned leading to a budget deficit lower than the Maastricht Criteria, lower than most Western European econolies at the time (none of whom had to deal with a major recession).
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
I spent a decent amount of time plowing through Keynes and I got surprisingly little out of it. His theory of course is fascinating, but his language just a tad too antiquated and complicated to make his book anything even close to a pleasure. Considering how relevant he seems to have become again it seemed like a good idea to have a look at him though.
Keynes basically wrote a criticism of classical econolic theory. He argued that Smith's invisible hand would not in fact provide market-clearing mechanisms for the employment market. In certain situations, an economy could get stuck at sub-equilibrium outpout and thus employment and welfare. Notably this were the case if future expectations lead to a slide in investment and consumtpion. In this case actions by individually rational actors lead to a sub-optimal aggregate outcome. In order to jump-start the economy the government needs to intervene either through monetary expansion or (if the former proves impossible) through fiscal deficit spending. It does not matter whether this budgetary deficit is sensibly spent ('digging for gold, building pyramides) pointless activities help create employment and in extension wealth.'
Fairly simple it seems (even though it isn't and I hope no one who reads this manages to call me out on any grave mistakes) and applicable only in the rare circumstances where output (employment) clearly lies above its potential (natural equilibrium).
Keynes basically wrote a criticism of classical econolic theory. He argued that Smith's invisible hand would not in fact provide market-clearing mechanisms for the employment market. In certain situations, an economy could get stuck at sub-equilibrium outpout and thus employment and welfare. Notably this were the case if future expectations lead to a slide in investment and consumtpion. In this case actions by individually rational actors lead to a sub-optimal aggregate outcome. In order to jump-start the economy the government needs to intervene either through monetary expansion or (if the former proves impossible) through fiscal deficit spending. It does not matter whether this budgetary deficit is sensibly spent ('digging for gold, building pyramides) pointless activities help create employment and in extension wealth.'
Fairly simple it seems (even though it isn't and I hope no one who reads this manages to call me out on any grave mistakes) and applicable only in the rare circumstances where output (employment) clearly lies above its potential (natural equilibrium).
Sunday, December 07, 2008
In Defense of Globalization
A bit of an overload today I realize that but I had to play catch-up. Just a really short critique of this book. Jagdish Bhagwati's In Defense of Globalization was something I had really looked forward to. He used to teach Krugman, is one of the elder statesmen of trade theory and I was really exciting to read a book by him, especially one with a title as aggressive as this one. Well, Mr Bhagwati let me down. Big time. Basically his book consists of a number of essays that are put together without much thought nor inherent logic. He mainly attacks globalization opponents, calls the demonstrators in the street out as being uninformed (really, the couldn't argue economics with someone with a PhD, that is surprising) and while he refutes some of the usual anti-globalization arguments he does so on a very basic level. Maybe he tried to educate the completely uninformed with this, I didn't really get anything out of his book.
The Great Crash 1929
Another one of the countless books in preparation for my economics exam next week (wish I could spend as much time simply reading literature/history, topics that I choose, no such luck though), John Kenneth Galbraith's The Great Crash 1929 is considered the classic study of this stock market failure. Considering the renewed interest in these subjects and the fact that financial aspects will definitely (possibly? I have no idea really) be part of my exam, I decided it would be a good idea to have read it.
The big surprise of this book basically was how much I enjoyed reading it, I finished it in less than 10 hours (in more or less one straight sitting) and never got tired of it. Galbraith provides a very detailed study, he does not try to overanalyze, but instead intends of providing his readers with enough information to pass judgment themselves. He shows the failure of market participants as well as regulators while also pointing out that the crash was inevitable and a market failure. Its size or impact could have been impacted by the Fed, the Treasury and a number of other actors, but they could have not prevented the bubble from bursting.
I find these economic subjects highly frustrating at times, simply because they are so inconclusive, everything is based on assumptions that might (or might not) be logically coherent but not necessarily true. Even if after reading this book I feel like I understand the nature of these bubbles, these crashes, better, it still seems to be such a superficial understanding, such a shallow knowledge. I guess there ain't nothing but to keep on reading.
Late add-on:
I just found my notes for this book again and just wanted to add a few comments:
The big surprise of this book basically was how much I enjoyed reading it, I finished it in less than 10 hours (in more or less one straight sitting) and never got tired of it. Galbraith provides a very detailed study, he does not try to overanalyze, but instead intends of providing his readers with enough information to pass judgment themselves. He shows the failure of market participants as well as regulators while also pointing out that the crash was inevitable and a market failure. Its size or impact could have been impacted by the Fed, the Treasury and a number of other actors, but they could have not prevented the bubble from bursting.
I find these economic subjects highly frustrating at times, simply because they are so inconclusive, everything is based on assumptions that might (or might not) be logically coherent but not necessarily true. Even if after reading this book I feel like I understand the nature of these bubbles, these crashes, better, it still seems to be such a superficial understanding, such a shallow knowledge. I guess there ain't nothing but to keep on reading.
Late add-on:
I just found my notes for this book again and just wanted to add a few comments:
- Galbraith argues that 'cheap credit [is] not sufficient as an explanation for a speculative bubble' which I found highly interesting considering that's what Europeans claim the Americans did wrong these last few years (also I think this is what Greenspan usually is criticized for).
- The high income gap in the United States before 1929 (low Gini-efficient) contributed to a dependency on luxury goods for continued economic growth. When the stock markets crashed a relatively low percentage of people were directly affected by this, but these were the guys that were needed to keep consumption at high levels. Basically (and this is me, not Galbraith), if the United States had been a more just (in terms of income) society the Great Crash wouldn't have had such an astounding (and long-term) effect. I wonder what that means for today's society, considering that thanks (to some extent) to Bush's economic policies the rich have gotten richer while everyone else stagnated.
- 'The bipartisan emphasis on balancing the budget in 1932 worsened the developing depression.' Let's just say I hope that Frau Merkel is reading some economics texts too, I'd like to find a job next summer after all.
- Highly amusing:
'Persons high in Republican circles are beginning to believe that there is some concerted effort on foot to utilize the stock market as a method of discrediting the Administration. Every time an Administration official gives out an optimistic statement about business conditions, the market immediately drops.'
Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie
L'Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie de Benjamin Stora est un petit livre de 100 pages que je n'ai pas réussi à lire vite quand même. Le livre est écrit comme une introduction au sujet, dense comme une historiographie, toutes phrases pleines de chiffres ou de noms inconnu. J'avais du mal avec ce livre à cause de cela. Je ne savais rien sur la guerre en Algérie, peut-être moins sur l'histoire de la France à l'époque, beaucoup des noms, beaucoup des sigles ne formaient qu'une foule incompréhensible pour moi. Même si le bouquin apparaît être une introduction, je le trouve trop dense, trop intense pour l'être pour quelqu'un vraiment ignorant.
Au même temps le contenu de l'œuvre m'a choqué, je ne me suis pas rendu compte de cet histoire. Le nombre de morts, la violence des deux côtés, le comportement des militants de l'Algérie française (l'OAS), les Européens en Algérie et leurs manifestations, le fait que pendant que la France faisait la guerre en Algérie il y avait une immigration massive des algériens vers la France (la métropole si vous voulez). Quel bordel.
Au même temps le contenu de l'œuvre m'a choqué, je ne me suis pas rendu compte de cet histoire. Le nombre de morts, la violence des deux côtés, le comportement des militants de l'Algérie française (l'OAS), les Européens en Algérie et leurs manifestations, le fait que pendant que la France faisait la guerre en Algérie il y avait une immigration massive des algériens vers la France (la métropole si vous voulez). Quel bordel.
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Filibuster proof majority
Not like anyone really still pays attention to this, but the Alaskans decided not to send back a convicted felon to the Senate.
1 down, 2 to go. Minnesota and Georgia still haven't been called. Obama could still start governing in January while only depending on Democratic lawmakers in Congress. Even my cynic self could become giddy because of that.
Completely unrelated, but who will replace Obama (President), Biden (Vice-President) and Clinton (Secretary of State?) in the Senate? As far as I know the governor of the home state decides who to substitute, this is the case in Alaska in any case, I believe this depends on states' respective laws. Which party are the governors of these states from anyway? Illinois (Democrat, undoubtedly), New York (Patterson - Democrat), where the hell is Joe Biden from? Fun exercise, if ultimately pointless in regard to majorities in the Senate (simply because I believe otherwise I would have read something on this somewhere).
1 down, 2 to go. Minnesota and Georgia still haven't been called. Obama could still start governing in January while only depending on Democratic lawmakers in Congress. Even my cynic self could become giddy because of that.
Completely unrelated, but who will replace Obama (President), Biden (Vice-President) and Clinton (Secretary of State?) in the Senate? As far as I know the governor of the home state decides who to substitute, this is the case in Alaska in any case, I believe this depends on states' respective laws. Which party are the governors of these states from anyway? Illinois (Democrat, undoubtedly), New York (Patterson - Democrat), where the hell is Joe Biden from? Fun exercise, if ultimately pointless in regard to majorities in the Senate (simply because I believe otherwise I would have read something on this somewhere).
Monday, November 17, 2008
Revue de presse - G 20
New York Times:
As Leaders Wrestle With Economy, Developing Nations Get Ringside Seats
World Leaders Vow Joint Push to Aid Economy
Telegraph:
G-20's admission of financial guilt may prove the first good step of many
Financial Times:
World leaders unite to restore growth
International Herald Tribune:
G-20 mostly avoids the thornier questions
Le Monde
Les pays du G20 s'accordent sur des grands principes et un plan d'action
Le G20 se donne 4 mois pour renouer avec la croissance
taz
Weltrettung bis März
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:
Wirtschaftsmächte vereinbaren Reformplan
Frankfurter Rundschau:
Neue globale Notärzte
Willkommen im 21. Jahrhundert
Libération:
G20: L'espoir d'un somment pas vain
Economist:
Not a bad weekend's work
Synthèse:
Presque tous les journaux soulignent le fait que le sommet du G20 a introduit un nouveau 'gouvernement' mondial. L'ouest ne peut plus régler toutes les questions financières entre ses membres seulement. Après il y a une divergence politique entre les journaux plutôt de la gauche et de la droite. Les journaux à gauche en général se montrent déçu des résultats peu concrets, au contraste avec ces à droite qui sont plus ou moins satisfait des résultats. Au niveau des différents pays il est intéressant de noter que Madame Merkel n'est pas vue comme une participante importante dans la presse anglophone (sauf l'International Herald Tribue qui est fait pour le monde non-anglophone). De plus il y a des différences selon les résultats reporté ou accentué. En Europe la lutte contre les paradis fiscaux est perçue comme un résultat pertinent, tandis qu'aux États-Unis et en Angleterre (sauf dans l'Economist qui en général est plus précis dans son reportage de l'économie) ce résultat n'est même pas reporté. La même divergence existe pour le reportage sur la coordination des stimulations fiscales. En général (et ceci n'est pas du tout surprenant) les journaux prennent des perspectives nationales dans leurs citations et les personnages jugés importants pour le succès du sommet.
As Leaders Wrestle With Economy, Developing Nations Get Ringside Seats
- accentuation du fait que les pays émergents ont été présent d'une manière frappante (ou nouvelle)
- implication que les pays émergents ont été invité grade à la volonté de Monsieur Bush (pas au fait qu'une solution sans ces pays serait impossible à cause de leurs réserves géants en monnaie étranger)
- citation d'un discours de Monsieur da Silva exigeant la croissance continuée des pays développés
- accentuation du fait qu'entre les 20 participants il y avait 2 femmes seulement, sans beaucoup de pouvoir pour les raisons différents
World Leaders Vow Joint Push to Aid Economy
- ajournement des décisions profondes au prochain sommet en avril avec la participation du nouveau Président américain
- graves différences idéologiques entre les participants
- pas de vrai résultat
- la crise la faute des leaders dans quelque pays développés, voit les États-Unis
Telegraph:
G-20's admission of financial guilt may prove the first good step of many
- le banquet comme le commencement de la discussion
- les responsables ont été d'accord du fait qu'ils sont les coupable de la crise
- Brown dirigeant la discussion
- trois résultats importants
- la promesse de continuer les négociations de Doha
- quelques implications des réformes financières dont la création d'un conseil de supervision pour les institutions financière
- un plan va être élargir regardant une réforme des institutions de Bretton Woods
Financial Times:
World leaders unite to restore growth
- les participants ont promis d'assurer de renouveler la croissance avec des stimulations fiscales
International Herald Tribune:
G-20 mostly avoids the thornier questions
- pas de réponses aux questions difficiles
- le seul journal anglophone qui cite Merkel et la donne une rôle importante
Le Monde
Les pays du G20 s'accordent sur des grands principes et un plan d'action
- d'accord sur une plus grande supervision de la finance mondiale
- renforcer la lutte contre les places financières 'non-coopératives'
Le G20 se donne 4 mois pour renouer avec la croissance
- d'accord sur les grandes lignes d'un plan
- citation de Strauss-Kahn qui soutien un réponse coordonné, une stimulation fiscale de 2% du PIB
taz
Weltrettung bis März
- le sommet comme la préparation d'un sommet beaucoup plus important en avril
- croyance de Sarkozy et Barroso que le monde a plus ou moins suivit les idées européens
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:
Wirtschaftsmächte vereinbaren Reformplan
- d'accord sur une supervision sans trou (Überwachungsnetz)
Frankfurter Rundschau:
Neue globale Notärzte
- le sommet comme la déclaration de la nouvelle multipolarité
- pas de solution possible sans les pays émergents
- Européens plus supranational que les américains
Willkommen im 21. Jahrhundert
- pas de vrai résultat mais signifiant à cause de ses participants
- l'idéologie de la moindre régulation possible est morte
- la récession va soi-même obliger le G-20 de se coordonner plus en avril
Libération:
G20: L'espoir d'un somment pas vain
- rien de concrete
- l'absence d'Obama fait une mystère si la position de Bush sur la régulation et le commerce international est à lui-même seulement ou représentative d'une position américaine qui Obama partage aussi
- l'Allemagne vu comme plus interventionniste que la France ('Merkel s’est révélée comme une vraie bolchevique')
Economist:
Not a bad weekend's work
- plus que de la rhétorique seulement
- le plus important a été la liste des participants
- la promesse de Japon de donner $100 billions au FMI
- la continuation de Doha
Synthèse:
Presque tous les journaux soulignent le fait que le sommet du G20 a introduit un nouveau 'gouvernement' mondial. L'ouest ne peut plus régler toutes les questions financières entre ses membres seulement. Après il y a une divergence politique entre les journaux plutôt de la gauche et de la droite. Les journaux à gauche en général se montrent déçu des résultats peu concrets, au contraste avec ces à droite qui sont plus ou moins satisfait des résultats. Au niveau des différents pays il est intéressant de noter que Madame Merkel n'est pas vue comme une participante importante dans la presse anglophone (sauf l'International Herald Tribue qui est fait pour le monde non-anglophone). De plus il y a des différences selon les résultats reporté ou accentué. En Europe la lutte contre les paradis fiscaux est perçue comme un résultat pertinent, tandis qu'aux États-Unis et en Angleterre (sauf dans l'Economist qui en général est plus précis dans son reportage de l'économie) ce résultat n'est même pas reporté. La même divergence existe pour le reportage sur la coordination des stimulations fiscales. En général (et ceci n'est pas du tout surprenant) les journaux prennent des perspectives nationales dans leurs citations et les personnages jugés importants pour le succès du sommet.
Saturday, November 15, 2008
La condition humaine
Je ne sais pas trop quoi dire sur La condition humaine d'André Malraux (et j'ai l'impression que je dis cela trop souvent quand je parle sur les bouquin français, peut être une expression de ma limitation d'expression dans cette langue qui m'énerve encore et toujours). Ce un livre très fort et ayant des difficultés d'y entrer au début, après un tiers j'avais du mal d'abandonner le bouquin, mais il n'y a pas d'espoir dans cet œuvre. Malraux ne raconte pas une histoire très cruelle parce que il discute en détail la violence, la mort, la torture, cela existe aussi mais pas beaucoup. Non, elle est cruelle parce que il n'y a aucune signe d'espoir. Tous les personnages sont perdus à la fin, morts ou vivants il n'y a plus rien pour eux. Malraux réussi à montrer ce désespoir dans mille variations (ok, je mens, mais six ou sept peut-être) et le destins de ses personnages sont si différents qu'un bouquin si déprimant que cela est si attirant au même temps. Hmmm, peut-être c'est moi aussi, j'aime très bien la culture déprimante en général à la fin (Townes, Hank, Faulkner...).
J'ai aussi trouvé super intéressant la période de laquelle Malraux parle ici, la Chine avant que les communistes aient gagné leur révolution est un sujet dont je sais rien. Tchang Kaï-chek je connaissais par nom mais dehors cela, rien. Alors, lis-le, mais ne plaignez-vous pas quand ce bouquin vous rendez tristes.
J'ai aussi trouvé super intéressant la période de laquelle Malraux parle ici, la Chine avant que les communistes aient gagné leur révolution est un sujet dont je sais rien. Tchang Kaï-chek je connaissais par nom mais dehors cela, rien. Alors, lis-le, mais ne plaignez-vous pas quand ce bouquin vous rendez tristes.
Tatanka Yotanka's death
I found these two gems (1, 2) by accident after I had watched a satire on Buffalo Bill's Wild West show and felt the need to scurry around a bit looking for some more information on Sitting Bull (one of my childhood heroes, quite unsurprisingly really). For those of you not initiated to the wonderful world of cowboys and Indians (such an inept and inaccurate description though), Sitting Bull (or Tatanka Yotanka in his native tongue) was the spiritual leader of the Hunkpapa Sioux, themselves part of the Lakota, he is widely held responsible (or celebrated?) for his preparation (again, more spiritual and motivational than as someone comparable to a general (that role would have been played by Crazy Horse (Tashunka Witko) or Gall), but considering the usual disaster called inter-tribal cooperation (see the disastrous defeat of Tecumseh) this role should not be underestimated) in the battle of the Big Horn river (Southern Montana). This battle was (and still is) the only one during which the US army ever lost every single man fighting on its side. Evidently, this last hurrah of the plains Indians didn't change anything in the long run, and the Lakota, like everyone other Indian tribe really, ended on a miserable reservation, dominated by alcoholism, violence and misery.
Is it scary that I wrote this without looking up anything by the way? Probably so, but then I spent most of my childhood reading books on this kind of irrelevant crap. Wait...that kind of reminds me of last week actually, and the week before that. Oh well.
What I found shocking was how the New York Times in 1890 reported on Sitting Bull's death, he was nothing but an old man at that point and it seems disproportionate how they condemn him especially considering the fact that the Indians miserable conditions and exploitation must have been widely known even then.
My favorite quotes:
Did I mention that these things piss me off?
Is it scary that I wrote this without looking up anything by the way? Probably so, but then I spent most of my childhood reading books on this kind of irrelevant crap. Wait...that kind of reminds me of last week actually, and the week before that. Oh well.
What I found shocking was how the New York Times in 1890 reported on Sitting Bull's death, he was nothing but an old man at that point and it seems disproportionate how they condemn him especially considering the fact that the Indians miserable conditions and exploitation must have been widely known even then.
My favorite quotes:
- the arch villain is dead
- [his followers] will be good Indians or prisoners [this of course being a disgusting reference to (I believe) General Sherman's epitome that only a dead Indian were a good Indian]
- the killing of the wily old plotter [part compliment, part insult I guess]
- the savages [interesting about that is the fact that the NY Times basically admits to the attempted arrest being made possible in the first case through a blatant lie by the commanding officer (that he only wanted to talk to Sitting Bull namely), yet no criticism of that is voiced of course]
- the Sioux, with a hideous yell, charged on the police
- the old rascal
- the arch traitor [to whom? To the white men's government that had broken treaty after treaty after treaty?] [..] was an accomplished liar [see above and just beforehand]
Did I mention that these things piss me off?
Tuesday, November 11, 2008
Pop Internationalism
The second book by Paul Krugman in the last few weeks (days really) I've gone through. I found the French title to be more explanatory if less catchy: Le mondialisation n'est pas capable. In any case, the book is simply a collection of essays and speeches that Krugman had written/given trying to dispel certain notions on trade policy in the (American) public and political arena. Even if some of content becomes slightly repetitive after the second or third essay (it a collection after all not a coherent body of work), I found the whole thing a very insightful and helpful read. It has already helped me twice these last days in arguments on trade policy with non-economists (even non-political scientists and it is not like I could even call myself an economist with producing inadvertent laughter within myself).
Krugman fears that public discourse has been decoupled from the scientific economic discourse and would like to try to refute some of the (economic) arguments put forth going against every economic theory or against empirical proof. I am not going to go into detail here, repeating his main arguments, but I most definitely can recommend at least one or two (or all) essays of this volume to most (non-economists) readers.
Krugman fears that public discourse has been decoupled from the scientific economic discourse and would like to try to refute some of the (economic) arguments put forth going against every economic theory or against empirical proof. I am not going to go into detail here, repeating his main arguments, but I most definitely can recommend at least one or two (or all) essays of this volume to most (non-economists) readers.
Sunday, November 09, 2008
La mort est mon métier
Dans une des critiques de Les bienveillantes de Johnathan Littell que j'ai lu le journaliste a fait un référence au fait que cette idée d'écrire un livre de la perspective d'une officier de SS serait rien nouveau, Robert Merle ayant fait là même chose en 1958 déjà. Évidemment, je m'avais promis que je lirais ce bouquin un jour. Je viens (ok, il y a peut-être deux moi) de le trouver dans une librairie à l'occasion à St-Michel. Ces derniers jours n'étant pas si génial que cela (pour des raisons différents, grâce à mes faiblesses autant qu'aux circonstances) j'ai passé beaucoup de temps à lire (rien nouveau, je sais). Alors, j'ai fini La mort est mon métier dans deux, trois jours. Quel bouquin!
La première partie je trouvais beaucoup moins persuasive que la deuxième, dont celle-là Merle décrit l'adolescence de Lang (Rudolf Hoess en vérité, le commandant d'Auschwitz). J'ai trouvé les explications de Merle un peu trop simple dans cette partie, le père cruel, la religion qu'il grandit à détester, l'officier qui lui apprend aimer l'Allemagne, après la chômage, la faim des années de Weimar. Peut-être tout cela et même vrai, je n'en sais rien, et la biographie de Hoess m'est complètement inconnu, mais le portrait semble plutôt à une caricature qu'une vraie personne parfois. Évidemment, et toujours, je critique trop, même la première partie a été super, mais comment vous devriez savoir maintenant, je suis critique.
Dans la deuxième partie Merle décrit comme Hoess devient plus en plus important dans la NSDAP, au début dans le SA, il entre dans le SS et devient même un protégé de quelque sort d'Himmler. Il est nommé commandant d'Auschwitz, même quand il préfère se battre en Russie, et Lang (le protagoniste) commence a raconté d'une manière froide, exacte et sans émotion ses tentatives d'améliorer le camp. Au début comme un camp de travail après quelque temps comme un camp de mort. Je ne crois pas qu'il y ait beaucoup a ajouté, je suis allemand (mon passeport le dit en tout cas) et je me rends compte de l'histoire. Elle est déprimante. L'odeur d'Auschwitz a dû être horrible (désolé mon français est nul, mais je ne trouve pas un meilleur mot) tout le monde y parle. La femme de Lang au milieu de son séjour à Auschwitz a dû découvrir ce que son mari fait, quel horreur. Hoess a été convaincu jusqu'à la fin qu'on ne peut pas le condamner, lui ayant rempli les ordres seulement. Les victimes ne disent rien dans le livre, pas un seul mot, juif, homos, socialistes/communistes, tsiganes (ai-je oublié quelqu'un?), je réaliste qu'il y avait quelques émeutes et Merle dont parle, mais, la silence diffuse l'horreur même plus. Il y a un officier du SS qui se suicide, plus capable de soutenir les sons des victimes dans leur chambre de mots. Évidemment on développe de la sympathie pour cet homme, mais pourquoi? Le suicide n'est-il pas seulement une autre manière de la peur? Il préfère de finir sa vie que faire quelque chose pour ces victimes. Non, il n'aurait pas pu arriver à obstruer beaucoup, mais mourir en essayant n'est pas mieux que s'enfuir?
Lisez-le. La seule chose que moi je ne peux jamais comprendre ayant lu les bouquins quelque chose sur ce sujet, c'est comment on ne peut pas tirer certains leçons. Le nationalisme est mort, je ne peux pas être fier d'un pays, si un pays est capable d'un act comme ce-là. La croyance ne vaut rien, à qui ou à quoi pourrait-on croire? Dieu? Une philosophie? Une façon de gouverner? La morale?
La première partie je trouvais beaucoup moins persuasive que la deuxième, dont celle-là Merle décrit l'adolescence de Lang (Rudolf Hoess en vérité, le commandant d'Auschwitz). J'ai trouvé les explications de Merle un peu trop simple dans cette partie, le père cruel, la religion qu'il grandit à détester, l'officier qui lui apprend aimer l'Allemagne, après la chômage, la faim des années de Weimar. Peut-être tout cela et même vrai, je n'en sais rien, et la biographie de Hoess m'est complètement inconnu, mais le portrait semble plutôt à une caricature qu'une vraie personne parfois. Évidemment, et toujours, je critique trop, même la première partie a été super, mais comment vous devriez savoir maintenant, je suis critique.
Dans la deuxième partie Merle décrit comme Hoess devient plus en plus important dans la NSDAP, au début dans le SA, il entre dans le SS et devient même un protégé de quelque sort d'Himmler. Il est nommé commandant d'Auschwitz, même quand il préfère se battre en Russie, et Lang (le protagoniste) commence a raconté d'une manière froide, exacte et sans émotion ses tentatives d'améliorer le camp. Au début comme un camp de travail après quelque temps comme un camp de mort. Je ne crois pas qu'il y ait beaucoup a ajouté, je suis allemand (mon passeport le dit en tout cas) et je me rends compte de l'histoire. Elle est déprimante. L'odeur d'Auschwitz a dû être horrible (désolé mon français est nul, mais je ne trouve pas un meilleur mot) tout le monde y parle. La femme de Lang au milieu de son séjour à Auschwitz a dû découvrir ce que son mari fait, quel horreur. Hoess a été convaincu jusqu'à la fin qu'on ne peut pas le condamner, lui ayant rempli les ordres seulement. Les victimes ne disent rien dans le livre, pas un seul mot, juif, homos, socialistes/communistes, tsiganes (ai-je oublié quelqu'un?), je réaliste qu'il y avait quelques émeutes et Merle dont parle, mais, la silence diffuse l'horreur même plus. Il y a un officier du SS qui se suicide, plus capable de soutenir les sons des victimes dans leur chambre de mots. Évidemment on développe de la sympathie pour cet homme, mais pourquoi? Le suicide n'est-il pas seulement une autre manière de la peur? Il préfère de finir sa vie que faire quelque chose pour ces victimes. Non, il n'aurait pas pu arriver à obstruer beaucoup, mais mourir en essayant n'est pas mieux que s'enfuir?
Lisez-le. La seule chose que moi je ne peux jamais comprendre ayant lu les bouquins quelque chose sur ce sujet, c'est comment on ne peut pas tirer certains leçons. Le nationalisme est mort, je ne peux pas être fier d'un pays, si un pays est capable d'un act comme ce-là. La croyance ne vaut rien, à qui ou à quoi pourrait-on croire? Dieu? Une philosophie? Une façon de gouverner? La morale?
Wednesday, November 05, 2008
The election and stuff
- Thanks to all you Floridians and North Carolinians (and everyone else) for restoring my faith in the American people that had been fundamentally destroyed in 2004.
- The super majority didn't work out, shame. I guess that was being overtly optimistic though.
- Ted Stevens seems to have gotten reelected to the Senate? That guy was sentenced to prison only a few days ago and these morons put him back into office?
- Talking about a trouncing by the way. Obama winning two maybe three slave states, plus Florida, plus Ohio.
- Funny how all these states I like for a variety of cultural reasons all voted for McCain. Tennesse (Memphis (the Sun Studios!), Nashville (Hank, Waylon, Willie), Mississippi (Faulkner, the Delta, the Hill Country), Louisiana (New Orleans (Fats, Toussaint, Prof Longhair, Bobby Marchan...), Jerry Lee), West Virginia (Hasil Adkins, Copperhead Road).
- Benton, Will, Trav...I am disappointed :)
- Be interesting how Mr 'Yes-we-can' will perform now that he actually has to do something.
- I've said this before, I'll say it again, sometimes I wish that I were less cynic. Don't think I can help it though.
Monday, November 03, 2008
Les Chouans
Balzac. Ce bouquin m'a sérieusement fatigué. L'histoire tragique d'une amour entre une républicaine et un comte. Mais, mais quoi? Tout cela sert à rien, la femme passe des mois (ou des pages) en assurant que le comte lui aime vraiment, elle n'en est jamais sûr et l'aime autant parfois qu'elle le déteste des autres fois. Et oui, j'ai fait des choses bête à cause d'amour (ou ce que j'ai pense a été de l'amour) mais ces deux risquent n'importe quoi (la vie de vingt-trente hommes par exemples) pour se rencontrer pendant cinq minutes (et disputer pendant ce temps). Fatigant. De plus Balzac n'écrit pas d'une façon captivante (dans ce livre et à mon avis en tout cas). Dit-on comme ça, je suis heureux que j'en aie fini, je peux commencer un autre bouquin.
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